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The “Social” in Social Science
Neelanjan Sircar
This dissertation focuses on the consequences of considering social networks in standard
frameworks in political economy and political methodology. The first paper introduces a
game theoretic model where an allocator may distribute benefits over a social network, but
the units in the network may extract rents from the allocator. This amendment to a classic
allocation game generates unique predictions. Units can use their social position to extract
rents and corruption persists in equilibrium. This has major implications for the provision
of local public goods. The second paper derives a general statistical framework for causal
identification in randomized experiments in the presence of spillovers. The paper addresses
a major question in the analysis of randomized experiments and develops a framework that
can be readily applied by practitioners. The third paper analyzes the impact of kinship
networks on political preference formation in rural India. It is shown that kinship networks
help to pool information, generate political discussion and provide explicit coordination of
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This dissertation combines three disparate papers comprising game theory, the statistical
theory of causal inference, and voter behavior in rural India. The tie that binds these papers
together is that they each use social networks theory to extend upon major methodological
or theoretical approaches in political economy.
As one reads through the dissertation, it will become immediately obvious that it is not
intended to be a single, cogent presentation. Rather, the three papers represent separate
research agendas. The underlying motivation to write each of these papers was strikingly
similar. Each of the papers takes a standard framework in political economy or methodology
and demonstrates how things change when one introduces “spillovers” between the units of
study. In broadest terms, a spillover occurs any time changing some outcome of interest
(e.g., vote preference) in one unit affects the same outcome for another unit in the study.
Typically, these spillovers occur through some social relation between the units of study, and
the entire collection of such social relations comprise a social network. In this dissertation, I
will use the term “social network” in a very precise way. It describes a structure containing
two sets, one set describing units for study, and one set describing the presence/absence of
a social relation between any pair of units in the study. In mathematics, this structure is
1
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referred to as a mathematical graph.
1.2 The Three Papers
The three papers in this dissertation address three very different areas of substantive and
methodological inquiry, each of which underscore the importance of considering social net-
works.
1.2.1 On Rent Extraction and Efficient Allocation over Social Networks
This paper develops a formal model of allocation and rent-seeking over a network with local
spillovers. In the model, the allocator is mandated to target every unit in the network, either
directly or through spillovers, and the only source of heterogeneity for units is its position in
the social network. Furthermore, units from the target network are able to extract rents from
the allocator. This is a common structure in political economy, in that there is one principal
and many agents. The most natural applications of the model include: 1) a government
trying to allocate a public good that has local spatial spillovers, such as a school, where
individuals from surrounding areas may also attend the school; and 2) a leader trying to
spread a message through a bureaucratic organization with incentive payments.
On the whole, the model demonstrates the existence of several realistic features that have
generally not been incorporated into models of allocation. This paper shows that the setup
described is only tractable when one considers the social network and, as such, suggests a
revision to existing theories of allocation and rent-seeking. In the model, units are able to
use their positions in the network to extract greater rents from the allocator, and some level
of corruption and rent-seeking persists even in equilibrium. The model also uncovers an
interesting mechanism. While units may use their social position to extract rents from the
allocator, the allocator may engender competition between influential units over the social
network to reduce rent-seeking and corruption.
2
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1.2.2 Analyzing Randomized Experiments with Spillovers
This paper develops a general inferential framework for causal identification in randomized
experiments in the presence of spillovers. Existing approaches focus on models of the un-
derlying stochastic process governing spillovers or a priori knowledge of exactly which units
share spillovers. This paper shows that the researcher may identify causal quantities of inter-
est, without such strong assumptions, by analyzing the experiment with respect to inclusion
probabilities induced by increasingly strong “social distance” restrictions. The social distance
approach characterizes a fully general framework for causal identification in the presence of
spillovers.
This paper has serious implications for practitioners of randomized experiments. First,
and foremost, it describes how spillovers cause difficulties in causal inference and the minimal
assumptions that need to be met for non-parametric causal identification (which is typically
the goal in randomized experiments). Many political economy and policy questions of interest
explicitly deal with spillovers, and sometimes the spillover itself is the quantity of interest.
These questions include anything from understanding the impact of vaccination to the role of
an information campaign in changing practices and attitudes. This paper shows how various
causal quantities of interest may be formed and estimated efficiently, as well as providing a
statistical framework that can be readily used by applied researchers.
1.2.3 A Tale of Two Villages: Kinship Networks and Preference Formation
in Rural India
This study investigates the effect of kinship networks on vote choice and issue preferences
over an electoral campaign in rural India. The study analyzes data collected on political
preferences and kinship networks in two villages just before and after the campaign period
during the 2011 Assembly election in West Bengal. The paper finds very strong kinship
network effects on changes in political opinions and vote choice over a campaign.
While the previous two papers critique methods from game theory and statistical theory,
this paper focuses on theoretical implications of using social networks. This paper shows that
3
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villagers engage in a far broader set of behaviors than is typically assumed in the narrative of
clientelism and patronage, and these behaviors tend to be coordinated over kinship networks.
Specifically, the paper finds that individuals use kinship networks to pool salient political
information, engage in political discussion and coordinate political behavior. The kinship
network also provides a space that is insulated from other political actors and engenders the
independence of the voter. This shows that social structure and personal networks can help
mitigate difficulties associated with weak state capacity, low information, lack of urbaniza-
tion, and poor education in democratic developing countries and generate stable democratic
practice.
1.3 Discussion
Many of the discussions in this dissertation revolve around methodological issues. For political
scientists, what we say matters as much as how we say it. Standards of methodological
rigor, whether in the statistical standards of causal inference or deductive standards of game
theory, must generally be met; when they are not met, we must try to understand how
our methods deviate from them. Unfortunately, the introduction of social networks into
the analysis often complicates things. In my own work, I have rarely faced resistance to
the theoretical principles of social interconnectedness affecting the things that we study.
Rather, hesitation to use theories of social networks in one’s analysis has stemmed from
methodological difficulties. Each of these papers contains a difficult methodological problem
(whether mathematical or statistical) and attempts to solve the issue in the course of the
paper. The hope is that many of the methodological tools discussed in these three papers
will help political scientists rigorously study a broader array of topics. The general treatment
on the analysis of randomized experiments in the presence of spillovers will be of particular
interest to practitioners.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to suggest that the only motivation for this
dissertation is methodological. Substantively, this project aims to demonstrate how we think
about politics changes radically when we move from atomistic individuals as the units of
4
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analysis to a universe where the units of study are interconnected. The introduction of
social relations and social networks allow the researcher to consider a host of behaviors that
cannot be easily addressed in the atomistic world. When units are connected, they have an
increased capacity to cooperate and coordinate actions together. They may, in the extreme,
not even choose to make decisions for themselves, choosing instead mimic the actions of a
social relation. Social networks can also be used to describe hierarchy and power relations.
One can characterize units that are more central in a social network, and those that are more
isolated, and may even characterize the direction a spillover flows between each pair of units
(as in a directed network).
While the dissertation often deals with abstract notions of social networks, my own moti-
vation to study social networks comes from something more concrete. Much of my substantive
work has focused on political behavior in India. One of the most striking features of study-
ing the Indian system is precisely the prominent role played by larger social structures, like
religion, caste, and family, in all spheres of life. The political economy literature on India has
had occasion to consider, for instance, the role of caste in voting behavior and patronage,
nepotism in candidate selection, and the structure of relations created as individuals migrate
from rural to urban areas. Each of these major research agendas puts social relations at the
center of the analysis. As I began to search for a topic to study, I found many of the existing
tools in political economy inadequate to study the prominent structural concerns in Indian
society, and I began to look to theories of social networks. In order to develop this perspec-
tive, many of the concepts used in the dissertation have been borrowed from sociology, which
has had a long-standing engagement with the power of social networks.
However, as network theory is still relatively young in political science, I have chosen to
remain agnostic on some of the central debates in sociology regarding social structure. In
particular, the functionalist position (Parsons, 1951) argues that outcomes cannot be simply
boiled down to individual, rational actions. Rather, the outcomes we observe are often
the result of the larger social structure and the social norms that govern it. By contrast,
exchange theory (Homans, 1958) argued that individual actions are impacted by the larger
5
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social structure and social networks but that all outcomes can be boiled down to decisions
by individual agents. At the core of this debate is the utility of methodological individualism
in explaining larger social outcomes. My paper on the impact of kinship network seems to
be much more strongly in the functionalist tradition. In reality, however, the duration of
the study is too short to observe changes in the kinship network, so there is room for non-
functionalist interpretation of the results as the shape of kinship networks can respond to
individual behavior in the long run. My game theory paper on rent-seeking over a network,
by contrast, seems to be much more firmly in the tradition of exchange theory. However, in
the paper, agents make fairly simple decisions and interact over a fixed social network that
they cannot change, which introduces shades of functionalism.
As the literature on social networks in political science grows, we will once again begin
to engage in the same theoretical debates described above. However, in order to get to that




On Rent Extraction and Efficient
Allocation over Social Networks
Abstract
This paper develops a model of allocation and rent-seeking over a network with local
spillovers. In the model, the allocator is mandated to target every vertex in the network,
either directly or through spillovers, and the only source of heterogeneity for vertices
is network position. Furthermore, members of the target network are able to extract
rents from the allocator. The model is generally tractable, and the paper identifies
several concepts to understand the level of rent-seeking and patterns of allocation over the
network. In general, the allocator may use the network structure to engender competition
between vertices to limit rents, while the vertices may use privileged positions in the
network to extract greater rents from the allocator.
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CHAPTER 2. ON RENT EXTRACTION AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OVER
SOCIAL NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
This paper develops a model of allocation and rent-seeking over a network with local spillovers.
In the model, the allocator is mandated to target every vertex in the network, either directly
or through local spillovers, but the vertices in the network can extract rents from the alloca-
tor.1
It is shown that the allocator may use the network structure to engender competition
between vertices to limit rents, while the vertices may use privileged positions in the net-
work to extract greater rents from the allocator. The model is quite flexible and generally
tractable, yielding, at times, quite surprising results about inefficiencies in allocation. This
model has practical implications for those scenarios that can be modeled as “location prob-
lems,” common in the study of communication networks, word-of-mouth advertising, diffusion
of technology, and public goods provision. This paper is among the first to address the re-
lationship between central allocation of goods and rent extraction in contexts with local,
network-like spillovers.
In the two-period game, each vertex requests a rent, and the allocator determines the
most efficient way to target the population, inclusive of rents.
Since the setting is a social network, the model simultaneously describes social hetero-
geneity (structure of the entire network) and variation in social status (network position for
each vertex). In equilibrium, there is variation in each vertex’s rent-seeking capabilities, re-
sulting from its position in the network. However, both the allocator’s optimal allocation
strategy and the rents extracted in equilibrium are mediated by the entire network structure.
While each vertex tries to extract as much in rents as possible, the allocator can mitigate
rent extraction by inducing competition between the vertices over rents. We use this model
to shed light on several key concepts:
1. The allocator never needs to allocate to vertices that are sufficiently distant from other
1I would like to thank Alessandra Casella, Macartan Humphreys, Matthew Jackson, Jeffrey Lax, Debasis
Mishra, Massimo Morelli, Pierce O’Reilly, Arunava Sen, David Siegel, Michael Ting, Johannes Urpelainen,
Timothy Van Zandt, participants at the 12th Social Choice and Welfare Conference, and seminars at Columbia
University and at the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi for useful comments and conversations in shaping this
paper. All errors are my own.
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(all but one) vertices. Such vertices never extract rents from the allocator. Conversely,
vertices with a high status network position are able to extract rents from the allocator.
2. In many cases, the most efficient equilibrium entails the allocator paying rents.
3. More socially integrated populations (where vertices are more connected) may actually
cause greater inefficiency and rent extraction in equilibrium due to reduced competition
between vertices.
4. The presence of multiple high status vertices may dampen the ability of each vertex to
extract rents in equilibrium due to increased competition over rents.
5. The allocator may be able to increase efficiency by reducing the number of vertices that
receive allocation in order to engender competition between the vertices.
This paper proceeds in 5 sections. Section 2 describes the substantive problem and
describes how social networks offer an insight into our problem, as well as stating the game
in formal terms. Section 3 derives the subgame perfect Nash equilbria of the game and
discusses the role of coalition-proofness in this setting. Section 5 uses examples of equilibria
to shed light on the relationship, and pathologies, between allocation and rent-seeking over
the network. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Framing the Problem
2.2.1 Examples
In this paper, the allocator targets a pre-defined network as efficiently as possible by either
targeting vertices directly or their neighbors in the network through local spillovers. At the
same time, the vertices may extract rents from the allocator. Below, a few applications of
the problem considered in this paper are discussed.2
2At this point, one should be clear about the bounds of the targeting problem. A seemingly related
problem, that of a profit-maximizing allocator over a network turns out to be a very different mathematical
problem. Rather than attempting to target an entire population, a profit-maximizing allocator allows access
to a subset of the target population up until the point where the marginal cost of providing the object exceeds
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Advertising. There is a large literature on word-of-mouth advertising and viral mar-
keting (see Goyal (2003) for a survey of the literature). Imagine that a marketer wants to
spread the word about a new Facebook application over a pre-defined population, and wants
to do so as cheaply as possible. The marketer faces some cost for enlisting each new person
to try the application (either in money or time). One feature of Facebook is that as soon
as an individual uses an application, every Facebook friend sees the application has been
used on her “news feed.” A network can be modeled where the vertices are individuals and a
link exists between two individuals if they are Facebook friends. The goal is thus to identify
the smallest set of individuals to enlist in order to make sure that each person has either
used the application or heard about it on her news feed. However, if individuals realize
their attractiveness to marketers, they may ask for a higher price in exchange for trying the
application.
Facility Location. Facility location is a major subject in operations research (see Daskin
(1995) for a much more general overview of the field), but a particular application is addressed
here. Imagine a town planner wants to ensure that each person in a village (where each person
is deemed to live on some small plot of land) has access to a well. The planner determines
that a well will be deemed accessible by the individual if it the center of the plot with the
well is within a half-kilometer of the center (i.e. centroid distance is less than or equal to a
half-kilometer) of the plot of the individual. Thus, a network for this situation can be formed
by defining the vertices to be plots of land, where a link exists between two plots of lands if
the distance between their centers is less than or equal to a half-kilometer. The goal is thus
to determine the fewest plots of land upon which to build wells in order to make sure that
each inhabitant has access to a well. However, an individual with particularly well-located
land may ask for greater compensation in providing the land towards the well.
Spreading Information/Propaganda. A political party wants to deliver informa-
tion/rumors/propaganda among party supporters and recruits people in the population to
work for the party full-time or part-time (see, for instance, Galeotti and Goyal (2009) for a
the marginal benefit in targeting more individuals. For instance, this would occur where the marginal cost of
building a well exceeds the benefit to the town planner of additional people with water access.
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similar logic in marketing). The party wants to make sure that each supporter receives an
amount of propaganda equivalent what would come from a single person working full-time.
This is a divisible allocation because the party can employ a single person full-time or, for
instance, three people at one-third time, where wages are proportional to the amount of
time worked. Communication between neighbors in the network is costless. The vertices are
the individual party supporters and the links represent social access. The goal is make sure
that each party member receives access to some minimum amount of party propaganda as
cheaply as possible. However, a particularly crucial individual in the party network may ask
for greater benefits in carrying out propaganda duties.
2.2.2 Relevant Literature
The question of determining an efficient allocation, as a decision-theoretic problem, is quite
similar to the idea of finding key individuals in a network, which has a been a recent focus of
social networks literature in economics. Galeotti and Goyal (2009) discuss a problem quite
similar to this paper, where firms decide on individuals to target within the network with
information about a product in order to optimize profits, under the assumption that these
individuals share the information with their neighbors. However, they simplify the problem
by assuming that the firms have very low information about the network, knowing only the
degree distribution of vertices in the network, whereas the structure and shape of networks
is central to the analysis of this paper.3 Unlike many applications of game theory, complete
information about the network is actually a significantly more mathematically demanding
problem than the incomplete information case.
Ballester et al. (2006) identify a single key individual in a criminal network. Here, the
authors consider a fairly general model of spillovers (substitutable and complementary) over
a network and discuss how to compute each person’s influence in the network using simple
results from exchange theory in mathematical sociology. These measures of network influence
relate to the number of paths going through the vertex. However, as this paper shows, it
3This allows the authors to avoid complications resulting from various structures of the network and focus
on standard results from game theory (e.g., those resulting from stochastic dominance).
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turns out that the problem of finding a single key individual and multiple key individuals are
quite different mathematical problems.
This paper shares similarities to Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), which uses the same
structure of spillovers. They model a decentralized structure where individuals invest in a
locally non-excludable good where the sum of contributions of two neighbors must always
equal a fixed value. This paper differs in two ways. First, this paper models the interaction
of an allocator and a target population, in addition to the members of the population with
each other, which allows for consideration of both the optimal allocation over a network and
rent extraction from the allocator.4 Second, without rent extraction concerns the allocator
can always provide the most efficient allocation over a network. Thus, this framework allows
us to consider the extent of deviations from the most efficient allocation over a network due
to rent extraction. Finally, the equilibria in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) amount to the
decentralized provision of a good with local spillovers. Comparison with these equilibria allow
us to make claims about the relative efficiency of decentralized provision versus centralized
provision, net of rents, of goods with local spillovers.
2.2.3 Formalizing Spillovers
We assume that there exists some social distance metric over the population for a given good
e, ρe, where the social distance between any two vertices, x and y, is represented as ρe(x, y).
Let a∗ denote a vertex receiving positive allocation. A vertex, x, is deemed to be targeted if
ρe(a
∗, x) < ρe, ρe ∈ R.
Let the set V , with cardinality n, denote the set of vertices in the target population, and let
S denote the set of n(n−1)2 edges that can be formed from the elements of V . We will let E ⊆ S
denote the set of edges over which spillovers occur, i.e. E = {(x, y) | ρ(x, y) < ρe, (x, y) ∈ S}
4There is virtually no literature on rent extraction in networks. The closest literature is a formal and
experimental literature in sociology on exchange networks. An exchange network is a social network along
which dyads of the network may bargain and make exchanges, where resources accrued to an individual in the
network are seen to be a function of her network position. Within this literature there are several papers (e.g.
Markovsky et al. (1988), Bienenstock and Bonacich (1993), and Bonacich (1987)) that develop axiomatic and
game theoretic approaches to measures of power as a function of network position. In our model, instead of
this power resulting from exchanges in the population, the power results from an increased ability to extract
from the allocator, which leads to very different results.
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. Using this this information, we can construct a graph (network), G, from V (vertices ) and
E (edges) as a representation of the structure of potential spillovers over the population.
Formally, we define the graph as a pair G = 〈V,E〉, where V will denote the vertices and
E will denote the edges of the graph . We will refer to the set of vertices linked to a vertex
v as the neighbors of v and denote the set as N(v), where the number of neighbors for v,
|N(v)|, will be referred to as the degree of v . Finally, it will be useful in our proofs to refer
to dominating sets. A dominating set, D ⊆ V is a set of vertices such that every vertex in V
is either in D or a neighbor of a vertex in D.
(a) A Patron (b) Pure Private Good (c) Pure Public Good (d) Complex Spillovers
Figure 2.1: Some Graphs/Networks
Figure 2.1(a) represents a “star” graph with an obvious important vertex, where a good will be accessible
to the whole population only if it allocated to the central vertex or to the other 4 vertices. Figure 2.1(b)
represents a particularistic good with isolated vertices. Figure 2.1(c) represents a “complete” graph which
represents a pure public good. Figure 2.1(d) represents a slightly more complicated graph where the good
will be accessible to the entire population if it allocated to the central or bottom vertices, but not otherwise.
Two points are worth noting here. First, by definition, spillovers only move over one link
in the network. If one stumbles upon a network where spillovers move over multiple links,
then such a network can be rewritten in a “reduced form” where a link is drawn between any
pair of vertices over which spillovers are possible. Second, this exposition uses undirected
networks for clarity of exposition and intuitive appeal. However, the approach is perfectly
applicable to directed network, where results regarding the degree of a vertex are replaced
by the “in-degree” of a vertex, the number of vertices from which a particular vertex receives
spillovers.
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The scenario is modeled as a simple two-period game, where the vertices move first, requesting
rents. In the second period, the allocator determines the most efficient way to target the
entire population with a local spillover good, given the requested rents. This is usually a
straightforward exercise in most settings, but the problem is complicated by the fact that
game takes place over network.
Let G = 〈V,E〉 be a graph where V represents vertices in the target population, and E
those edges along which potential spillovers can occur. G will be assumed to be connected;
that is, there exists a “path” between any two vertices in the network.5 In the first period,
the vertices, i ∈ V , request a rent or private good, ri ≥ 0, and the objective of each vertex will
be to maximize her personal rents. The allocator will allocate a local spillover good, where
the vertex that has directly received the good as well as her neighbors benefit, in a manner
that targets the entire population (discussed below). Crucially, the allocator must also pay
the requested rents associated with those vertices directly receiving the local spillover good
(or any portion thereof). The goal of the allocator is to minimize costs of allocating this local
spillover good over the entire population, inclusive of rents.6
Let the allocator provide a level of goods, ei, where i ∈ V (G). Two versions of the
game will be considered, when ei ∈ {0, 1}, the indivisible allocation, and when ei ∈ [0, 1],
the divisible allocation. In the indivisible allocation, the allocator may only allocate the
good as a whole or not at all, as in a building. In the divisible allocation, the allocator
may allocate fractions of the good, as in scenarios where money equivalents of the good are
being considered.7 A population will be targeted if the sum of allocations to each vertex or a
5All of these results can be generalized, using the fact that all graphs are a union of connected components.
6In this game, we will assume that the allocator can neither receive side payments nor has ability issues;
she is only interested in targeting the entire population as efficiently as possible. This allows us to focus on
inefficiencies that result from the structure of the network, rather than focusing on the characteristics of the
allocator.
7Simple examples include the central government paying for levels of pollution reduction in particular
regions, where the pollution has spatial spillovers, or word-of-mouth advertising where the advertiser pays for
level of effort in advertising towards the units of the population.
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neighbor reaches a fixed amount (which will be normalized to 1), where the allocator aims to








ej ≥ 1 for all i ∈ V (2.2.1)
Define the space of possible allocations, e, that satisfy the targeting constraint (
∑
j∈N(i)∪i ej ≥
1 for all j) as E(G) and the space of allocations solving the targeting problem in (2.2.1) as
E∗(G) ⊆ E(G).8 Those vertices i receiving ei > 0 will be referred to as allocated vertices,












Figure 2.2: Some Examples of Efficient Allocations that Solve the Targeting Problem
Figure 2.2 shows examples of efficient allocations that solve the targeting problem with the numbers indi-
cating the investment in each vertex. Figure 2.2(a) represents an indivisible allocation since each vertex
receives either a 0 or 1. Furthermore, contrary to standard intuitions, the vertex with the highest degree
does not receive investment from the allocator in the efficient allocation. Figure 2.2(b) shows a divisible
allocation since vertices receive investments between 0 and 1. Under such a situation, we expect a more
evenly distributed allocation as compared to an indivisible allocation. Efficient allocations are discussed in
detail in appendix B.
8The setup of the targeting problem implicitly assumes anonymity, since the cost is not a function of specific
vertices, and perfect substitutability, since allocating 1
2
to neighboring vertices is as costly as allocating 1 to
a single vertex. These assumptions allow for a focus on network intuitions in the analysis and make sure that
vertices are not differentiated in any way other than by network position.
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Formal Statement
Let some population distributed according to a network G, with n = |V |. Let ei be the
allocation to i ∈ V , with ei ∈ {0, 1} (indivisible) or ei ∈ [0, 1] (divisible). Let each i ∈ V have
utility ui(ei, ri), where
∂ui
∂ri
, ∂ui∂ei > 0.
9 The cost of the allocation to the allocator is a function
of a non-negative request vector r and a feasible allocation e. We define C : 2V (G)×RN+ → R+
as C(J, r) = mine
∑
J(ei+ ri), where J is the set of vertices receiving positive allocation such
that every vertex in the population is targeted directly or indirectly through spillovers. This
represents the cost associated with efficient allocation given that a particular set of vertices
receive positive allocation and a particular profile of rent requests.
















ej ≥ 1 for all i ∈ V (G), where I = {v|ev > 0}
(2.2.2)
We will denote the space of allocations, e, satisfying (2.2.2) as EC(G, r). It will be shown
that the solutions to the set of allocations in the decision-theoretic problem will always be
part of some equilibrium; that is, E∗(G) ⊆ EC(G, r). It will further be shown that E∗(G) is
identical to the set of feasible allocations satisfying the game under coalition proofness.
The game play is as follows:
1. Each i ∈ V (G) selects requests some rent, ri ≥ 0.
2. The allocator selects some e and pays
∑
I(ei+ri), where I is the set of vertices receiving
positive allocation, subject to the constraint that
∑
j∈N(i)∪i
ej ≥ 1 for all i ∈ V (G)
9It turns out that ei is an extraneous parameter in the vertex’s utility function. Intuitively, this implies
that a vertex’s private valuation in the good does not affect game play.
16
CHAPTER 2. ON RENT EXTRACTION AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OVER
SOCIAL NETWORKS
We will assume that the allocator chooses with uniform probability between solutions
that minimize cost (that is, she chooses between identical cost ).
2.3 Equilibrium
In this game, the allocator will attempt to minimize the sum of the rents paid to allocated
vertices and the aggregate cost of the allocation. One might believe that the vertices in the
network can arbitrarily raise requests, and thus costs, to the allocator. However, this non-
cooperative framework puts restrictions on this behavior, as each vertex is competing with
other vertices over the network for rents.10 Each vertex, then, is bound by the threat of the
allocator choosing to allocate to other vertices, what will be called a binding set.
Definition 2.3.1. For a given request vector, r, and as set of allocated vertices, I, a set Bi
is called a binding set of i ∈ I if it solves
Bi = arg min
S
C(S, r)− C(I, r) where i /∈ S
The existence of a binding set for a vertex will ensure tractability of the model since it
represents a threat for the allocator to deviate by allocating to other vertices; otherwise, a
vertex could extract an arbitrarily high level of rents from the allocator. Thankfully, binding
sets exist quite generally, as it always exists as long as the vertex is not isolated, i.e. as long
as it has neighbors in the network.11
Theorem 2.3.2. If G has no isolated vertices, there exists a binding set for each i ∈ V (G).
Proof: The set V (G) \ {i} is a dominating set in G for each i ∈ V (G). It follows that
some subset of V (G) \ {i} forms a binding set for each i ∈ V (G).
10Although it is not discussed in this paper, one can use the setup here to describe a transferable utility
framework through potential functions. The trick is to establish an equivalence between a vertex’s marginal
contribution and the rent extracted in equilibrium (??).
11In the context of directed networks, the conditions for theorem 2.3.2 would be that the vertex is the target
of spillovers from some other vertex in the network.
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(c) Another Binding Set
on a Square
Figure 2.3: Binding Sets
The two sets of graphs show some graphs and the binding set for a particular vertex on the graphs shaded
in gray. The bold numbers outside the circles denote amounts given to allocated vertices, and the numbers
inside the circles denote requests. In 2.3(a), the we show the binding set of the vertex with degree 2. In
2.3(b) and 2.3(c), we show the the binding set for the vertex in the upper right corner of the square. As the
last two figures show, efficient allocation and the binding set depend upon the rent requests, even on the
same graph.
In figure 2.3, we display those allocations and allocated vertices that reach the minimum
cost bound for the allocator, as well as binding sets for specific vertices.12 We see that both the
allocated vertices and the binding sets are dependent upon the shape of the network and the
profile of requests. The allocated vertices in figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) show allocated vertices
and allocations that are consistent with the efficient investment over the graphs. However,
if a vertex requests too much, as in 2.3(c), the allocator may be forced to select allocated
vertices and allocations inconsistent with the efficient solution to the targeting problem. In
figure 2.3(a) we see that if vertices with neighbors of degree 1 are allocated vertices, then
those vertices of degree 1 must be included in the binding set of that vertex. Figures 2.3(b)
and 2.3(c) both display binding sets for the top right vertex of the graph. Here, we see that
different allocations may yield similar binding sets over the same graph.
12Intuitively, this a way to visualize the best response function for the allocator.
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In equilibrium behavior, vertices will adjust positive requests to ensure inclusion as an
allocated vertex. Thus, it should be clear that the bottom right vertex in 2.3(c) will lower
her request to ensure an allocation similar to that of 2.3(b). Similarly, in 2.3(b), all vertices
beside the bottom right vertex should realize that they can request more and still be included
as an allocated vertex. As we will show in some detail below, equilibrium behavior entails
each vertex extracting as much as possible from the allocator without giving it the incentive
to shift to the allocated vertices corresponding to its binding set.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game can now be characterized:
Theorem 2.3.3. Assume there exists a binding set for each j ∈ J . Then, an SPNE exists
and the set of SPNE is characterized by the following conditions:
1. Let J be the set of vertices receiving positive allocation in equilibrium. For each j ∈ J :
C(J, r∗) ≤ C(K, r∗)− r∗k for all sets K such that j /∈ K, k ∈ K \ J
2. Define the efficient allocation with allocated vertices J as e∗. For each j ∈ J , define the
most efficient allocation to the vertices of Bj as e
Bj . The equilibrium request vector,
r∗, is any request vector satisfying the two conditions below:
(a) For each j ∈ J , each k ∈ Bj \ J makes the request r∗k = 0
(b) For each j ∈ J :












Corollary 2.3.4. If a SPNE exists, there is always a SPNE characterized by the following
three conditions:
• The allocator solves its decision-theoretic problem to determine an allocation and the
corresponding set of allocated vertices, I, i.e. e∗ ∈ E∗(G)
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• Each vertex v ∈ V (G) \ I requests r∗v = 0.











The equilibrium in corollary 2.3.4 constitutes a particularly robust equilibrium that gen-
erally exists and is not susceptible to coalitional deviations (as shown below).
2.3.1 Examples
We now discuss a few simple examples. Intuitively, a vertex connected to vertices of degree
1 will be able to extract more in rents. The examples below show the basic idea.
The graph in figure 2.4(c) shows that a vertex linked to other vertices of degree 1 is
in a privileged position in being able to extract rents, irrespective of the rest of the graph.
However, if the vertex is only linked to a single vertex of degree 1, then it might not be able
to extract rents. The next, fairly straightforward, theorem makes this idea more precise.
Theorem 2.3.5. If some vertex has two vertices of degree 1 as neighbors, it can always
extract rents greater than or equal to 1 in equilibrium.
We now discuss the SPNE of the square example that has been used in our discussion
of efficient divisible allocations and binding sets above. The unique equilibrium is shown in
figure 2.5.
Let us analyze equilbrium behavior of vertices in making their requests. Once again,
we focus attention on the vertex on the upper right, vertex B. Sticking with our earlier
convention, the efficient targeting will be over the set I and the binding set of B will be
denoted as BB.
The cost to the allocator for the graph in figure 2.6(a) is C(I, r) = 13×4+rA+rB+rC+rD,
and cost for the graph is 2.6(b) is C(BB, r) = 12 × 3 + rA + rC + rD. Thus it follows that the
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(c) Various Abilities to Extract Rents
Figure 2.4: Various Equilibria
Figure 2.4(a) shows an equilibrium request with all players requesting 0, since the allocator can just choose
any vertex in the population whereas figure 2.4(a) shows the center of a claw graph or 3-star is able to
extract positive rents. The graph in 2.4(c) shows that a vertex connected to many vertices of degree 1 is








Figure 2.5: SPNE of a Square
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(b) Binding Set for B
Figure 2.6: Illustrating the SPNE on a Square
Figure 2.6(a) represents an arbitrary profile of requests over a square and 2.6(b) represents the binding set
for B.
allocator chooses the allocation in figure 2.6(a) as long as:
C(I, r) ≤ C(BB, r) ⇒
1
3
× 4 + rA + rB + rC + rD ≤
1
2
× 3 + rA + rC + rD ⇒ rB ≤
1
6
It follows that B is included in the allocation as long as rB ≤ 16 . Since B attempts to extract
as much as possible, this inequality will bind, so rB =
1
6 in equilibrium. A similar calculation
follows for each of the remaining three vertices.
The square example is interesting because it forces us to distinguish between rent-seeking
behavior and social inequality. By one normative standard, the equilibrium over a square
is an ideal scenario because each vertex receives an identical share of goods. On the other
hand, the fact that each vertex receives positive allocation allows each vertex to extract rents
from the allocator. This scenario requires us to think carefully about the tradeoff between
egalitarianism and corruption. In the next section, we return to the square example to devise
a scheme that will reduce rents (and increase efficiency of the equilibrium) but lead to greater
inequality in goods allocated over the network.
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2.3.2 Refining Equilibria
In this section, we discuss some abstract properties of the equilibria. First, we show that all
equilibria may not be efficient. In this case, we define an efficient equilibrium as the lowest






























Figure 2.7: Efficient and Inefficient Equilibria
Figure 2.7(a) shows an efficient equilibrium and figure 2.7(b) shows an inefficient equilbrium over the same
graph. This occurs because the two vertices receiving allocation in the efficient equilibrium must coordinate
their requests together. Since Nash equilibrium logic does not allow for such coordination, we end up with
an inefficient equilibrium in the right panel.
The problem in the above example is that the two vertices in the center of the diamonds
(which should receive allocation in equilibrium) need to coordinate their rent requests. Since
the Nash concept does not allow for this, this creates a higher cost equilibrium. We are
naturally interested in how refinements might allow us to select the minimum cost equilibrium.
We might feel the solution concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is not restrictive
enough in that it does not allow deviations by a coalition of vertices. We investigate this
refinement of the SPNE concept by allowing for some coordination while maintaining the
non-cooperative environment. A refinement that makes sense here is that of a coalition-proof
Nash equilbria (Bernheim et al., 1987) which allow subpopulations of the entire network to
make self-enforcing contracts. In other words, a coalition may coordinate upon a deviating
strategy if members of the coalition are made better off by the deviation, and the deviating
strategy does not allow further deviation from a subcoalition. A more restrictive refinement is
the concept of strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959), which requires that there be no coalitional
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deviation which increases the utility of each vertex. In order to guarantee tractability, we
will assume that that allocator prefers to allocate to the set of vertices containing the entire
deviating coalition.13 Theorem 2.3.6 shows that all coalition-proof equilibria give positive
allocation to the same set of vertices and have identical costs.
Theorem 2.3.6. The SPNE is coalition-proof if and only if e∗ ∈ E∗(G). That is, the allocated
vertices in equilibrium correspond to the vertices receiving positive allocation in the efficient
solution to the targeting problem if and only the equilibrium is coalition-proof. All equilibria
are of identical cost to the allocator.
Corollary 2.3.7. Every SPNE is a strong equilibrium unless there exist some i, j ∈ I under
the equilibrium request, r∗, where and i ∈ Bj and j ∈ Bi and C(Bj , r∗) = C(Bi, r∗).
2.4 Implications of Equilibrium
2.4.1 Internalizing Rent Demands
In this subsection, we investigate how the rent request of vertex is affected by the rent request
of other vertices in the graph. We begin by analyzing a graph that is a hybrid of the other
cases we have discussed. In this example one part of the graph constitutes a square and
another part includes a vertex that is connected to two vertices of degree 1. The unique
equilibrium is shown in figure 2.8.
The graphs in figure 2.9 represent the request strategy of vertex F and of surrounding
vertices. We can draw two lessons about competition across vertices from this example.
First, the vertices in the binding set for F that are not allocated vertices must request 0 in
equilibrium. Secondly, vertices that request non-zero rents and are not in the binding set of
F actually hurt F ’s ability to extract rents in equilibrium. The allocator will select the those
vertices receiving positive allocation in the efficient solution to the targeting problem, which
we denote by I.
13These terms are generally used in a normal form game. For our purposes, we will use these terms to refer
to the induced game in the first stage from using backwards induction on the action of the allocator.
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(b) Binding Set for F when rE ≤ 16
Figure 2.9: Illustrating the SPNE
Figure 2.9(a) represents a profile of requests on the graph where the requests on the square are as shown in
figure 2.8. Figure 2.9(b) represents the binding set for vertex F .
In figure 2.9(a) and 2.9(b) , we show a profile of requests where the requests of E, F , G,
andH are arbitrary except for the fact that rE ≤ 16 (so that we have the correct binding set).
14
The cost to allocator for allocation to the allocated vertices is C(I, r) = 13×4+
1
6×4+1+rF .
The cost to the allocator for allocation to the binding set of F is C(BF , r) = 1× 4 + 16 + rE +
14We will also show that rE = 0 in equilibrium, so the assumption does not actually rule out any equilibria.
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rG + rH . Then, the allocator selects I if:
C(I, r) ≤ C(BF , r) ⇒ rF ≤
7
6
+ rE + rG + rH
Once again, in equilibrium, the constraint will bind, so rF =
7
6 + rE + rG + rH . We now
show that rE = rG = rH = 0 in equilibrium. Assume, towards a contradiction and without
loss of generality, that rE > 0. There exists some r
′
E such that 0 < r
′
E < rE . Then we have
rF =
7




E + rG + rH . Hence, E has an incentive to deviate
and request r′E since this would give her some rents where as the allocation to I would give
her no rents. This shows that vertices in a binding set but not in the set of allocated vertices
will request no rents in equilibrium. Thus, rF =
7
6 .




3 × 4 + 1
]
= 53 . However, we see that F is only able to extract
7
6 in equilibrium.
The reason this occurs is because vertices A, B, Cand D all request 16 . Thus, while cost
of allocating to the binding set is significantly higher, the allocator saves by not having to
pay the total 23 in rents resulting from the requests of A, B, C and D. This shows that the
extraction power of an allocated vertex is hurt by not having other allocated vertices that
can extract positive rents in its binding set.
Without network structure, this game operates under two conflicting logics. On one hand,
a group that knows the allocator cannot credibly exit the negotiations can extract large rents
from the allocator by behaving cooperatively. On the other hand, if the allocator knows that it
will only have to allocate to some subset of the population (in order to target everyone), then
it can induce competition between vertices to make sure there is no rent extraction. Network
structure allows us to reconcile these logics to get a tractable non-cooperative solution in
equilibrium. In particular, allocators are able to use competition between vertices to keep
rent extraction down. At the same time, vertices are able to take advantage of their position
in the network structure in order to extract rents from the allocator because she cannot exit.
A vertex that receives allocation in equilibrium experiences two factors that curb her
ability to extract rents in equilibrium. First, it faces competition from vertices that do not
26
CHAPTER 2. ON RENT EXTRACTION AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OVER
SOCIAL NETWORKS
receive allocation in equilibrium; such vertices lower their rents as much as possible to be
attractive to the allocator (but ultimately still fail to receive allocation). The second factor
is more interesting. Other vertices that receive allocation in equilibrium, but are not a part
of the binding set, also limit rents. This implies that beyond competition between vertices,
the mere presence of other powerful vertices in the population can limit rent extraction.
2.4.2 Adding Links
The next two subsections deal with the notion of equilibrium efficiency. First, we look at
the situation where we add links to the graph. We might believe that as we add links to the
graph, we should move “monotonically” towards a more efficient solution, since a complete
graph represents a globally non-excludable good (and the most efficient allocation possible).
However, as we show, adding links to graph may increase the ability of a vertex to extract
rents in equilibrium, and we may actually create a more inefficient equilibrium if adding links
induces less competition between vertices over rents.
It is easy to see that adding links never decreases the efficiency of the investment for the
allocator. On the other hand, we might think that adding links decreases rents in equilibrium.
This turns out to be false. The simple example in figure shows that rents might actually
increase in equilibrium after adding links.
Simply adding links to a graph may actually strengthen a vertex vis-a-vis other vertices
in the graph because adding a link to a vertex always increases its rent extraction position.
Thus, adding links can induce countervailing effects, increasing the efficiency of the targeting
but also increasing rent extraction. As the next example shows, adding links to a graph may
actually induce less efficiency in equilibrium.
This subsection shows that while adding links to graph may create greater efficiency
in allocation, there may be countervailing effects in terms of rent extraction which could
potentially lead to more inefficient outcomes. First, links can strengthen the rent extraction
capabilities of a vertex relative to other vertices. Second, adding links may actually reduce
competition for rents between vertices, which is necessary to exert a downward pressure on
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(b) Adding a Link
Figure 2.10: Increasing Rents by Adding a Link



















(b) Adding a Link
Figure 2.11: Decreasing Efficiency by Adding a Link
Figure 2.11(b) adds a link to figure2.11(a), but the increase in rents more than offsets in the increase in
efficiency of the allocation. In this case, adding a link decreases the competition between vertices over rents.
rent extraction.
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2.4.3 Domination Efficiency
In this subsection, we discuss a mechanism to potentially increase efficiency and decrease
rent extraction. In particular, we introduce a useful concept, domination efficiency,15 to
determine when the allocator should restrict the number vertices receiving positive allocation.
The intuition here is that the allocator may induce competition between vertices for rents by
limiting the number of vertices receiving positive allocation.
Definition 2.4.1. A k-game is a game where the allocator is restricted to give positive
allocation to at most k vertices in the graph G. In other words, the allocator selects the most
efficient allocation when positive allocation is restricted to at most k vertices in the graph,
subject to the restriction that each vertex in the population meets the targeting constraint.
In order to see why the allocator might want to restrict the number of vertices, consider
the example of the square. By potentially allowing for positive allocation to all 4 vertices,
i.e. a 4-game, the allocator actually ends up spending more in equilibrium. In the 3-game,
the allocator gives an allocation of 12 to each of 3 vertices. But since only 3 vertices will
receive allocation, the vertices compete to included as allocated vertices. In the 2-game, the


























(c) An Equilibrium in a 2-
game
Figure 2.12: Illustrating k-games on a Square
15We refer to this type of efficiency as domination efficiency because all feasible allocation give positive
allocations to a dominating set.
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Looking at the examples in figure 2.12, we see that the the 4-game shown in figure 2.12(a)
and the 2-game shown in 2.12(c) yield an aggregate cost of 2 to the allocator, whereas the
3-game depicted in figure 2.12(b) yields an aggregate cost of 32 to the allocator. By simply
guaranteeing that one vertex will not receive allocation in equilibrium, the allocator is able
to engender competition between the vertices because one vertex will be left out. Such a
vertex is in the binding set of all of the other vertices, and so must request 0, according to
earlier arguments. Since the argument is the same for each of the 4 vertices, each vertex
must request 0 in equilibrium. The following definition relates to the cost to the allocator of
various k-games.
Definition 2.4.2. A k-game is domination efficient if it contains the minimum cost
equilibrium for the allocator over all equilibria in all k-games.
In the square example, the 3-game is domination efficient. The natural question is when
should the allocator be restricted in the number of vertices receiving positive allocation. In
other words, when does a graph with n vertices have a domination efficient n-game? Here,
we provide some simple sufficient conditions.
Theorem 2.4.3. Let all e∗ ∈ E∗(G) be such that e∗i > 0 for all i ∈ V (G) (in the n-game
with n > 1), and let each i have a binding set with n − 1 vertices. Then, the n-game is not
domination efficient.
The condition is here is quite straightforward. If each vertex receives positive allocation
in equilibrium in the n-game and is bound by the rest of the vertices, then the equilibrium is
not domination efficient. The basic intuition is that in such a situation each vertex requests
lower rents when the number of vertices receiving allocation is lowered to n− 1, so this leads
to inefficiency in the n-game.16
It is trivial to show that in the indivisible game the n-game is always domination efficient
because the solution entails allocating to as few vertices as possible. The implications for
16We could have used a slightly more general condition that states that the binding set of any allocated
vertex is a subset of the allocated vertices, and allocation to the binding set is strictly less efficient than the
efficient allocation. The proof would be a bit more complicated.
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these results for rent-seeking and efficiency are quite interesting. Normatively, we might find
it appealing that all vertices receive positive allocation (and perhaps an identical amount).
However, since all vertices receive positive allocation, they can extract larger rents from the
allocator. These results suggest that the allocator can decrease rents and increase efficiency
by limiting the number of allocated vertices allowed, thereby manufacturing competition
between the vertices for rents and allocation.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper models the interplay between rent extraction and efficient allocation over networks.
Many political economy models talk of a tradeoff between corruption and efficient provision,
but explicitly modeling the spillover structure shows that certain levels of rents may be
necessary for more efficient provision. The model is used to understand several important
principles in equilibrium behavior:
• Heterogeneous Vertices Key vertices in the network, in terms receiving positive
allocation and being able to extract rents, are those vertices that are linked to vertices
of degree 1. In particular, such vertices are able to leverage their unique ability to
access a remote vertex to personal benefit. This leads to the counterintuitive result
that vertices with high degree may, at times, be particularly weak in terms of targeting
and rent extraction because a lot of links means that these vertices can be accessed
more easily through spillovers from other vertices.
• Adding Links. Adding links to a graph always yields a more efficient targeting, but
this can be mitigated by higher rents. In fact, one may actually induce less efficient
outcomes with much higher rents by adding links. Adding links to vertices of degree
1 may cause the allocator to spread its allocation around the network, leading to less
inequality in public goods allocation over the network.
• Competition. There is a network relationship over rents because vertices must inter-
nalize the other requested rents. In particular, if there exist some vertices that do not
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receive positive allocation in equilibrium, they request a rent of 0. These zero requests
dampen the ability of vertices receiving allocation to request higher rents. This also
guarantees that the allocator only needs to worry about the most efficient public goods
allocation as a decision-theoretic problem, and the rents will sort themselves out.
• Internalizing Rents. One of the peculiar results in this model is that multiple influ-
ential vertices can dampen rent extraction, even though such vertices may not be direct
competition with each other. In particular, the ability of an allocated vertex to extract
rents is dampened by the rent extraction of other allocated vertices that are not a part
of its binding set.
• Corruption and Rents. In this setup, in many cases the most efficient outcome
will entail the allocator paying rents. While rents are dampened by competitive effects,
some vertices are able to extract rents in equilibrium due to heterogeneity resulting from
network position. However, at times, the allocator can induce competition between
vertices by limiting the number of allocated vertices. This competition may lead to
fewer rents being paid and greater overall efficiency. Scenarios where every vertex
receives positive allocation will invariably lead to higher rent extraction. Thus, there
is a tradeoff between egalitarian allocation of the good and levels of rent extraction.
• Tractability. The setup discussed in this paper is tractable as long as there are no iso-
lated vertices (and as long as every vertex is the target of some spillover in the directed
case). One might analogize our game to an auction with multiple buyers. However, in
a classical auction setup, if individuals are not differentiated and not everyone receives
a good, they will never extract a rent. On the other hand, if everyone receives a good
in the auction, then it is not tractable. Because binding sets exist quite generally, one
is able to adjudicate between these countervailing pressures, as well as heterogeneity in
network position, to find non-zero rents in equilibrium even when each vertex receives
positive allocation.
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There are several directions for further research on efficient allocation over a network with
spillovers; three are highlighted here. First, one can consider significantly more complicated
interactions in a repeated setup where network changes endogenously as a function of the
allocation. Here, both vertices in the network and the allocator would have to account
for future network effects of current allocations and requests for rents. A second direction
would be to have the allocator maximize a utility function that does not depend on complete
targeting of the network, where the utility depends on which or how many vertices have
been targeted and the extent of spillovers. Finally, one may construct a richer game that
incorporates a decentralized allocation structure (e.g., Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)) with
the centralized allocation structure in this paper to provide a nuanced analysis of provision
of goods with local spillovers.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2:
The set V (G)\{i} is a dominating set in G for each i ∈ V (G). It follows that some subset
of V (G) \ {i} forms a binding set for each i ∈ V (G).
Proof of Theorem 2.3.3:
Let J be the set of allocated vertices in equilibrium. The proof requires reasoning about
when the allocator can and cannot defect (by moving to a cheaper allocation, inclusive of
rents) due to a defection by one of the vertices. Consider the first condition:
C(J, r∗) ≤ C(K, r∗)− r∗k for all sets K such that j /∈ K, k ∈ K \ J (2.5.1)
This is a direct statement of the “single defection rule” for non-allocated vertices, i.e.,
no single vertex that does not receive allocation in equilibrium can defect by requesting a
lower rent in way that induces the allocator change her allocation by flipping the inequality
in 2.5.1.
Assume the existence of a binding set. The cost inequality must bind for the binding set.
To see this, consider some vertex j and request profile r such that:
C(J, r) < C(Bj , r) (2.5.2)
Choose some ε such that C(Bj , r)−C(J, r) > ε > 0. Then, the vertices i ∈ J may defect






i−ri) < ε That is, the allocated vertices extract more
without changing the allocation decision.
Then, there exists a defection r∗j > rj which preserves the inequality, so j can extract
more. If the constraint binds, so C(J, r) = C(Bj , r), any defection (r∗j > rj) would imply
that C(J, r∗) > C(Bj , r∗) and cause j to receive no allocation (and thus no rents).
This shows that in equilibrium, C(J, r∗) = C(Bj , r∗) for j ∈ J . Now assume, that there
exists some vertex in the binding set but not receiving positive allocation, i.e. in k ∈ Bj \ J
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with equilibrium requested rent r∗k > 0. Since it must be the case that C(J, r∗) = C(Bj , r∗)
in equilibrium, there exists 0 < rk < r
∗
k that induces C(J, r) > C(Bj , r), which forces the
allocator to allocate to Bj instead of I. This shows that in equilibrium r
∗
k = 0 for all
k ∈ Bj \ J , the first sub-condition of condition 2. The second sub-condition follows from
putting the result of the first sub-condition into the equality constraint shown above.
Proof of Corollary 2.3.4:




k∈K ek for all sets such that i /∈ K. Our
conditions imply C(I, r∗) ≤ C(K, r∗), which is consistent with condition 1 in theorem 2.3.3,
so the allocator has no incentive to defect. The requested rents imply that the constraint
binds for some K, namely Bi, so no vertex has the incentive to defect either.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.5:
Consider v ∈ V (G) and u,w ∈ N(v), where N(u) = N(w) = {v}. Let I be the set
corresponding to an efficient allocation. Notice that I must contain v since any set of feasible
allocated vertices without v must contain u and w, each allocated 1. Let J be a dominating
set containing u and w. Clearly J \ {u} \ {w} ∪ {v} (with v allocated 1) is a also a feasible
allocation and strictly more efficient, showing that each efficient allocation contains v. Now
consider some request, R, and let I ′ be some dominating set not containing v (and thus
containing u and w). Notice that for rv ≤ ru + rw + 1, we have CIR ≤ CI
′
R . Thus, in
equilibrium, rv ≥ 1.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.6 and Corollary 2.3.7:
In order to prove the theorem and corollary, we proceed in three steps. First, we show
that any set of allocated vertices, J , that does not correspond to the efficient allocation is
susceptible to deviations from some coalition. Second, we will show that the set of allocated
vertices corresponding to the efficient allocation does not admit a self-enforcing deviation
from a coalition (which will also show the conditions under deviations by coalitions, which
are not self-enforcing, are possible). Finally, we will show that all coalition-proof equilibria
admit the same aggregate cost to the allocator.
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First, we show that any equilibrium with positive allocation to J such that the corre-
sponding investment vector eJ /∈ E∗(G) is susceptible to coalitional deviations. Let us also
denote the set I as the set of allocated vertices corresponding to some vector under the
efficient solution to the targeting problem, e∗ ∈ E∗(G).






































i , there exists some number ε > 0 such that rk = ε for all
k ∈ I \ J makes the right and left sides of the expression equal. By assumption, this induces
the allocator to allocate to vertices in I. Thus, any allocation to J is susceptible to deviations
from some coalition.
Now, we show that an allocation to the set of vertices in the efficient allocation is coalition-
proof. In order to find coalition-proof equlibria, we show that we need only need to consider
defections that contain some i ∈ I and some member of the binding set j ∈ Bi. Remem-
ber that the space of subgame perfect Nash equilibria is characterized by the conditions in
theorem 2.3.3. Thus, if i ∈ I increases r∗i without a defection from some member in Bi,
C(Bi, r∗) < C(I, r∗), ruling out such defections. We now consider two cases, defections which
include (1) i ∈ I and j ∈ Bi \ I, and (2) i, j ∈ I, i ∈ Bj and j ∈ Bi, so an equilibrium
allocation to J is susceptible to deviations from a coalition.
We now show I is not susceptible to self-enforcing coalitional deviations.
In the first case, let us consider a defection by a coalition S that contains i ∈ I and
some member of the binding set not in I, j ∈ Bi \ I. Any potential defection induces
C(Bi, r∗) ≥ C(I, r∗), in which case the deviation does not increase the utility for j, or
C(Bi, r∗) < C(I, r∗), in which case the deviation does not increase the utility for i.
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In the second case let us consider a defection by a coalition S that contains i, j ∈ I
where i ∈ Bj and j ∈ Bi. In other words, each allocated vertex is in the other vertex’s
binding set. As before, it never makes sense for either i or j to decrease its requested rent.






j respectively yielding a request vector, R
′. This
implies that C(Bi, r∗) < C(I,R′) and C(Bj ,R′) < C(I,R′). If C(Bj ,R′) < C(Bi,R′) or
C(Bi,R′) < C(Bj ,R′) then the deviation does not benefit i or j, respectively.
But, what if C(Bi,R′) = C(Bj ,R′)? Since i /∈ Bj and j /∈ Bi, this implies that i and
j will be allocated vertices with probabilities pi and pj , which are less than 1 (because the









a deviation improves the utility of both i and j. But, now notice that there exists some






i which induces C(Bi,R′) < C(Bj ,R′). Thus, such a coalition
defection is subject to single defection by either i or j.
Finally, we show that all coalition-proof equilibria yield the same aggregate cost to the
allocator, net of rents. Let I and I ′ denote two sets of allocated vertices that are selected in a
coalition-proof equilibrium under the rent vectors r∗ and allocations e∗ and e′, respectively.













































k. This would imply
that the allocator would allocate to I ′ making I susceptible to deviations from some coalition,









Therefore, C(I, r∗) = C(I ′, r∗). Now consider some other equilibrium rent vector, r′. Direct








j . Appealing to equation
2.5.3 and the previous arguments show that all coalition-proof equilibria yield the same cost.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.3:
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(b) B Defection to Guarantee Al-
location
Figure 2.13: Non-Existence of a Strong Equilibrium
Figure 2.13(a) represents a Pareto-improving defection from equilibrium for all four vertices, where the
allocator randomly selects two vertices and allocates 1 to each. Figure 2.13(b) shows that vertex B can
further defect to guarantee selection as an allocated vertex.
Let us consider an n-game. The condition that all vertices receive positive allocation in the
efficient allocations guarantees that the cost of any binding set for a vertex i ∈ V (G), Bi with
optimal allocation eBi , is less efficient than the most efficient allocation e∗, so C(Bi, r∗) >
C(V (G), r∗). It follows that






We can then rewrite C(V (G), r∗) as:







Now consider the (n−1)-game, and let the government select the most efficient allocation
to a set J with equilibrium requests r′. If this allocation excludes positive allocation to some
i′, then this allocation goes to the binding set of i′, so J = Bi′ . Notice that the binding set
for each j ∈ V (G) is still feasible for the government. Now, for each j 6= i′, we have, following
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above, that:




















j for j 6= i′. It follows that:
















r∗k = C(V (G), r∗)
Thus, there is a more efficient outcome in the (n− 1)-game as compared to the n-game.
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Appendix B: Results about the Efficient Allocation
Indivisible Allocation
In this section, the paper investigates various aspects of the efficient allocation in the alloca-
tor’s targeting problem, essentially the second stage of the game. The results in this section
are akin to writing down the objective function of the allocator and solving for the allocation
that maximizes her utility. But, in most models, this is fairly easy to do using standard
methods in arithmetic and calculus. Here, however, since our analysis is over a network,
these methods are of limited value, but the complicated structure allows us to develop a
deeper intuition for how allocation is affected by social structure.
In order to develop intuition, we begin with the special case where ei ∈ {0, 1}, what we
call an indivisible allocation; that is, we investigate the some properties of E∗(G) when the
allocator can only make a binary allocation. In section B.2, we consider how the efficient
allocation changes if we allow for divisible allocations, i.e. ei ∈ [0, 1]. We will show that
there will always be a solution to the targeting problem that excludes positive allocation to
vertices of degree 1 and a set of necessary conditions for the efficiency of divisible allocations.
We begin our discussion by interpreting the use of spillover networks in allocation prob-
lems. Consider an allocation in E∗(G) that satisfies the (indivisible) targeting problem. Form
a subgraph by connecting each vertex to all possible sources with a link, i.e. for each vertex
not receiving positive allocation, connect the vertex to all neighbors with positive allocation
with a link. This will lead to a graph (not necessarily connected) that “spans” the network.
This is a nice way to visualize feasible solutions to the indivisible allocation problem, and it
generally known as a star cover of the network.
Definition 2.5.1. The spillover network associated with a graph G and induced by an allo-
cation A, G[A], is the subgraph formed from the set of dyads including a vertex with positive
allocation. Formally, G[A] = (V, S) where S ⊆ E(G) and S = {(u, v)| eu + ev ≥ 1} under A.
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Figure 2.14: Spillover Network
Figure 2.14 shows a network with an overlaid spillover network induced by an allocation, represented by
the thick black links. The black vertices represent those vertices receiving an allocation of 1, with the gray
vertices receiving 0.
The question of a minimum cost allocation to the network, then, is a question of covering
the network with the fewest stars, or the minimum star cover. This problem is identical
to finding a minimum dominating set over the network, a classic problem in mathematical
graph theory (see Haynes et al. (1998) for details). Although, intuitively, one might believe
the efficient strategy is to target the vertex with the most neighbors, this intuition turns out
be false, as shown in figure 2.15, where the vertex in the center has the most neighbors. The
problem is that a vertex with many neighbors can reach many others but can be reached by
many others as well. The example in figure 2.15 also shows an important property of the
efficient allocation, discussed in section B.2, that there is always an efficient allocation that
allocates nothing to vertices of degree 1 and 1 to their neighbors.
Allocation strategies can be similar on very different graphs. We tend to think of complete
networks (where every vertex is connected to every other vertex) and stars (where everyone is
linked to one vertex and no one else) as very different social structures, representing systems
with no hierarchy and severe hierarchy, respectively. But, from the standpoint of allocation,
they yield very similar results.
The difference between the two graphs in figure 2.16 does not yield a difference in allo-
cation strategy; as shown in the paper, these graphs lead to very different rent extraction
strategies.
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Figure 2.15: Finding the Efficient Allocation
The graphs above depict an optimal allocation. In figure 2.15, we see an example where the optimal allocation
does not include giving a “1” to the vertex with the most neighbors, the vertex in the center of the graph.
We have overlaid the flow network, denoted by the bold links.
(a) Complete Network (b) Claw
Figure 2.16: Complete Network and a Claw
Figure 2.16(a) shows a complete network with an efficient spillover network (bold links) overlaid on the
graph, and figure 2.16(b) shows a claw (star) with the same spillover network.
Allocation Strategies
We now discuss the case where the allocation is divisible, i.e. ei ∈ [0, 1].
First, we show that it is always efficient to not allocate anything to vertices of degree 1,
and to allocate the maximum amount (i.e. allocate 1) to the neighbors of vertices of degree
1.17 This implies that the vertices that are connected to hard to reach areas are those vertices
that can expect to receive the highest levels of allocation.
Theorem 2.5.2. If u is a vertex of degree 1 with neighbor v, so N(u) = {v}, then there
17The result can be extended in a natural way to directed networks by noting that all vertices that are only
targets of spillovers, never the origin of spillovers, will receive no allocation in equilibrium.
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exists an efficient allocation, e∗ ∈ E∗(G), that:
1. Allocates 0 to u
2. Allocates 1 to v
If v has two neighbors of degree 1, so there exist t, u, v ∈ V (G) such that N(t) = N(u) = {v},
then the above conditions are true for every efficient allocation in E∗(G).
Proof of Theorem 2.5.2:
Consider some efficient allocation e over G. We further consider two vertices u, v ∈ V (G)
with N(u) = {v}. Note that eu, ev ≤ 1, since it is never efficient to allocate more than 1 to
a vertex. Since u is a vertex of degree 1, and satisfies the targeting problem, eu + ev = 1.
Since u is of degree 1, the set of allocations to vertices other than u, V (G)\{u}, constitutes
an allocation that satisfies the targeting condition over G \ {u}. Formally, if e is efficient





j ≥ 1 for all j ∈ V (G) \ {u}. Consider an allocation, e∗ over G with
e∗u = 0 and e
∗
v = 1. It is clear that e
∗ is as efficient as e over G and satisfies the targeting
constraint for u. To see that e∗ satisfies the targeting constraint over the whole network,
note that e∗uj ≥ euj for all j ∈ V (G) \ {u}.
Now consider two vertices of degree 1 with a common neighbor. Let t, u, v ∈ V (G) satisfy
N(t) = N(u) = {v}. Assume, without loss of generality, that there exists an allocation e′




v ≥ 1 and e′t + e′v ≥ 1, we know that e′t + e′u + e′v ≥ 1 + e′u. This
implies that an allocation e∗ with e∗t = e
∗
u = 0 and e
∗
v = 1 is strictly more efficient than e
′.
The efficiency of e∗ follows from the arguments above.
The theorem shows that vertices of degree 1 are likely to experience inequalities when it
comes to receiving. We might be interested in scenarios where the allocator will be induced
to give a more equal distribution of goods. There are certainly any number cases where
“dividing the allocation” yields more efficient outcomes. In figure 2.17, the allocator pays a
total of 2 in the efficient indivisible allocation (figure 2.17(a)) and a total of 43 in the divisible
case (figure 2.17(b)):
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Figure 2.17: Efficiency Over Indivisible and Divisible Allocations
Figure 2.17(a) shows the efficient indivisible allocation, whereas figure 2.17(b) shows an efficient divisible
allocation (where each vertex receives 1
3
). Clearly, the divisible case yields a more efficient allocation.
The next theorem derives necessary conditions for the efficient divisible allocation to
yield strictly a more efficient outcome than the efficient indivisible allocation. Basically, the
more efficient divisible allocation occurs when, in the indivisible case, at least two vertices
receiving positive allocation share neighbors and are not linked to any vertices of degree 1 in
the network.
Theorem 2.5.3. If the efficient allocation over divisible goods is more efficient than that
over indivisible goods, then there exist two vertices receiving positive allocation in an efficient
indivisible solution that share neighbors and have no vertices of degree 1 in the spillover
network. More precisely, if for any e ∈ E∗(G), there exists some i ∈ V (G) where ei /∈ {0, 1},
then for some minimum dominating set I and for some u, v ∈ I (u 6= v):
1. N(u) ∩N(v) 6= ∅
2. If w ∈ N(u) or w ∈ N(v), then there exists some other r ∈ V (G) such that w ∈ N(r)
(i.e. w is not a vertex of degree 1)
Proof of Theorem 2.5.3:
Let the set of vertices receiving positive allocation in the indivisible allocation, I, have
cardinality m. Assume the conditions do not hold, so we have a set K ( I (possibly empty)
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containing vertices that satisfy condition 2 and not 1 (i.e. they share all neighbors with those
vertices receiving positive allocation, but those vertices with which they share neighbors are
connected to a vertex of degree 1). Consider the most efficient divisible solution, x. For
each u ∈ I \K (vertices that do not satisfy condition 2), allocate 1 − xu for xu ≥ 0 (which
represents all the possible allocations to the vertex). Notice, however, that each element of
I \K is connected to a vertex of degree 1 since condition 2 fails. In the divisible allocation,
these vertices of degree 1 must be allocated xu in order to satisfy the targeting constraints.
For each v ∈ K, let the sum of allocations to the neighbors of v be xv in x. Then, it follows






(xv + 1− xv) +
∑
I\K
(xu + 1− xu) = m
This shows, that we can never do better than the efficient indivisible solution if conditions
1 or 2 fail to hold.
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(a) More Efficient Possible
(b) More Efficient Impossible
Figure 2.18: Possibility of a More Efficient Divisible Allocation
Figure 2.18(a) shows the efficient allocation over indivisible goods of a graph where the we can find a
more efficient divisible allocation (the small numbers), whereas figure 2.18(b) shows an efficient indivisible






This paper develops a general inferential framework for causal identification in random-
ized experiments in the presence of spillovers. Existing approaches focus on models of the
underlying stochastic process governing spillovers or a priori knowledge of exactly which
units share spillovers. This paper shows that the researcher may identify causal quantities
of interest, without such strong assumptions, by analyzing the experiment with respect to
inclusion probabilities induced by increasingly strong “social distance” restrictions. The
social distance approach characterizes a fully general framework for causal identification
in the presence of spillovers. Necessary assumptions for causal identification, as well as
quantities that can be feasibly estimated, are discussed in detail. Using this framework,
this paper develops an estimation strategy for causal identification with spillovers using
thin-plate regression splines (TPRS). Above all, this paper demonstrates that the anal-
ysis of experiments in the presence of spillovers is feasible under reasonable, intuitive
assumptions.
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3.1 Introduction
Randomized experiments typically depend upon the strong assumption of no spillovers be-
tween units; that is, when one experimental unit receives the treatment, the effect of the treat-
ment may not impact any other experimental unit through “spillovers.” However, researchers
are often interested in: 1) treatments that exhibit spatial and social network spillovers, such
as information/advertising and vaccines; and 2) making empirical claims about spillovers,
such as peer effects on the spread of information and the contagion effect in reducing illness
through vaccines. This paper develops an inferential framework and a corresponding estima-
tion strategy to deduce claims about randomized experiments in the presence of spillovers.1
Over the past few decades, the standard Rubin Causal Model (Rubin, 1974), which does
not allow for spillovers, has been systematically extended to include for “partial interfer-
ence” (Halloran and Struchiner, 1991; Sobel, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and Halloran,
2008; Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2010). In such a setting, subject are arranged in
“blocks,” where it is assumed that spillovers may occur within blocks but not across them.
Typically, however, spillovers over a social network, as in the examples above, cannot be
neatly partitioned into blocks, and it is not known a priori which units share spillovers. This
paper extends the partial interference framework and shows that, even in this more compli-
cated setting, experimental inferences are feasible under reasonable assumptions. Further-
more, the partial interference framework and classic Rubin Causal Model emerge as special
cases of this general framework.
Intuitively, one expects peer effects over a social network to weaken as the frequency
or likelihood of interaction diminishes between two individuals. Similarly, one expects the
extent of spatial spillovers to diminish as two experimental units are placed geographically
further apart. This insight serves as the basis for the inferential framework in this paper. In
1I would like to thank Peter Aronow, Jake Bowers, Albert Fang, Mark Fredrickson, Donald Green, Do-
minik Hangartner, Macartan Humphreys, Ryan Moore, David Nickerson, Cyrus Samii and participants at
the European Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2013, the 6th Annual Meeting of the Political
Networks Section of the American Political Science Association, the American Political Science Association
Annual Meeting and the Columbia University Methods Workshop for useful comments and advice. I am deeply
grateful to Alexander Coppock, with whom a related paper has been co-authored, for continuing engagement
and conversation on the topics discussed in this paper. All errors are my own.
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particular, spillovers are analyzed with respect to a “social distance,” such as frequency of
interaction or geographic distance. As experimental units placed further and further apart
according to the social distance are analyzed, estimators of a quantity of interest which
condition upon the probability of assignment to appropriate treatment conditions, resulting
from known randomization probabilities, converge in expectation to the true value. In short,
by making successively more stringent distance restrictions, biases in the estimator resulting
from spillovers may be removed. It can be shown that this social distance formulation is fully
general; that is, any information the analyst can bring to bear on the problem of spillovers
can be reformulated as a social distance.
Any number of social distance measures may suffice for the analysis. The social distance
measure need only satisfy the non-cascading assumption – that spillovers eventually die out
between experimental units placed further and further apart according to the social distance
measure. Practically speaking, however, randomized experiments will rarely have the power,
and experimental units will rarely dispersed enough, for this technique to fully converge to
true quantity of interest. Accordingly, stronger conditions on the social distance measure are
required for the analysis to be practicable.
3.1.1 Overview and Contribution
Quantities of interest are formed from reference assignments, idealized treatment assignment
vectors such that one is guaranteed to see the potential outcome of interest. For instance,
even in the context of spillovers, one is guaranteed to observe a fully untreated outcome for a
particular unit under the treatment assignment vector that assigns no unit in the sample to
receive the treatment (since this guarantees that there is no danger of spillovers from any other
unit). Comparing observed outcomes, and estimated quantities, to these idealized quantities
of interest yields a robust statistical inferential framework that allows for the analysis of bias
and efficiency.
In order to implement these insights, the paper discusses an estimation strategy, with
associated assumptions, to provide a fully practicable framework. In particular, a convexity
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assumption is imposed; that is, the expected magnitude of the bias is a convex (and decreas-
ing) function of the social distance measure. It is argued that most intuitive social distance
measures satisfy this assumption, and this assumption allows the researcher to bound the
magnitude of the bias. Furthermore, estimators using thin-plate regression splines (TPRS)
are developed to provide reasonably efficient estimation of quantities of interest, providing
superior performance to standard inverse-probability weighted (IPW) estimators in a similar
setting.
This paper makes several contributions to statistical analysis in a randomized experimen-
tal setting with spillovers. Existing approaches focus on models of the underlying stochastic
process governing spillovers or knowledge a priori of exactly which units share spillovers. This
paper shows that the researcher may retrieve a reasonable estimate of the quantity of interest
without these sorts of strong assumptions if she can find a suitable candidate for the social
distance measure without selecting an underlying stochastic process. Furthermore, this paper
develops a self-contained statistical inferential framework through which one can assess the
bias and efficiency of various approaches to causal estimation under spillovers. Finally, this
paper extends upon existing methods for consistent estimation of causal quantities of interest
by proposing a Bayesian penalized spline estimator which provides superior performance in
efficiency without generating serious biases in the process.
Section 2 discusses the related literature and motivates the subject of this paper. Section
3 derives the inferential framework from a formal perspective, focusing on defining reference
assignments, treatment conditions, and quantities of interest. Section 4 derives a set-theoretic
formulation of interference structures, and develops a mathematical construction of the social
distance measure. Section 5 develops the estimation strategy and assesses the performance
of the proposed Bayesian thin-plate regression spline technique through simulation. Section
6 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Related Literature and Motivation
The assumption of “no interference between units” (Cox, 1958) is commonly made in ex-
periments and is one component of the stable unit treatment value assumption, or SUTVA
(Rubin, 1980). Non-interference, however, may not always hold between experimental units,
as with treatments that are likely to spillover such as advertising or vaccination.
In the past decade, researchers have begun seriously investigating contexts involving
spillovers through experimental methods. Quantities of interest from such studies include,
for instance, the effects of vaccination on infection rates in surrounding areas, the effects of
get-out-the-vote campaigns on neighbors’ voting rates, and the effects of educational inter-
ventions for students on their classmates.2
Recent work on the topic has focused upon blocked double randomization designs, origi-
nally described by Halloran and Struchiner (1991), where spillovers may occur within blocks
but not across them. Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2010) show that IPW estima-
tion, conditional on the probability of an outcome of interest being observed, can be used
for unbiased estimation if there is a priori knowledge of exactly which units share spillovers.
The IPW estimator, in the context of known spillover structures, has also been considered in
Chen et al. (2010), Gerber and Green (2012), and Aronow and Samii (2013). Unfortunately,
spillovers over more complex spaces, such as social networks and geography, do not fit into
this framework since the data do not form discernible blocks, and the researcher does not
know a priori which experimental units share spillovers. Spillover structures cannot just be
assumed and compared because, unlike classical regression techniques, there is no way to
assess the “fit” of an assumed spillover structure and corresponding estimator to an under-
lying causal parameter of interest. This paper demonstrates that a more general approach
2Such studies have often been conducted through blocked designs or double randomization (e.g., Duflo and
Saez (2003), Giné and Mansuri (2011), Sinclair et al. (2012)). This yields three types of experimental groups,
consisting of: (a) those units that are directly treated; (b) those units that are not directly treated but are
located in clusters where units were treated (thus experiencing spillovers); and (c) those units that are not
directly treated and are in clusters where no other unit was treated (serving as a control group). The average
indirect effect is estimated as the average outcome in group (b) minus the average outcome in group (c). The
statistical foundations of estimation via double randomization are discussed in detail in Hudgens and Halloran
(2008).
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that conditions upon probabilities of assignment at various distance restrictions can fit into
a proper inferential framework when the spillover structure is unknown. The classic Rubin
Causal Model and blocked randomization emerge as special cases of the framework.
The framework in this paper allows for inferences even when the researcher does not know
the structure of spillovers and constitutes a generalization of the classic Rubin Causal Model
(Rubin, 1974), as well as frameworks that require a known spillover structure such as Hudgens
and Halloran (2008). In particular, following the insights of Rubin (1990) and Sobel (2006),
potential outcomes are defined as a function of the vector of treatment assignments resulting
from the randomization. This idea is used to define “reference assignments,” which are assign-
ment vectors that guarantee the potential outcome of interest will be observed (Rosenbaum,
2007). For example, one is guaranteed to see the fully untreated potential outcome for each
unit under the assignment vector where no unit receives treatment. Following Sobel (2006),
the quantity of interest is defined as a function of the number of reference assignments. This
approach defines quantities of interest separately from assumptions about spillovers, thereby
generating a self-contained inferential framework which allows for a characterization of bias
and efficiency.
This framework does not require any parametric or model-based assumptions about the
stochastic process governing spillovers. While this provides a more objective approach to
estimating quantities of interest, it should be noted that estimation based upon the IPW
estimator tends to be quite inefficient (Basu, 1971). For this reason, section 5 develops
an estimation strategy to increase efficiency by using thin-plate regression splines. From a
model-based perspective, Bowers et al. (2013) provide a novel Fisherian approach to assessing
the plausibility of various theory-driven models of spillovers.
The approach in this paper differs from the existing literature in three ways. First and
foremost, this approach does not require the researcher to know the exact spillover structure or
stipulate an underlying spillover process, greatly enhancing the objectivity of the estimation
procedure. Second, this paper characterizes the class of quantities that can be reasonably
estimated from randomized experiments under spillovers and provides a principled approach
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to constructing such quantities. Finally, while inverse-probability weighted estimators may
provide consistent estimation, they are known to be highly inefficient. This paper develops a
semi-parametric estimator using thin-plate regression splines to generate a nearly consistent
estimation strategy with superior performance in terms of efficiency, providing more robust
estimation of quantities of interest.
3.3 General Framework
This section develops a principled approach to constructing quantities of interest when treat-
ment effects can spill over units in the sample population. In particular, following Rubin
(1990) and Sobel (2006), general potential outcomes are defined as a function of each pos-
sible vector of treatment assignments. The quantities of interest, however, are defined with
respect to reference assignments, idealized treatment assignment vectors over which one is
guaranteed to see a potential outcome of interest. The notion of a reference assignment was
developed by Rosenbaum (2007), which he referred to as a “uniformity trial.”3 One of the
key innovations of this paper is to notice that a meaningful statistical inferential framework
results from the comparison of estimators, constructed from observed treatment assignment
vectors, to this idealized quantity, constructed from reference assignments.
In this section, it is shown that reasonable causal inferences can be made under intuitive
assumptions, even if the researcher does not know the underlying stochastic form governing
spillovers. In particular, estimators are defined with respect to restrictions on social distance
between units. As more restrictive assumptions are made, these estimators, which condition
on the probability of assignment, converge in expectation to the quantity of interest. This
occurs when the social distance measure satisfies a non-cascading assumption; that is, the
strength of spillovers between two units diminish as the social distance between them in-
creases. The flexibility of the framework results from the fact the researcher need not choose
3Originally, Rosenbaum (2007) used the phrase “uniformity trial” to refer to a situation where treatment
was withheld from every unit to guarantee observation of the outcome for an untreated unit without spillovers,
but in principle this idea can be generalized to any underlying “reference assignment,” not just the no treatment
case.
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one “true” social distance measure; rather, any social distance measure that satisfies the
non-cascading assumption will suffice for analysis. In practice, however, more restrictive as-
sumptions will have to be placed upon the social distance metric in order to make inferences
about the amount of bias, as discussed in section 4.
The steps of the inferential framework are as follows:
1. Classify reference assignments that guarantee observation of potential outcomes of in-
terest
2. Form treatment conditions, collections of reference assignments that are consistent with
an exposure type of interest (e.g., direct, indirect)
3. Generate quantities of interest which are typically formed as the difference between two
treatment conditions
4. Identify a desirable social distance measure
5. Iteratively calculate estimators conditioning on probability of assignment under more
and more stringent social distance restrictions, which converge in expectation to the
quantities of interest
The first 3 steps of this process are covered in this section. Section 4 discusses step 4,
identifying a social distance measure. Finally, section 5 discusses the estimators and general
estimation strategy.
Section 3.3.1 defines the types of quantities that can estimated in an experimental setting,
which will be discussed in the remainder of the paper. Section 3.3.2 develops the ideas of
references assignments and treatment rigorously, and section 3.3.3 defines the quantities of
interest rigorously, using the ideas of reference assignments and treatment conditions.
3.3.1 Quantity of Interest: Average Exposure Effect
Once a treatment may spill over to other units in the sample, the researcher must make
difficult choices about what she intends to estimate. Not every quantity of interest will be
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estimable using experimental approaches. To understand this point, it is useful to make a
distinction between an average equilibrium effect and an average exposure effect.
An average equilibrium effect measures the population average effect of the treatment if
the treatment regime was “fully implemented” in the population. Suppose the researcher is
interested in the average effect of a get-out-the-vote campaign encouraging women to vote
on female voter turnout, as in Giné and Mansuri (2011). Suppose further that the researcher
defines full implementation of the campaign as targeting each household in the village. With
no spillovers, the average treatment effect estimated from a sufficiently large experiment,
where a randomly selected subset of the population is given the treatment, is a good estimate
of the average treatment effect if the treatment is fully implemented. However, this is not
true if the treatment, the get-out-the-vote campaign, has spillovers over the population. The
quantity measuring the average effect of the information campaign under full implementation
cannot be measured using an experiment without strong assumptions. To see this, notice
that any experiment would only treat some subset of the village. However, the potential
outcome of any unit under spillovers is necessarily a function of the treatment status of every
other unit in the population and thus the average outcome when every unit is treated cannot
generally be estimated from an experiment which only treats a subset of the population.
In such a scenario, certain non-experimental techniques, such as interrupted time series or
pre-post designs, may be preferred.
An average exposure effect measures the population average effect of a certain type of
“exposure” isolated for each unit. For instance, one may be interested in the average effect
of a unit directly receiving the campaign and experiencing no other spillovers, or the average
effect of having exactly one adjacent household receiving the campaign when untreated, or
the average effect of having at least two adjacent households receiving the campaign when
untreated. This sort of average isolated effect can be estimated well by experimental tech-
niques under certain conditions, which are detailed below. The reason for measuring average
exposure effects is that it allows the researcher to develop a more nuanced understanding of
spillover effects in the population. For instance, the researcher can estimate a direct treat-
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ment effect, the effect of having a single neighbor treated when untreated, the effect of having
two neighbors treated when untreated, and so on, in order to map out the strength of the
direct effect and spillovers in the population. These sorts of quantities are particularly useful
when the researcher must estimate treatment effects over an entire population when only
being allowed to treat a portion of it; these nuanced measures can provide data on how to
most effectively target a population given a fixed number of units to treat or a fixed budget.
It will be assumed throughout the rest of this paper that the quantity of interest follows the
form of an average exposure effect.
The average exposure effects estimated in this paper are similar to those described by
Sobel (2006), with one difference. Sobel (2006) defines quantities of interest as averages
over possible treatment assignments in a particular randomization scheme. By contrast,
this paper averages over reference assignments, idealized treatment assignment vectors over
which one is guaranteed to see a potential outcome of interest. This idealized form for the
quantity of interest is necessary because it allows for an analysis of bias and consistency and
its relationship to social distance.
3.3.2 Treatment Conditions, Reference Assignments, and Potential Out-
comes
Let R be a space associated with a “social distance” or quasi-metric ρ : R × R → [0,∞]
(Wilson (1931)).4 In other words, ρ is a like a traditional metric, but it may be the case that
ρ(x, y) 6= ρ(y, x), which is common is many social settings.5 Consider a set of experimental
units, Ω = {1, . . . , N}, drawn from R such that for any x, y ∈ Ω, one may associate ρ(x, y).
Intuitively, this means that the experimental units are endowed with social distance which
will be used to characterize how far spillovers may travel between the units. The implications
4The quasi-metric ρ is still non-negative and satisfies the triangle inequality. Given x, y, z ∈ R:
• ρ(x, y) ≥ 0 with ρ(x, x) = 0
• ρ(x, z) ≤ ρ(x, y) + ρ(y, z)
5This is seen in directed social networks. Intuitively, if we think of distance as the likelihood of interaction
for spreading a disease, the likelihood of spreading from x to y may not be the same as spreading from y to x.
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of social distance will be discussed in section 4.
Formally, each unit i is assigned to one of t treatments, di ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1},6 and
a treatment assignment vector over the entire population will be denoted as the N -tuple
d ∈ D, where D = {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}N .
Let y : D → RN be a real vector-valued potential outcome function over the treatment
assignment draw, where yi(d) denotes the outcome for subject i associated with a particular
treatment assignment vector, d. In studies with spillovers, the quantity of interest is typically
the expected difference in the population between two treatment conditions. In the presence
of spillovers, a treatment condition is any subset of treatment assignment vectors defined
for each unit that necessarily satisfies the condition of interest (e.g., spillover from a single
neighboring unit).
In order to construct the treatment conditions of interest, it is first necessary to properly
define reference assignments, which are treatment assignment vectors that will guarantee
that the outcome of interest is observed. These will serve as the rudiments of the treatment
conditions of interest and will assure that the construction of quantities of interest are not
dependent upon modeling assumptions. The following two definitions formally explicate these
ideas:
Definition 3.3.1 (Reference Assignments and Exposure Conditions). A subset of entire space
of treatment assignment vectors, Si ⊆ {0, . . . , t − 1}N , that satisfies some logical condition
such that each element may admit a different observed outcome is defined as an exposure
condition for unit i. That is, given d,d′ ∈ Si, it follows that yi(d) 6≡ yi(d′). Each d ∈ Si
is referred to as a reference assignment for the exposure condition.
Definition 3.3.2 (Treatment Conditions). A treatment condition is defined by a collection
of exposure conditions, one for each unit, S = {S1, . . . ,SN} where Si ⊆ {0, . . . , t − 1}N is
a subset of treatment assignment vectors (possibly empty) for each i ∈ Ω that satisfies some
6Throughout the paper di = 0 will be used as a control condition.
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logical condition. For clarity of exposition, Si ∈ S will be referred to as the treatment condition
with respect to i.
Intuitively, reference assignments are those assignment vectors for which the potential
outcome of interest is guaranteed to be observed. As an example, the untreated condition
will typically be written as S0 = {{0}, . . . , {0}}, where the reference assignment for the
untreated condition for each unit is 0, the assignment vector where each unit receives di = 0.
One is guaranteed to observe the potential outcome in the fully untreated condition for a
particular unit when every experimental unit, i, is assigned to di = 0.
An Example
In order to make the formal framework easier to comprehend, the formal details will be
presented alongside a toy problem. Consider the following problem:
Over a population of 50 individuals, 10 individuals are randomly selected to receive
the treatment, an advertisement to buy some product.7 The researcher is interested
in the following questions: What is the average increase in expenditure on the
product if the individual is directly targeted by the advertisement? What is the
average increase in expenditure on the product if a friend is directly targeted by the
advertisement while the individual is/is not directly targeted by the advertisement?
The goal is to isolate the usual direct treatment effect, the average effect of having a single
treated neighbor treated while untreated, and the average effect of having a single treated
neighbor while treated. The treatment is the advertisement. The four treatment conditions
of interest are: 1) the direct exposure condition–the direct effect of being treated without any
other interference; 2) the indirect exposure condition–the spillover effect from a neighboring
treated friend on an untreated individual; 3) the joint exposure effect–the combined of effect
of receiving direct treatment and having a friend that is directly treated; and 4) the untreated
7This is a problem that has been studied extensively in the game-theoretic literature under the topic of
“word-of-mouth advertising.” See Galeotti and Goyal (2009) for an overview.
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condition–an untreated individual experiencing no spillovers. The related quantities of inter-
est are the direct treatment effect, the average difference between the direct and untreated
conditions, the indirect exposure effect, the average difference between the indirect exposure
and untreated conditions, and the joint exposure effect, the average difference between the
joint exposure and untreated conditions.
Estimation problems involving spillovers are often best visualized over a network or a
mathematical graph. Causal effects are estimated for a population of N individuals, the
units of our analysis. The sample space is Ω = {1, . . . , N} with N = 50. An edge is formed
between two individuals in the network if they are friends, where the set of such edges is
denoted by E ⊆ Ω× Ω.8 G is uniquely defined by the pair G = (Ω, E).
Figure 3.1 is a representation of the problem with 50 individuals. The individuals are
represented as nodes of the graph, and an edge exists between any two nodes if the corre-
sponding individuals are friends. The “neighbors” of an individual, i, are those individuals
who are friends of i. As shown in figure 3.1, the neighbors of i, ζ(i), are described by those
nodes that share an edge with i. The degree of node i, δi = |ζ(i)|, is the number of neighbors
for node i in the graph.
In this experiment, the treatment is binary, di ∈ {0, 1}. The treatment conditions of
interest are the direct treatment condition (S1), the indirect exposure condition (S01), the
joint exposure condition (S11) and the untreated condition (S0). Let dj = {d|dj = 1, dk =
0, k 6= j} denote a vector of treatment assignments where unit j is assigned to treatment and
all other units have been assigned to no treatment. Furthermore, let 0 denote the vector of
treatment assignments where each unit is assigned to no treatment.
Figure 3.2 describes possible reference assignments. Figure 3.2(a) displays the only ref-
erence assignment for the direct treatment condition for unit i, the assignment vector that
assigns i to be directly treated while no other unit is treated. This implies that one is guar-
anteed to see the outcome associated with unit i being directly treated without any other
8Although our discussion assumes “undirected edges,” i.e. an edge between i and j implies and edge
between j and i, this framework is applicable to “directed networks” as well, where this property need not be
true. Also note that this implies that each undirected edge is counted as two reciprocal directed edges in E .
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Figure 3.1: An Example of a Network or Graph with 50 Nodes
Figure 3.1 shows a graph or network, G. The set of individuals is denoted by the nodes in the network. The edges
between two nodes denote farmers with adjacent plots of land. The set of neighbors of i, ζ(i), are shown as the nodes
shaded in a darker blue. The degree of i is δi = |ζ(i)| = 3. The network is drawn to have a “scale-free” distribution,
which means that degree distribution for the nodes in the network follow an inverse power law, a pattern typically
observed in social networks. This network is generated from a Barabási-Albert model with m = 1 (Albert and
Barabási, 2002).
interference under the treatment assignment vector that assign i to treatment and all other
units to no treatment. Figures 3.2(b) and 3.2(c) display two possible reference assignment for
treatment condition of indirect exposure from having exactly one neighbor treated. There are
a total of three such reference assignments, corresponding to treatment assignment vectors
where exactly one neighbor of i is treated and no other units receive treatment. These imply
that one is able to observe the outcome of having exactly one neighbor treated under the
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Figure 3.2 describes possible reference assignments. Figure 3.2(a) displays the only reference assignment for
the direct treatment condition for unit i, the assignment vector that assigns i to be directly treated while
no other unit is treated. Figures 3.2(b) and 3.2(c) display two possible reference assignment for treatment
condition of having exactly one neighbor treated. There are a total of three such reference assignments,
corresponding to treatment assignment vectors where exactly one neighbor of i is treated and no other
units receive treatment. Figure 3.2(d) displays the only reference assignment for the untreated treatment
condition for unit i, the assignment vector that assigns no unit to the treatment condition.
treatment assignment vector that assigns one such neighbor to treatment and every other unit
to no treatment. Notice, however, that there are multiple such reference assignments; this
is because the outcome is potentially different based on which neighbor is treated. Finally,
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as before, the only reference assignment for the untreated condition is the assignment vector
that assigns no unit to the treatment, as shown in figure 3.2(d).
The four treatment conditions of interest can be written as follows:
S1 = {{d1}, . . . , {dN}} (3.3.1)
S01 = {{dj , j ∈ ζ(1)}, . . . {dj , j ∈ ζ(N)}}
S11 = {{d1 + dj , j ∈ ζ(1)}, . . . {dN + dj , j ∈ ζ(N)}}
S0 = {{0}, . . . , {0}}
The potential outcomes in S1 are of the form yi(di), the potential outcomes in S01 are of
the form yi(dj) if j ∈ ζ(i), he potential outcomes in S11 are of the form yi(di+dj) if j ∈ ζ(i),
and the potential outcomes in S0 are of the form yi(0).
3.3.3 Quantity of Interest
The quantity of interest is defined over treatment conditions. In particular, a quantity will
typically involve the (weighted) average of the difference in potential outcomes between the
treatment conditions over all of the units, defined through the reference assignments. The
notation for a quantity of interest is made more complex by the fact that each unit may have
a different number of potential outcomes within and across treatment conditions (as in the
example for the indirect and untreated treatment conditions). For a fixed set of units, Ω, the
quantity of interest is defined as follows:9
Definition 3.3.3. Let a quantity of interest, τ : D ×D → R, be defined over Ω. Then,









9i.e., S and S ′ have non-empty components for the corresponding units in Ω
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where wi are unit-specific weights.
It will be useful at times to deal with the two terms in the final equation separately.
Definition 3.3.4. The weighted expected value under the treatment condition S,









Thus, the quantity of interest may be written as τ(S,S ′) = y(S,S ′)w − y(S ′,S)w. Note
that the definition of a quantity of interest does not depend on non-interference assumptions
in this setting. Non-interference assumptions, which are necessary for estimation, are made
independently of the quantity of interest.
Application to the Example
In order to define a more intuitive notation similar to Hudgens and Halloran (2008), let
yi(di) ≡ yi(1), yi(dj) ≡ yij(0, 1), yi(di + dj) ≡ yij(1, 1), and yi(0) ≡ yi(0), where dj =
{d|dj = 1, dk = 0, k 6= j} . The advantage of this notation is that it become clear that there
is a potential outcome for each pair of nodes i, j, j ∈ ζ(i). It follows that the quantities of
interest, the direct treatment effect, τ(S1,S0), the indirect exposure effect, τ(S01,S0), and



































































The average direct effect, τ(S1,S0) is the analogue of the average treatment effect in
a classical setup. In the indirect and joint exposure conditions for some unit i, there is a
separate potential outcome corresponding to each unique neighbor j, while in the untreated
condition there is one potential outcome for unit i. Thus, the number of potential outcomes
(reference assignments) in the indirect and joint exposure conditions for unit i is equal to the
degree of i, implying that each unit has a different number of potential outcomes within and
across treatment conditions. In order to create an intuitive quantity, where each unit receives
“equal” importance, the difference between the indirect/joint condition and the untreated
condition is normalized by the degree of the unit. Note that |S1i| = |S0i| = 1 and |S01i| =
|S11i| = δi. In τ(S1,S0), wi = 1, and in τ(S01,S0) and τ(S11,S0), wi = 1δi . The calculations
follow from the fact that:
∑
i∈Ω













3.4 Non-Interference Partitions and Social Distance
The previous section constructed quantities of interest without resorting to modeling assump-
tions. After one has determined reference assignment and quantities interest, the goal is to
understand when these quantities can be isolated with little or no interference from other
spillovers. This section describes a general approach to isolating these quantities. The con-
struction in this section will follow two steps. First, the notion of non-interference will be
precisely defined from a mathematical and set-theoretic point of view. Second, the section
develops the idea of a “social distance” measure and its relationship to non-interference, as
well as the generality of the framework. As the researcher considers the set of units that
are further and further apart according to this social distance measure, biases due to com-
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plex spillovers are reduced. Thus, considering units subject to a sufficiently stringent social
distance constraint allows for estimation of quantities of interest with lower levels of bias.
Section 4.1 describes the idea of interference from a set-theoretic perspective. Section 4.2
defines the social distance framework and describes how it applies to the toy problem. Section
4.3 discusses how the chosen distance restrictions affect the sample chosen for the quantity of
interest; in particular, it is shown that considering more stringent distance restrictions also
decreases the number of admissible units considered for the quantity of the interest. Finally,
section 4.4 discusses the generality of the social distance approach, namely that information
brought to bear on the problem can be reformulated in terms of a social distance measure.
3.4.1 Non-Interference Partitions
Non-interference assumptions entail partitioning the set of assignment vectors for which one
believes the potential outcome of interest for unit i will be observed. A non-interference
partition is a partition of the space of assignment vectors where each element of the partition
is comprised of the treatment assignment vectors over which one observes the same potential
outcome as the reference assignment. Thus, in this framework, non-interference assumptions
entail making a guess at the (unknown) non-interference partition. For instance, under
the standard non-interference assumption made in most experiments, the set of assignment
vectors {d | di = 1} yields the same potential outcome as di, the vector that assigns i to
treatment and all other units to no treatment.
Each distinct potential outcome in the quantity of interest must be separately observable.
This will imply that two reference assignments in the relevant treatment conditions for i,
Si and S
′
i, have non-overlapping non-interference partitions (due to the fact that they yield
distinct potential outcomes).
Definition 3.4.1 (Non-Interference). Let Qi be a non-interference partition. For ease
of exposition, denote the element of the partition containing d as Qi(d). The following three
conditions always hold for non-interference partitions:
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1. Qi is a partition of the space of assignment vectors, D.
2. Let d∗ ∈ Qi(d). Then, yi(d) = yi(d∗).
3. For d,d′ ∈ Si ∪ S′i, Qi(d) ∩Qi(d′) = ∅.
An experiment is a design where probability of observing each treatment assignment
vector is known. The associated measure-theoretic definition of an experiment is given below.
Definition 3.4.2. An experiment is defined by the triple (D,F , P ), where D = {0, . . . , t−
1}N is a space of possible assignment draws, and P is a probability measure with P (∅) = 0
and P (D) = 1. F is the usual σ-algebra formed by unions, intersections, and complements
from the elements of D.
The probability that an outcome yi(d) is observed under non-interference partition Q
i is
just the probability measure of the partition containing the reference assignment d:
πyi(d) = P (Q
i(d)) (3.4.1)
In order for a quantity of interest to be estimable, each potential outcome in the quan-
tity must be observable with positive probability,10 and at least one unit in each treatment
condition must be observed.
Definition 3.4.3 (Estimability). Let Qi denote the non-interference condition for unit i. A
quantity, τ , over the units Ω is said to be estimable if:
1. πyi(d) > 0 for all d ∈ Si ∪ S′i and all i ∈ Ω
2. For each d ∈ D, P ({d}) > 0 implies that there exists di ∈ Si, dj ∈ S′j such that
d ∈ Qi(di) ∩Qj(dj) for i, j ∈ Ω
10A more precise statement would be that for the quantity to be estimated without distributional assump-
tions, each potential outcome must be observed with positive probability. This will have implications for the
consistency of the estimate under the Bayesian approach described below. See Rubin (1978) for more on this
point.
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To understand this framework, consider a standard experimental setup with binary treat-
ment status and N units in the population. In this setting each unit, i has treatment assign-
ment di ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, when isolating the effect of di = 1 or di = 0, one assumes that
all other units are not given any other treatment. Thus, the “treated potential outcome”
for i, generally denoted as yi(1), can be written as yi(di) where the reference assignment
di = {d|di = 1, dj = 0, j 6= i} denotes an assignment draw where unit i has been assigned to
treatment and all other units have been assigned to no treatment. Similarly, the “untreated
potential outcome” for unit i, generally denoted as yi(0) may be written as yi(0), where 0
is the assignment vector where each unit in the population is assigned to no treatment. The
two treatment conditions of interest are the isolated effect of treatment on a unit and the un-
treated condition for a unit, i.e. S = {{d1}, . . . , {dN}} and S ′ = {{0}, . . . , {0}}. Averaging
over all units, the usual quantity of interest can then be written as:





This quantity, the standard direct treatment effect, requires no assumptions about non-
interference. Independently of this experiment, ({0, 1}N ,F , P ) and associated quantities,
the associated non-interference condition in this classical setting is defined as as Qi(di) =
{d|di = 1} and Qi(0) = {d|di = 0}. The probabilities of assignment to treated and untreated
potential outcomes for i, generally denoted as πi(1) and πi(0), are defined as:
πyi(di) = π
1
i = P (Q
i(di)) = P ({d|di = 1}) (3.4.3)
πyi(0) = π
0
i = P (Q
i(0)) = P ({d|di = 0})
While the usual complete non-interference condition has been stipulated, more compli-
cated assumptions about spillovers may be made over the same data.
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3.4.2 Social Distance and Convergence in Expectation
The statistical approach advocated in this paper is to stipulate successively “more restrictive”
non-interference assumptions in terms of social distance. It will be shown that a class of esti-
mators that condition upon the probability of assignment generally converge in expectation
under this sequence of more restrictive assumptions. Since the estimators are broadly de-
sign unbiased/consistent, this technique produces causally identified estimates without direct
knowledge of the interference structure.
Experimental units are endowed with social distance through the quasi-metric ρ defined
in section 3.3.2. Interference with observing the potential outcome of unit i occurs if another
treated unit, j, is “too close” to i. This suggests restrictions of the form dj = 0 if ρ(i, j) < c,
where c is some distance restriction imposed on the estimator. However, the relationship
between c and the potential outcomes is unknown to the researcher. Consider an estimator
τ̂ that provides a consistent estimate of the quantity of interest, when conditioning upon
known probabilities of assignment to respective treatment conditions. Let τ̂(c) denote the
same estimator under the restriction implied by c; that is, the estimator is conditioned upon
probabilities implied by the distance restriction c. The main mathematical result of this
















| is arbitrarily small for k > K.
The non-interference assumption implied by a distance restriction is stated formally below.
Definition 3.4.4. Consider some constant c ∈ [0,∞] for each unit i with reference as-
signment d ∈ Si ∪ S′. A non-interference assumption induced by c is a partition of
assignment vectors that satisfies:
Q̃ic(d) = {d + d′|d′j = 0 if ρ(i, j) ≤ c}, d′ ∈ D
for each reference assignment d ∈ Si ∪ S′i.
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It is important to note that the set of reference assignments and treatment conditions may
not be identical over distance restrictions since some restrictions may not be stringent enough
to permit observation. For instance, under the restriction c = 0, there are by definition no
spillovers between units (as in the classical case). In this situation, the notion of indirect
exposure does not exist so such a treatment condition is never observed for any unit. It
is true, however, that any reference assignments and treatment conditions that exist at a
particular distance restriction will necessarily exist at more stringent distance restrictions.
A second definition, which captures treatment conditions induced by the distance restric-
tion c, will also be useful. The definition states that an observed treatment assignment vector,
d∗ satisfies a treatment condition induced by c for unit i, Si(c) when there exists a refer-
ence assignment in the treatment condition for which d∗ is contained in the non-interference
assumption induced by c.
Definition 3.4.5. A treatment assignment vector d∗ is included in a treatment condition
induced by c for unit i if there exists d ∈ Si such that d∗ ∈ Q̃ic(d). This will be denoted by
d∗ ∈ Si(c). The treatment condition induced by c will be denoted as S(c).
Using this definition, the estimator implied by a particular distance restriction, c, can be
stated:
Definition 3.4.6. For each reference assignment, d ∈ Si, define:
πyi(d)(c) = P (Q̃
i
c(d))
For a given assignment vector d∗, the corresponding estimator under the restriction implied
by c for the expected value of the treatment condition will be denoted by:
̂y(S,S ′)w(c)
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The associated quantity of interest is:
̂τ(S,S ′)w(c) = ̂y(S,S ′)w(c)− ̂y(S ′,S)w(c)
The analysis requires one important assumption, what will be referred to as the non-
cascading assumption. Intuitively, this means that: a) the distance measure is well-behaved–
more restrictive assumptions on distance imply that the observed outcome is closer to the
desired potential outcome; and b) it cannot be the case that assigning any unit i to di 6= 0
implies that the potential outcome for every unit is affected, i.e. there are no spillovers




|yi(d′)− yi(d)| = αi,d(c)
Then:













Assumption 3.4.8 (Non-Cascading Assumption). Let
max
d′∈Q̃ic(d)
|yi(d′)− yi(d)| = αi,d(c)
As c→∞, αi,d(c)→ 0 for all i and d ∈ Si ∪ S′i.
Corollary 3.4.9 (Convergence in Expectation). Under assumption 3.4.8, E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w(c))→
y(S,S ′i)w as c → ∞. Define a sequence (ck)
∞
k=1 → ∞. It follows that for every ε > 0, there
exists K such that |E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w(cK))− E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w(ck))| < ε for all k > K.
11This idea may be somewhat testable if one considers the “uniformity trial” framework discussed by Rosen-
baum (2007). One can use either a pre-measurement or a placebo trial to estimate the potential outcome under
the no treatment condition, and compare the potential outcomes of untreated units in the actual experiment.
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Although the proof is relatively straightforward, it has deep implications for the analytic
framework. In particular, it shows that particular units i that may be highly influenced or
are highly influential in terms of spillovers are unlikely to make a large impact on the bias.
Thus, while the non-cascading assumption is a pointwise convergence property, the estimator
behaves much like uniform convergence when there are few influential or highly influenced
units. This also suggests some basic guidelines in selecting a social distance for the analysis.
The goal is to select a distance measure for which those units that interfere the most with
observing the potential outcome of i are seen as “close” to i. While mathematically any social
distance measure that satisfies the non-cascading assumption is admissible, it will typically
be necessary to find a social distance that quickly “removes” the bias due to spillovers due
to a strong negative correlation to the magnitude of spillovers.
Non-Interference and Social Distance in the Example
The toy example affords an opportunity to clarify some of the complexities of the above expo-
sition. In particular, consider a simulated experiment where exactly 10 of the 50 experimental
units, in the same configuration shown in figure ??, are treated (with equal probability). A
natural choice for a non-interference assumption over a social network is the network distance,
the minimum number of edges between two nodes. Formally, the minimum path length be-
tween two nodes, i and j, defines the distance measure, ρ(i, j). If c = 1, the potential
outcomes of a unit may vary with the treatment status of its neighbors, but not with the
treatment status of the neighbors of its neighbors. If c = 2, a neighbor of a neighbor may
interfere with the potential outcome of a unit, and so on. The classic non-interference as-
sumption has c = 0. Of course, if the nodes were defined with other features, social distances
(continuous or discrete) could be defined with respect to those features (e.g., geographic dis-
tance, frequency of interaction, friendship). This network distance formulation is formalized
below.
Definition 3.4.10. A path is an alternating sequence of edges and nodes where each node
is incident with the edge before and after it in the sequence. The shortest path between two
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nodes i and j, ρ(i, j), is the path connecting i and j with smallest number of edges.
Definition 3.4.11. The restriction c, is a number such that two nodes, i and j, with ρ(i, j) ≤
c, implies:
d′ /∈ Q̃ic(d) if dj 6= d′j
The resulting non-interference assumption induced by c corresponding to a reference assign-
ment, d∗, is:
Q̃ic(d
∗) = {d|dk = d∗k if ρ(i, k) ≤ c}
Using this definition, the non-interference assumptions for each value c are:
Q̃ic(dj) = {d|dj = 1, dk = 0 if j 6= k and ρ(i, k) ≤ c} (3.4.4)
Q̃ic(0) = {d|dk = 0 if ρ(i, k) ≤ c}
Figure 3.3 depicts how the choice of c affects observed potential outcomes. In figure
3.3, 10 of 50 units are selected to receive treatment (those units with a thick red border),
while no other units receive treatment. The magenta units correspond to units for which
yi(1) observed, and the light blue units correspond to units where yi(0) is observed. Finally,
yij(0, 1) is observed among the light green units, those units with a single treated neighbor.
Finally, complex outcomes are represented by gray units, which do not correspond to any of
the outcomes of interest. Note that yij(1, 1) is never observed in these graphs.
Increasing c = 1 to c = 2 makes it more difficult to observe the outcomes of interest.
Only two untreated units cannot be classified as an outcome of interest when c = 1, but
23 unclassified outcomes for untreated units and 6 unclassified outcomes for treated units
emerge when c is increased to 2. For example, six treated units cannot be classified when
c = 1 is increased to c = 2 because they are separated by a path length of 2. In general,
stipulating more stringent non-interference assumptions through a higher c, or increased
network density will yield more units observed with complex spillovers. Thus, under complete
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(b) c = 2
Figure 3.3 describes how selecting c = 1 and c = 2 affects the ability to observe various potential outcomes,
with 3.3(a) depicting c = 1, and 3.3(b) depicting c = 2. In each subfigure, a graph with 50 units, where
10 have been selected for treatment, is depicted. Those units with a thick red border correspond to units
selected for treatment, while the rest of the units are not selected for treatment. The magenta units are those
units for which yi(1) is cleanly observed, and the light blue units are those for which yi(0) is cleanly observed.
The light green units are those for which yij(0, 1) is cleanly observed, i.e., the spillover to an untreated unit
, i from a single treated neighbor, j, is observed without interference. yij(1, 1) is never observed in the
graphs. The gray units correspond to complex spillovers where none of the potential outcomes of interest
are observed.
random assignment, estimation is likely to get increasingly inefficient as c or network density
grows.
3.4.3 The Relationship Between Distance Restrictions and the Admissible
Sample
In this subsection, the toy example discussed above is extended to a more realistic setting. In
particular, a network containing 10,000 nodes is constructed from the Barabási-Albert algo-
rithm with m = 2. Furthermore, 250 nodes are randomly selected to receive the treatment,
and all the quantities of interest are constructed as above. The first set of considerations
involves evaluating the tradeoff between the admissible sample and the distance restrictions
placed on the calculation. The admissible sample is defined as the set of nodes that may
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be placed in each treatment condition of interest with positive probability under the dis-
tance restriction under consideration. In order to generate these probabilities, 250 nodes
were selected for treatment under complete randomization over 5,000 draws and the respec-
tive treatment conditions (with respect to the distance restriction, c) were calculated in each
draw. The probability of assignment to any treatment condition for a node, conditional on
the distance restriction, is simply the fraction of draws over which that node is observed to
be in the treatment condition. Table 3.1 summarizes the results for the admissible sample.
Admissible Sample
c = 1 9983
c = 2 5838
c = 3 394
Table 3.1: Admissible Sample
Table 3.1 demonstrates a strong tradeoff between the admissible sample and the distance
restriction, c. Once c is increased to 3, only 4% of the original nodes are included in the
admissible sample. There are a number of ways of boosting the sample when more stringent
restrictions are considered. First, the researcher may choose to estimate different admissible
samples for different quantities of interest, which would boost the sample since a node is not
required to be observed in each treatment condition of interest. The downside of this approach
is that the units are no longer comparable across quantities of interest. A second, more
complicated approach is to incorporate the distance restrictions explicitly in the sampling
algorithm to guarantee that more units will be observed in each treatment condition by
minimizing the number of units experiencing complex spillovers at a particular distance
restriction. This is a significantly more complicated task than the complete randomization
considered above, but it yields strong gains in the efficiency of the estimation procedure.
This approach, as well as other design phase criteria, are discussed at length in Coppock and
Sircar (2014).
Nonetheless, the researcher must balance generally conservatism in terms of the distance
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restriction and the representativeness of the sample. Figure 3.4 shows the ratio of the degree
distribution12 under c = 2 to the degree distribution under c = 1 (for degrees ≤ 21). The ratio
shrinks at higher degrees, suggesting that higher distance restrictions underrepresent nodes
with higher degrees. Under c = 2, only one node of degree greater than 31 is included in the
admissible sample (not shown), whereas there are 78 such nodes in the original sample. In
order to address this issue, the researcher may choose to define reference assignments where
a fixed set of higher degree nodes are guaranteed to be treated/untreated and the complete
randomization is conducted over lower degree nodes. Alternatively, the researcher may define
treatment conditions with less restrictive assumptions for higher degree nodes (e.g., the node























































Figure 3.4: Ratio of Degree Distribution under c = 2 to c = 1
Figure 3.4 shows the ratio of the degree distribution under c = 2 to the degree distribution under c = 1.
In the previous section, the framework was defined with regard to the probability of as-
signment to each treatment condition. At first, this might seem odd since the researcher is
unlikely to randomize with respect to any characteristics of the nodes. However, the very
structure of the network affects the probability of observing each treatment condition. In
order to see this, figure 3.5 plots the values of the potential outcomes13 associated with the
12The degree distribution is defined as the distribution of the degrees of the nodes in a network.
13The potential outcome is drawn as a function of the degree of the node. More information is provided in
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direct treatment condition, S1, and untreated condition, S0, against their respective proba-
bilities of assignment to the treatment condition under c = 1. A clear relationship is observed
in both cases, with directed treatment condition demonstrating a sharper relationship due
to the fact that both untreated potential outcome and treatment effect for a node are drawn
as a function of its degree. Taken together, figure 3.5 demonstrates the need for address-
ing the probabilities of assignment to treatment conditions for estimation of causal effects
under spillovers. The researcher is recommended to plot the probabilities of assignment to
a treatment condition against observed outcomes in the treatment condition to understand
this relationship.










































Figure 3.5 describe how the potential outcomes in the directly treated [3.5(a)] and untreated [3.5(b)] con-
ditions vary as a function of their respective probabilities of assignment to the treatment condition. The
lighter colored bands represent 90% confidence intervals within a ± .001 (± .01) band for the directly treated
(untreated) condition, and point estimate represents the mean over the band.
3.4.4 Generality of the Social Distance Approach
In this paper, the goal is to draw causal inferences about quantities of interest without making
parametric or functional assumptions about potential outcomes in the presence of spillovers.
the next section.
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Although the social distance approach is more general than approaches that assume known
structures for spillovers, one might wonder about the existence of more general approaches
to causal identification in this setting.
It is possible to show that the social distance approach characterizes a fully general
framework. To see why, first consider a situation where the analyst knows that spillovers
from each treated unit reaches every other unit in the population. In this scenario, the
analyst cannot directly observe more than one treatment condition of interest, whereas the
quantity of interest requires two such conditions to be observed. More concretely, consider
some unit u ∈ Ω. Since spillovers emanating from u reach every other unit, the outcome
observed for some other unit v is always dependent upon the treatment status of u; that is,
for v ∈ Ω \ {u}, yv|du = au 6= yv|du = a′u when au 6= a′u. Since this is true for each unit
u ∈ Ω, each constellation of treated units admits a unique potential outcome for each unit in
the population.
Causal identification in this setting, thus, requires units for which spillovers will not reach
every other unit in the population, as well as units for which there exists some unit from
spillovers do not reach. Consider a function ρ and let u, v ∈ Ω. Define ρ(u, u) = 0, ρ(u, v) = 1
if spillovers from v reach u and ρ(u, v) = 2 if spillovers from v do not reach u. It is easy
to verify that ρ is a quasi-metric that satisfies the non-cascading assumption. Therefore, at
a minimum, the analyst requires assumptions that are mapped to a social distance metric
satisfying the non-cascading assumption.
In a non-parametric setting, the maximum amount of information an analyst can bring
to the problem is the relative magnitude [as opposed to absolute magnitude] of spillovers
between units. Now consider a function ρ∗ : Ω × Ω → R such that for each u, u′, v, v′ ∈ Ω,
ρ∗(u, v) ≤ ρ∗(u′, v′) implies that the magnitude of the spillover from v to u is greater than
or equal to of that from v′ to u′. Furthermore, for all u, v ∈ Ω, u 6= v, define c∗ such ρ∗ > c∗
implies that spillovers do not exist between the units under consideration. The non-cascading
assumption requires that for each u ∈ Ω, there exists some v, v′ ∈ Ω, where ρ∗(u, v) > c∗
and ρ∗(v′, u) > c∗. Now let min ρ∗ ≥ c and max ρ∗ ≤ 2c; this can always be done through
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simple transformations that preserve the order for some candidate social distance function
that meet the above conditions. It can be easily verified that ρ∗ is a quasi-metric that satisfies
the non-cascading assumption. This shows that any information that be can brought to bear
on the problem of spillovers in a non-parametric setting can be stated in terms of a social
distance metric. A “true” social distance metric will be any quasi-metric ρ̃ such that for each
u, u′, v, v′ ∈ Ω, ρ∗(u, v) ≤ ρ∗(u′, v′) implies ρ̃(u, v) ≤ ρ̃(u′, v′).
However, the researcher will rarely possess the necessary information to determine a true
social distance metric, and not all admissible social distance measures will always be usable
or available. For instance, the social distance metric may only be weakly correlated to the
bias, so it is relatively ineffective in removing such bias. Furthermore, the actual sample
may exhibit small deviations from the non-cascading assumption. In order to address these
concerns, the following section develops more stringent assumptions on the hypothesized
social distance measure (that the expected bias as a function of the social distance measure
is decreasing and convex) in the estimation strategy. These more stringent assumptions allow
the researcher to generate a bound on the bias in estimation.
3.5 Analytical Framework
This section demonstrates how successive distance restrictions can be used in a practicable
empirical framework to estimate causal quantities of interest in the presence of spillovers.
In particular, an example of the estimation strategy is shown, as well as an intuitive test to
deduce convergence of the estimator with respect to distance restrictions. Given the complex
pattern of probabilities of assignment to various treatment conditions, and the challenges
of efficiency and power in the spillover setting, this section proposes the use of cubic thin-
plate regression splines (TPRS) to flexibly estimate quantities of interest. The TPRS are
estimated using Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC), so statistical inference results from
a straightforward application of the Bayesian inferential machinery. The argument in this
section follows two steps. First, more stringent, but intuitive, assumptions are placed on
the social distance measures in order to create a bound on the bias in estimation, and it is
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shown that the preferred “measure” is that of the expected sample size at each restriction.
Second, the TPRS estimator, and resulting inferential framework, is developed over this social
distance measure.
The arguments in this section may be viewed as supporting the so-called “calibrated
Bayes” approach (Little, 2006, 2011), which seeks to develop flexible regression models with
the benefits of Bayesian estimation and desirable frequentist properties. However, unlike
traditional regression approaches where researchers can calibrate the “fit” of the model to
the data, no such fit may be analyzed with respect to the theoretical parameters of interest in
this paper. For this reason, the strategy must incorporate flexible estimation over increasingly
stringent distance restrictions and develop a test to deduce “convergence.”
Inference in this Bayesian framework is straightforward since it only requires a com-
parison of the posteriors generated from the model and is based upon credible intervals.
By contrast, it is somewhat unclear how to proceed in a frequentist framework and create
classical confidence intervals. Fisher-style randomization inference is hampered by several
treatment conditions of interest and the fact that for many units no treatment condition of
interest will be observed. Furthermore, as Aronow and Samii (2013) show, design-consistent
estimation of the variance of standard inverse-probability weighted (IPW) estimators, the
usual estimator in experimental settings, is typically not possible.
Section 5.1 develops the form of the social distance measure that will be used in real em-
pirical settings. Section 5.2 develops the proposed TPRS estimator, section 5.3 discusses the
simulated data, and section 5.4 describes the inferential framework with sample calculations.
Finally, section 5.5 compares the TPRS estimator to more classic inverse-probably weighted
(IPW) estimators, typically used in experimental settings, through simulation. It is shown
that TPRS provides superior performance in terms of root-mean squared error (RMSE), with
a reduction of approximately 30% in RMSE.
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3.5.1 Developing a Plausible Social Distance Measure
As discussed in the previous section, defining a usable social distance measure for empirical
analysis can be difficult. In order create a practicable measure, it will be important to address
two issues.
First, while only the non-cascading assumption is required for appropriate estimators
to converge to the quantity of interest, without more stringent assumptions the expected
bias may exhibit serious non-monotonicities (and non-convexities) with respect to the social
distance measure. In other words, for the purposes of analysis, it is desirable to choose a social
distance measure such that the function mapping the social distance measure to expected
bias is strictly decreasing and convex.
Second, it is important to select a social distance measure that is sensitive to the sample
size. In other words, it is entirely plausible that a more stringent distance restriction barely
affects the sample under consideration. In order to explicitly tether the sample size to the
social distance measure, the social distance measure will be taken to be the expected sample
size under each distance restriction.
Assumptions on Social Distance Measure
The following assumption of a decreasing, convex function relating expected bias and the
social distance measure will be necessary to make calculations.14
Assumption 3.5.1 (Decreasing, Convex Bias Function). Consider an unbounded increasing
sequence of distance restrictions, (ck)
∞
k=0. Define the expected bias function:
B(ck) = |E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(ck)− y(S,S
′
i)w|
This expected bias function is decreasing and convex. In particular:
1. B(ck) ≤ B(cj) if j < k
14I am particularly grateful to Macartan Humphreys for pointing out importance of these assumptions for
this framework.
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2. For every 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, B(λck + (1− λ)cj)) ≤ λB(ck) + (1− λ)B(cj) for j 6= k
Although the following assumption is not necessary, it is natural to assume that the bias
is always going in the same direction. The following assumption states this formally:
Assumption 3.5.2 (Same Direction Bias). The bias of the estimator will always be in the
same direction. That is,
|E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(cj)− E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w)(ck)| ≤ B(cj); k > j
Note that the non-cascading assumption implies that B(ck)→ 0 as k →∞. Using these
definitions and assumptions, one can put a bound on the bias at the distance restriction
cK , given an assumption about the value of B(ck). In particular, the decreasing convexity





This follows from setting λ =
cK−cj
ck−cj and solving through the inequality, B(λck + (1 −
λ)cj) ≤ λB(ck) + (1− λ)B(cj).
The next theorem shows that this inequality implies that convergence of the estimator for
the expected value of the treatment condition over distance restrictions implies an unbiased
estimate. It is for this reason that it will be desirable to demonstrate convergence of the
estimator.
Theorem 3.5.3 (Duality Between Convergence and Unbiasedness). Consider the expectation
of an unbiased estimator, E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(.), and assume the assumptions in 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. If




E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(cj) = E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w)(cK) for some K > j
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then
1. E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(cj) = E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w)(ck) for all k ≥ K
2. B(ck) = 0 for all k ≥ K
Proof: Note that:
E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(ck) = y(S,S
′
i)w +B(ck) or E(
̂y(S,S ′i)w)(ck) = y(S,S
′
i)w −B(ck); B(ck) ≥ 0
(3.5.2)
If E( ̂y(S,S ′i)w)(cj) = E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w)(cK), then |E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w)(cj) − E( ̂y(S,S
′
i)w)(cK)| = 0
Plugging in the equations in (3.5.2), it follows that |B(cj)−B(cK)| = 0.
If B(cj)−B(cK) = 0, then consider (3.5.1). It follows that B(cj)−B(ck) = 0 for k ≥ K.
It also follows, from l’Hôpital’s Rule, limk→∞B(cj) − B(ck) = B(cj) − limk→∞B(ck) = 0.
The non-cascading assumption implies limk→∞B(ck) = 0, so it follows that B(cj) = 0 and
that B(ck) = 0 for k ≥ K. Plugging this back into (3.5.2) proves the theorem.
One can also use (3.5.1) to generate a maximum bound on the bias in estimation based on
the statistical power of the procedure from assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. In particular, let ∆Bjk
be the minimum detectable difference in bias. That is, given restrictions cj and cK , ascertain
the minimum value of B(cj) − B(cK) that can be detected from the statistical procedure.





While (3.5.3) is just a simple rearranging of terms, it can yield important insights in
a power analysis and do much to convince the reader of the quality of the estimate. The
bound requires some assumption about the magnitude of the bias at B(ck), but at a relatively
stringent distance restriction one may reasonably assume the value to be near zero (or one
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may perform sensitivity analysis on the values for ck and B(ck)).
15 Under this assumption,
and in an experimental setting with sufficient to guarantee that ∆Bjk is relatively small, the
magnitude of the bias at B(cK) is likely to be small.
Tethering the Social Distance Measure to the Sample Size
One way in which the researcher may “cheat” is to consider more restrictive distance restric-
tions that do not dramatically alter the sample under consideration. For instance, for certain
treatment assignment vectors in the example, there may be little difference in the sample
under consideration for c = 0 and c = 1. In such a situation, it may seem that estimator has
converged, when in reality the samples under consideration are very similar. Such a scenario
is also likely to cause non-convexities in the distance measure.
In order to prevent this situation, one can tether the social distance measure to the sample
sizes under consideration. More precisely, let E(N(y(S,S ′), ck)) be the expected sample size
under consideration when the sample is restricted to a specific distance restriction for a
particular treatment condition of interest. Define an induced distance restriction:
c′k = E(N(y(S,S ′), 0))− E(N(y(S,S ′), ck))
These new social distance measures are a form of “convexification” of the existing social
distance measure because small/no changes in the sample size for significant changes in the
existing social distance measure may create non-convexities. In these new sample size based
social distance measures, the greatest restrictions correspond to those situations where the
existing social distance measure induces very few units to be observed in the treatment
condition of interest. If the researcher believes that there is still a significant bias present
under such stringent distance restrictions, then this implies that the sample is not close to
satisfying the non-cascading assumption.
15As will be shown below, such an assumption will have intuitive meaning when the distance measure is
tethered to the sample size.
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3.5.2 Developing the Estimator
This sections develops the TPRS estimator for experimental analysis under spillovers. The
process entails iteratively fitting TPRS and checking for convergence at the end of the process.
In particular, a TPRS is fit to the data with respect to the probability of assignment induced
by the weakest restriction and the residuals are obtained. In the next iteration, the residuals
corresponding to those observations satisfying a stronger distance restriction are taken as
the dependent variable, and TPRS is fit to these residuals with respect to the probabilities
of assignment induced by this stronger distance restriction. The researcher continues this
process until convergence, where convergence is achieved when the TPRS approximates a
zero function.
TPRS is a penalized spline technique which fits naturally into a Bayesian regression
framework and can be easily estimated through open source software without serious diffi-
culty. While other flexible semi-parametric or data mining methods may also work in this
context, the main benefits of this approach are its simplicity, access to a natural inferential
framework and ability to prevent serious overfitting of the data. TPRS was first introduced
by Wood (2003) and extended to a fully Bayesian implementation (in open source software)
by Crainiceanu et al. (2005b), which the exposition below follows closely.
Let πi(c) denote the probability of assignment to a treatment condition under the distance
restriction c, and let yi be the corresponding observed outcome. The goal is to determine the
“smooth” function m such that satisfies:
yi = m(πi(c)) + εi; εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (3.5.4)
Under this smoothness assumption, the weighted average expected value of condition S









In order to estimate the function m, TPRS is used. TPRS addresses several issues which
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are beyond the scope of this paper, including admitting a low-rank spline which has low
sensitivity to number and placement of knots. Consider a sequence of knots κ1, . . . , κK . The
cubic TPRS to the function m, m̂, can be written as:




It will be easier to rewrite the equation in matrix form:
̂m(πi(c),θ) = Xb + ZKg (3.5.7)
where θ = {b0, b1, g1, . . . , gK }, Xi = (1, πi(c)), and ZKi = (|xi − κ1|3, . . . , |xi − κK |3) . For
the “smoothing parameter,” λ, the penalized approach yields the parameter estimates θ̂:













with Γ a K ×K matrix with the (j, k) entry defined as |κj − κk|3.
Now, let Z = ZKΓ
− 1
2 and γ = Γ
1
2 g
Ruppert et al. (2003) and Crainiceanu et al. (2005b) have shown the equivalence of (3.5.8)
with parameters resulting from estimation of the following Bayesian mixed model:
y = Xb + Zγ + ε (3.5.9)
γi ∼ N(0, σ2γ) εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
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3.5.3 Data
The method is demonstrated on simulated data. The simulation is generated to be realistic
but also to maximize difficulties that might arise during estimation. Since the probability of
assignment to each condition is likely to be a function of the network, potential outcomes at
the level of the node are drawn as a function of node’s degree. Furthermore, the extent of
complex spillovers are constructed to be a function of relative “centrality” of the node, where
each node receives spillovers from nodes that are within a network distance of 4, and the
magnitude of spillovers is constructed be extremely large by most empirical standards. As
before, a fixed scale-free network with 10,000 nodes is drawn according the Barabási-Albert
algorithm with m = 2, which guarantees that the minimum degree for a node is 2 and that
the network is fully connected.




















yi(di) = yi(0) + τi(di)
Spillovers were modeled as a function of the network adjacency matrix, A, which is a
symmetric matrix where the entry in row i and column j, (A)ij , takes the value 1 if there
exists an edge between nodes i and j, and 0 otherwise. For AK , it follows that the entry in
row i and column j, (AK)ij , denotes the number of paths of length K between nodes i and
j. If treated, the direct treatment effect of node j “spills over” to node i according to the
function κi ∗ φKj τi(dj) ∗ (AK)ji.
For a given assignment vector d∗, spillovers were generated if K ≤ 4 with φj = 0.2 and
φj = 0.6 and κi = 1 if d
∗
i = 1. This captures the following realistic conditions: 1) spillovers
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move a long way (and thus the estimate under the most restrictive condition c = 2 is not
unbiased); and 2) a significant portion of the direct effect of the treatment spills over the
network. The complexity of this process provides a good test of the proposed estimator. The
observed outcome for unit i is given by:
yobsi (d





φKj ∗ d∗j ∗ τi(dj) ∗ (AK)ji (3.5.10)
A relatively small number of units, 250, out of a total of 10,000 units were treated to
minimize the extent of complex spillovers in the data and allows for more frequent observation
of treatment conditions of interest. Although this paper has not discussed optimal designs in
a spillover setting, one might reasonably expect the researcher to take a similar approach and
directly treat a fairly small percentage of a large number number of units. In the situation
where the researcher chose less optimal designs than the one presented here, one might
reasonably expect even greater efficiency benefits from the TPRS approach due to smaller
samples sizes in treatment conditions of interest. Tests are currently being conducted in a
higher bias environment, where a higher percentage of units are selected for assignment to
treatment.
3.5.4 The Inferential Procedure
The probability of assignment to each treatment condition under each distance restriction
was calculated from 5000 simulations [complete random assignment of 250 nodes out of
10,000 nodes] in a manner described in the previous section. In this section, the method
is demonstrated with respect to estimating the direct treatment condition and the indirect
exposure condition. Once the probability of assignment under each distance restriction is
obtained, TPRS can be fit to the data. This subsection describes statistical inference resulting
from this framework.
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Sample Calculation for Direct Treatment Condition
In this analysis, as in the previous section, the social distance considered is network distance.
In order to estimate the effect, and assess convergence, the procedure is considered at distance
restrictions c = 0, 1, 2 to estimate the average of the direct treatment condition. The data
are generated with φj = 0.6, which means 60% of a unit’s treatment effect spills over to
neighbors.
Let y1(c) denote the vector of directly treated units observed under restriction c with in-
dividual observations y1i (c), and let m̂c denote the estimated mean function of y
1
i (c) resulting
from the TPRS fit with respect to assignment probability to direct treatment, π1i (c). The
estimation strategy follows the following steps, starting with c = 0, and fitting iteratively up
to c = 2. (or until convergence).
1. Calculate mean function, m̂c, of y
1(c)
2. Form the residual ε1i (c+ 1) = y
1
i (c+ 1)− ̂mc(π1i (c)), the residual for treated units that
satisfy the restriction c+ 1 with respect to the mean function corresponding to c.
3. Fit the TPRS with dependent variable ε1i (c+1) and predictor π
1
i (c+1), yielding function
η̂c+1
4. Form m̂c+1 = m̂c + η̂c+1
5. Test for convergence by checking if y1i (c + 1) − ̂mc+1(π1i (c+ 1)) approximates a zero
function
6. Repeat steps 2-5 until convergence is reached
One example of the calculation is conducted here. The true value of the average of the
direct treatment condition is 4.95. At c = 0, the estimate of average of the direct treatment
condition, m̂0 is the naive mean of treated units, which is 5.28 in this case. For c = 1, the
residual ε1i (1) is constructed by taking the observed values of y
1(1) and subtracting off m̂0.
Now, TPRS is fit to ε1i (1) with the predictor π
1
i (1). The fitted spline, η̂1, with 90% posterior
interval, is shown in figure 3.6(a).
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(b) Fit to Residual under c = 2
It is evident that the spline is downward sloping, and a significant portion of the 90%
posterior interval fails to intersect with the zero function, suggesting that the estimator has
not reached convergence. Now, m̂1 = m̂0 + η̂1 is constructed and the estimated expectation






̂m1(π1i (1)) = 4.97
Since convergence has not been reached, the restriction c = 2 is considered. Again, a
residual under the restriction of c = 2 is formed as ε1i (2) = y
1
i (2)− ̂m1(π1i (1)), and the TPRS
is fit with the predictor π1i (2). The resulting spline, η2 with 90% posterior interval is shown in
figure 3.6(b). This spline seems very close to the zero function, suggesting convergence. Since
this suggests convergence, we take the value ̂y(S1,S0)(2) as the estimate of the average of
the direct treatment condition. Once again, the estimate is calculated through fitted values.
First, the mean function is constructed, m̂2 = m̂1 + η̂2. Then, the the estimate of the average






̂m2(π1i (2)) = 4.93
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Finally, using the Bayesian inferential framework, the 90% posterior interval of ̂y(S1,S0)(2)
is calculated to be the interval between 4.45 and 5.41.
Sample Calculation for Indirect Exposure Condition
The calculation for the indirect exposure condition is a bit more tricky. First, notice that
indirect exposure, by definition, cannot be observed if c = 0; thus, the estimator is only
considered with respect to c = 1, 2. Second, the probability is at the level of the dyad, not
the unit. However, since the data drawn from complete randomization, the spline model will
use probabilities at the level of the unit i by summing all the probabilities for which i receives
indirect exposure from exactly one neighbor in the network [since the dyad probabilities are
nearly identical]. If the analyst wishes to consider differing probabilities at the dyad level,
she is suggests to fit a two-level model with the higher level modeling probabilities at the unit
level, and the lower level modeling dyadic probabilities within a neighborhood of the unit.
Thus, in this discussion, the probability that unit i receives indirect exposure from exactly
one neighbor under the restriction c will be denoted as π01i (c).
Let y01(c) denote the vector of directly treated units observed under restriction c with
individual observations y01i (c), and let m̂c denote the estimated mean function of y
01
i (c)
resulting from the TPRS fit with respect to assignment probability to direct treatment,
π01i (c). The estimation strategy follows the steps above beginning with c = 1, substituting
y01(c) for y1(c) and π01i (c) for π
1
i (c). In this simulation, 20% of a unit’s treatment effect spills
over to neighbors. The true value of the average indirect exposure condition is 3.59.
Figure 3.7(a) demonstrates the fit of the TPRS to the indirect exposure outcome, m̂1, with
90% posterior intervals for the restriction c = 1. The residual ε01i (2) = y
01
i (2) − ̂m1(π01i (1))
is calculated, and the TPRS is fit to the residual to obtain the function η̂2, which is depicted
in figure 3.7(b) with 90% posterior intervals. As before, the mean function is calculated as
m̂2 = m̂1 + η̂2. Once again, figure 3.7(b) suggests convergence to the zero function. The
point estimate at c = 2 is 3.74 with the 90% interval 3.54 to 3.94.
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(b) Fit to Residual under c = 2
A Note about Convergence
While likelihood ratio tests have been developed for this penalized spline setting (Crainiceanu
et al., 2005a), these tests may be of low power or more difficult to implement. It is imper-
ative to develop high powered tests in this setting in order to make proper inferences about
convergence. In particular, weak tests will create too lax a standard for convergence. The
logic used here to determine convergence is straightforward. Once a model has been fit to
the residual in the manner described in this section, one wants to test whether the predicted
function has converged pointwise to the zero function.
In order to this, it is assumed that εi ∼ N(η̂c, σ2εi) are drawn independently from the
posterior, and 90% posterior intervals are analyzed pointwise to see if they bracket 0. If 90%
of these posterior intervals bracket 0, then the estimator is said to converge. Of course, other
standards may be used in this process. More testing is required to understand the properties
of this form of testing.
3.5.5 Simulation
This subsection assesses the proposed TPRS estimator against more common approaches to
conditioning on the probability of assignment, namely the inverse-probably weighted (IPW)
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estimators. Two other estimators are compared here, the Horvitz-Thompson (Horvitz and
Thompson, 1952) and Hájek (Hájek, 1964) estimators. As is well-known, while these IPW
estimators display desirable properties in terms of bias and consistency, they often perform
poorly in terms of efficiency (Basu, 1971). In this spillover setting, the shrinking sample size
due to distance restrictions makes efficiency all the more important.
For a given treatment assignment vector, d∗, and indicator function I, the Horvitz-
Thompson estimator, conditional on the distance restriction c, for the expected value of
a treatment condition is given by:










For a given treatment assignment vector, d∗, the Hájek estimator, conditional on the
















The Hájek estimator is known to be much more efficient than the Horvitz-Thompson, but
if probability of assignment is accurate, the Horvitz-Thompson estimator is guaranteed to be
unbiased and the Hájek estimator is guaranteed to be consistent.
To assess the relative performance of Horvitz-Thompson, Hájek, and TPRS estimators in
this setting, 1000 simulations from the data-generating process in section 5.2 with φj = 0.6 for
the direct treatment condition, and 250 simulations with φj = 0.2 for the indirect exposure
condition. The results are shown in table ??
In both cases, once c = 2 is reached, the TPRS estimator shows a 30% improvement in
root-mean square (RMSE), which is quite significant. Thus, at higher distance restrictions,
precisely where power becomes more of the a problem, the TPRS significantly outperforms
the IPW estimators. At c = 1 the TPRS and Hájek estimator display similar performance,
and the Horvitz-Thompson estimator is always significantly more inefficient and largely im-
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Table 3.2: Indirect - ̂y(S01,S0)
c = 0 c = 1 c = 2
truth 4.95 4.95 4.95
HT
mean 5.31 4.95 4.96
RMSE (0.47) (0.37) (1.12)
Hájek
mean 5.31 4.96 4.95
RMSE (0.47) (0.21) (0.43)
TPRS
mean 5.31 4.93 4.92
RMSE (0.47) (0.20) (0.30)
Table 3.3: Direct - ̂y(S1,S0)
practicable in this setting. The provides strong evidence for use of the TPRS estimator. It
should also be noted that the data were not drawn from a “smooth” distribution since they
were drawn with respect to the degree of nodes. This suggests that even in settings where
splines are not supposed to perform as well, they may still perform significantly better than
IPW estimators.
Assessing Convergence
The procedure described to deduce convergence was implemented in each simulation. For
the directly treated outcome, the probability of reaching convergence according to the 90%
rule at c = 1 was 49% and at c = 2 was 94%, and for the indirect exposure outcome,
the probability of reaching convergence at c = 2 was 79%. This suggests that even under
relatively strong spillover biases (60% of the treatment effect in the direct case, and 20% in
the indirect case), the method converges the vast majority time relatively quickly (within 2
distance restrictions).
In any sort of power analysis, the probability of deducing convergence should also be cal-
culated. In short, in the design phase, the probability of deducing convergence, the likelihood
of detecting an effect, and the likely bias should all be calculated.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper has a provided a self-contained statistical inferential approach to the estimation
of causal quantities of interest in randomized experiments under spillovers and the evaluation
of estimators for this purpose.
This paper provides a technique to recover causal quantities of interest without specifying
an underlying stochastic process for spillovers or a priori knowledge of precisely which units
share spillovers over the network. Rather, estimation is conducted with respect to a social
distance measure, which is often a fairly intuitive measure (e.g., the network distance). This
technique is particularly useful for detection of biases under spillovers (which is not possible
in the a priori knowledge approach) and provides a more objective approach to the estimation
of quantities of interest under spillovers.
One of the biggest complicating factors for causal analysis under spillovers is that the
observed outcome for any unit is a function of the entire vector of treatment assignments. This
paper simplifies the problem by constructing potential outcomes, treatment conditions, and
quantities of interest from reference assignments. Furthermore, it is shown that experiments
are well-suited to recovering “average exposure effects,” which isolate the average effects of a
specified type of treatment exposure over the population; these quantities are particularly of
theoretical significance in analyses where a portion of the entire population is treated, perhaps
due to a fixed budget. This construction allows for a full inferential framework which assesses
the bias and efficiency of various estimators.
Finally, this paper proposes a Bayesian TPRS estimator and posterior inference to analyze
spillovers. It is shown that TPRS provides significant gains in efficiency vis-a-vis classic IPW
estimators. Inference from the posteriors is straightforward in this setting and avoids the
difficulties associated with inconsistency in estimation of variance parameters in a frequentist
setting. Furthermore, a simple comparison of posteriors from successive distance restrictions
yields a natural test of convergence for the proposed estimator.
There are several directions for future work on this topic; two are highlighted here. As was
discussed earlier, experimental design in this setting can become quite complicated. Unlike
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classical settings, where power is simply a function of the number treated and untreated
units, the calculations are far more complicated under spillovers. The extent of complex
spillovers increase as the number of units treated increases, and if too many units are treated
for a given number of nodes, it may be difficult to isolate treatment conditions of interest.
Furthermore, the researcher will typically have to move beyond complete randomization in
order to maximize the number of units over which inferences may be made. These issues are
discussed in more detail in Coppock and Sircar (2014).
At a theoretical level, the estimator will converge to true value irrespective of the social
distance measure used. In practice, however, different measures will yield different estimates.
In fact, it may be a good idea to estimate the model with a few natural distance measures to
demonstrate the robustness of the results. But, this also yields concerns. Which estimates
should the analyst believe? Intuitively, it makes sense to select the measure that yields
convergence with the greatest amount of power and one may look at the sample size in each
treatment condition induced by particular distance restrictions. In the case of the direct
treatment effect, one may check which estimator causes the most movement from the näıve
estimate.
The methods and approach discussed in this paper constitute a new, powerful way to view
spillovers between units in a randomized experimental context. This framework can shed light
on precisely what is being estimated when spillovers occur and the relative quality of inference
of various estimators. Most importantly, however, this paper shows that estimation of causal
quantities of interest is feasible with reasonable, intuitive assumptions.
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Appendix A: Existing Frameworks as Special Cases
Known Structure of Spillovers
If SUTVA holds, then IPW estimator provides a consistent/unbiased estimate of the quan-
tity of interest (direct treatment effect) under each distance restriction. To see this, notice
that non-interference assumption induced by each value of c is necessarily a non-interference
partition. The result follows from section 3.4. Thus, the naive estimate (with c = 0) yields
an unbiased/consistent estimate of the quantity of interest.
Double Randomization
Now consider a blocked design with double randomization, where spillover occur within blocks
but not across them. This exposition follows that of Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele
(2010) closely.
Let the sample of experimental units be denoted by Ω, nested in M blocks, with a total
sample size of N . The sample size of block bk ∈ {b1, . . . , bM} is denoted as Nk. For unit
i ∈ Ω, the block containing i will be denoted by b(i).
In double randomization, first a subset of M1 blocks are randomly chosen to receive the
condition α1, with the remaining blocks receiving α0. Typically, α0 and α1, 0 < α0 < α1 < 1,
correspond to the fraction of units receiving treatment in the corresponding block with the
condition assigned to block bk denoted as α(bk), so the condition received by the block
containing unit i will be denoted as α(b(i)). Treatment to each unit will be binary di ∈ {0, 1},
i.e. untreated or treated.
There standard quantities of interest, the total effect and the indirect effect, will be
discussed. The total effect is the effect of changing the treatment condition from being in a
block with α0 while untreated to a block with α1 while treated. The indirect effect is the
effect of changing the treatment condition from being in a block with α0 while untreated to
a block with α1 while untreated.
To keep the calculations clean, it will be assumed that α0Nk and α1Nk are integer-valued
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ways of selecting the conditions for blocks, and within each




ways of implementing the condition α(bk).
At the level of the experimental unit, there are 3 treatment conditions of interest: 1) Sα11
– direct treatment in a block receiving α1; 2) Sα10 – no treatment received in a block receiving
α1; and 3) Sα00 – no treatment received in a block receiving α0. Consider a binary treatment
assignment vector (di ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Ω). The corresponding treatment conditions for an
experimental unit i may be written as a set of assignment vectors, d:
• Treated in a block with α1 –
Sα11i =
d








• Untreated in a block with α1 –
Sα10i =
d








• Untreated in a block with α0 –
Sα00i =
d








Since the quantity of interest makes inferences about the effect of treated units in the
block, the reference assignments for unit i correspond to assignment vectors where only units
in block containing i are treated. In the analysis of such experiments, typically the cluster
averages for the quantities of interest are calculated. The quantities of interest, total effect




















































































































Notice, once again, that these quantities of interest are formed without making any as-
sumptions about the structure of spillovers between the units. Now, consider a class of
distance measures that fit the following criteria:
ρ(i, j) s.t.

ρ(i, j) = 0 if and only if i = j
ρ(i, j) ≤ c if and only if b(i) = b(j)
ρ(i, j) > c if and only if b(i) 6= b(j)
This implies that the blocks are induced by a certain class of distance measures, but
the blocks must be formed before experiment since they affect the randomization procedure.
Based upon the distance measure, the probability of inclusion under a distance restriction,
c, can be written easily through conditional probabilities:
πyi(d)(c) = P (α(b(i))) ∗ P (Sνi(c) | α(b(i))) ∗ P (d | Sνi(c), α(b(i))), ν ∈ {α00, α10, α11}
(3.6.3)
Under the assumption of no spillovers across blocks, the probability πyi(d)(c) is selected.
Typically, blocks are selected equal probability to receive α0 or α1, and α(bk)Nk units receive
treatment in bk through complete randomization with equal probabilities of inclusion.
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If unit i is in block bk receiving treatment, where block has α1Nk units treated, then the




























































Consider an observed assignment vector of d∗. Plugging the probabilities induced by the
restriction c into the IPW estimators yields the usual estimators of differences in the average










































∗)I(d∗i = 0, α(bk) = α0)
As before the function I denotes an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the
condition is met and 0 otherwise.
The double randomization design is dependent upon a known structure of blocks a priori,
where spillovers occur within blocks and not across them. This suggests that all plausible
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distance measures must yield the exact same block structure.
Once again this framework defines the quantity of interest independently of any inter-
ference assumptions. In doing so, it is possible to provide some guidance on extending the
double randomization framework. Suppose the researcher is concerned there may be spillovers
between two blocks, bj and bk, for which the same condition the same condition is generated,
α(bj) = α(bk) = α1. In the final analysis, the researcher decides to run the analysis in two
ways, under the standard double randomization estimator and by combining blocks j and k
(properly accounting for the probability that α(j) = α(k) = α1).
Even if the researcher gets different results, she will be unable to determine whether there
actually were or were not spillovers between block bj and bk, and thus unable to select to
a valid result. To see why, notice that the researcher has unwittingly changed the under-
lying quantity of interest. When the researcher combined blocks, she failed to notice that




ways of selecting the
condition α1 at the combined block of bj and bk. But this is not true if the blocks have









ways of selecting α1 jointly and thus certain
reference assignments have been omitted in this quantity.
This is clearly a very important problem in double randomization; one cannot simply
assume that there are no spillovers across blocks (when there may in fact be spillovers).
Remember, however, that the blocks have been induced by a distance measure, ρ. Using the
usual procedure of considering more stringent restrictions under ρ, c > c, one can arrive at a
defensible estimate even if there is a fear that there may be spillovers across blocks. Notice
that the procedure has nothing to do with combining or dropping blocks, but rather taking
subsets of blocks for which the outcomes of interest are cleanly observed.
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Chapter 4
A Tale of Two Villages: Kinship
Networks and Preference
Formation in Rural India
Abstract
This study investigates the effect of kinship networks on vote choice and issue pref-
erences over an electoral campaign in rural India. The study analyzes data collected
on political preferences and kinship networks in two villages just before and after the
campaign period during the 2011 Assembly election in West Bengal. The paper finds
very strong kinship network effects on changes in political opinions and vote choice over
a campaign. It is argued that this is due to information pooling, political discussion
and explicit coordination of political behavior within the family, which results from the
codependence between members of a family. Based on eight months of direct observa-
tion around the election, this paper provides strong qualitative evidence for the proposed
mechanisms. Furthermore, using a network autoregressive lag model, data on vote choice
and ideal point estimation, the paper provides fine grained quantitative information on
the role of kinship networks in changing vote choice and issue preferences.
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4.1 Introduction and Motivation
The study of voting behavior in a democratic developing country context is dominated by
accounts of clientelism and patronage (Chandra, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Posner, 2005; Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007; Lust, 2009). Clientelism and patronage are, however, equally present
in non-democratic contexts (Bates, 1981; Anderson, 1987), so the focus of this literature has
been to describe how clientelism and patronage can persist in democratic settings. While
clientelism and patronage are undoubtedly present, less attention has been given to features
of democratic practice unique to developing world democracies, even as the number of stable
democratic developing countries is growing. Indeed, there is little literature in democratic
developing countries on one of the most fundamental questions in democratic practice: how
do voters form preferences?1
This paper endeavors to provide an account of how voters in a democratic developing
country context form their political preferences. This study focuses on two villages just
before and after the electoral campaign period during the 2011 Assembly election in the
Indian state of West Bengal. Democratic developing country contexts are often characterized
by weak state capacity and low information about politically salient matters. The campaign
period around an election constitutes a democratic moment where voters are required to piece
together information from disparate sources on the ability of a candidate to govern.
Kinship networks aid in this task by providing information pooling, political discussion
and explicit coordination of political behavior in order to develop and update political pref-
erences. This political coordination across a kinship network is nested within the larger role
of the kinship network in fostering cooperation to mitigate physical and economic risks in
rural contexts. A voter by herself, with little information about politically salient issues,
is vulnerable to manipulation from political actors. However, by hooking into her kinship
network, and pooling and reasoning over salient information, the voter is able to make an
1I thank S. Chandrasekhar, Devesh Kapur, Macartan Humphreys, Sripad Motiram, Armando Razo and
Steven Wilkinson for helpful comments, as well as participants at the SSDS seminar at Columbia University,
Indira Gandhi Institute for Developmen Research, MPSA 2013 and PolNet 2013. Research was funded by
grants from the Applied Statistics Center and Center for the Study of Development Strategies, both housed
at Columbia University.
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informed decision and magnify the impact of her decision through coordination over the kin-
ship network. It is, therefore, the kinship network that engenders the independence of the
voter.
In order to demonstrate these claims, the paper discusses fine-grained qualitative and
quantitative evidence on the role of kinship networks in changing vote choice and issue pref-
erences over the electoral campaign. Using eight months of qualitative field research around a
single election in two villages, this paper provides detailed information on the characteristics
of kinship networks, their structural connection to existing political preferences, and their
role in changing political preferences. The data, using information on vote choice and issues
preferences combined with ideal point estimation and network autoregressive models, provide
quantitative justification for the claims.
4.1.1 Democracy in the Developing World
Today, democracies comprise a significant proportion of developing world countries. Begin-
ning with democratic transitions in Southern Europe, and Latin America in the 1970s and
1980s, as well as transitions in Africa, Southeast/East Asia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s
and the 2000s, the expansion of democracy is the fruit of what has collectively been referred
to as the “third wave of democracy” (Huntington, 1991). This expansion spawned a litera-
ture on democratic transitions and democratic consolidation in the developing world (Stepan
and Linz, 1996; Przeworski et al., 2000). While this is undoubtedly an important literature,
this paper asks a different question. After democratic consolidation has taken place in a
developing world country, what does democracy look like?
This paper focuses on a rural Indian setting. On the whole, India is more than two-
thirds rural (Census of India, 2011), making it one of the most agrarian-based democracies
in the world. Many developing world democracies, mostly recently consolidated, display
very large rural populations, such as countries in Africa, Central America, as well as South
and Southeast Asia. Like India, many of these countries also exhibit weaker state capacity
(Migdal, 1988), which hampers their abilities to properly enact policies without bureaucratic
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or political manipulation. At the same time, Indian democracy is a strongly consolidated
democracy; it is just one of 33 countries (and by far the poorest and least literate of such
countries) that has been continuously democratic since 1977 (Lijphart, 2006). This makes
India a particularly good place to understand the longer run aspects of voter behavior in
burgeoning developing world democracies.
4.1.2 Studying the Indian Voter
Much of the political science literature dealing with political behavior or voter behavior in
a democratic developing country context focuses on patronage, clientelism or vote-buying.2
While this is undeniably a large part of politician-voter interaction in the developing world,
it mutes the democratic deepening that is taking place in many of these countries over time.
In the context of India, many of these claims are an outgrowth of the literature in the
1960s on the so-called “Congress system,”3 which focused attention on how the Congress
Party, the party that controlled national government following Indian independence, co-
opted elites and manufactured a strong patronage system. These elite-centric and party-
centric arguments diminished the importance of the Indian voter and little effort was put
into understanding how the average Indian voter forms political preferences. However, more
recent literature has focused on the democratic deepening of India. Stepan et al. (2011) report
robust support for democracy and democratic principles in India.4 Many studies have shown
an increase in formal political actors from lower classes and castes, signifying a breakdown
of elite domination.5 In fact, while essentially characterized by single party rule from 1947-
2Patronage or clientelism fundamentally involves “imbalance in exchange...which expresses and reflects the
disparity in...relative wealth, power, and status.” (Scott, 1972, p. 93) Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) edited an
entire volume on the topic, with examples from Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. Stokes (2005) discuss
how political parties monitor voters in Argentina to enact a system of clientelism. Chandra (2004) refers to
India as a “patronage democracy” and derives a model by which caste groups vote for co-ethnic politicians in
exchange for patronage.
3The term “Congress system” was first coined in Kothari (1964) and was further developed in a compre-
hensive study by Weiner (1967).
4Furthermore, Banerjee (2011), also based upon anthropological work in West Bengal, shows that elections
have taken on increased cultural significance, even displaying sacred and ritualistic elements.
5Krishna (2002) and Manor (2000) have demonstrated the rise of a new class of brokers, through whom
villagers can access public goods and services, whose viability relies on the ability to deliver goods and not
social status. Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009) and Michelutti (2009) have chronicled the “subalternization” of
Indian politics, whereby lower castes are entering the formal political arena in greater numbers.
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1977, India has, more recently, tended to be characterized by party/candidate alternation
and anti-incumbency (Linden, 2004). This alternation and belief in democracy would seem
to militate against the patronage/clientelism view. As India’s political culture has become
more democratic, and traditional structures of co-optation have deteriorated, it has become
important to understand how the average Indian voter forms political preferences.
4.1.3 Argument
Using data from two villages in the Indian state of West Bengal, this paper demonstrates
that kinship networks are used to pool political salient information and to explicitly discuss
and coordinate political behavior to generate political preferences of voters. In particular, in
order to make an informed choice under an environment with weaker state capacity, the voter
requires information about various candidate characteristics due to the party’s or candidate’s
capacity to manipulate state resources and powers. This information can affect the voter in
two ways. First, she may attempt vote for the winning candidate in order to opt in to a
clientelistic scheme. Alternatively, the voter may seek detailed information on a candidate’s
qualifications since weak state capacity increases the salience of a politician’s personal skill
and capacity in performing his duties.
The electoral campaign provides information on many of these factors and the kinship
network acts to pool information gleaned by various family members. Kinship networks are
also used to explicitly coordinate political and voting behavior. This coordination may be
due to an explicit desire for the family to demonstrate its support for the winning party,
or it may simply be due to the larger structure of codependence over a kinship network.
The paper finds that in addition to changing vote choice, kinship networks affect ideological
preferences, suggesting an information role for kinship networks that move beyond patronage.
Importantly, these kinship structures act to mitigate the costs associated with updating
personal political preferences, costs which are particularly acute in a developing democratic
context.
This paper extends classic theories about social influence, e.g., the Columbia School,
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to an expanded role for families in information pooling and political coordination. This
is important because it shows that the underlying social structure in a developing country
helps mitigate difficulties caused by lower levels of economic and institutional development
in a democratic context. The information pooling function of kinship networks helps to piece
together politically salient information about candidates, parties and policies, which would
otherwise be difficult for voters to access. The discussion and coordination function of kinship
networks allows voters to reason over complicated and disparate pieces of information to make
informed choices about the election in an environment with low levels of literacy and where
political leaders can manipulate state resources and powers. Fundamentally, this ability
to coordinate behavior, both vote choice and ideological preferences, over kinship networks
demonstrates that, despite coercive pressures from political actors above, voters can act
independently due to a family’s capacity to provide a forum insulated from other political
forces. Paradoxically, the independence of the voter results from an individual giving away
her personal agency to the kinship network at large.
4.1.4 Layout
Using extensive fieldwork and data on kinship networks, this paper provides fine-grained
qualitative and quantitative information on the role of kinship networks in changing vote
choice and issue preferences. The empirical results rest on three claims which are shown in
detail:
1. The campaign period has an effect on vote choice and issue preferences
2. There are strong kinship network effects on vote and opinion change over the campaign
3. Kinship network effects can be largely attributed to political discussion and coordina-
tion, even when controlling for other prominent explanations
In short, this paper juxtaposes close qualitative observation in two villages and data
collection in the same villages to demonstrate strong evidence for its propositions. This
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affords the opportunity to collect detailed village-level data, as well as providing meaningful
explanation of data trends.
Section 2 lays out the theory of how family coordination and discussion affect political be-
havior. Section 3 discusses the qualitative evidence and study design. Section 4 demonstrates
that vote choice and issues preferences change over the campaign. Section 5 demonstrates
strong kinship network effects in changes in vote choice and political opinions. Section 6
demonstrates that kinship network effects are largely due to political discussion and coordi-
nation of political behavior, even when controlling for other prominent outcomes. Section 7
concludes the paper, discussing larger implications for developing world democracies as well
as hypotheses to be tested in the future.
4.2 Theory
The modern social network approach to political behavior has its origins in the so-called
“Columbia School” of sociologists, who studied American voting behavior in the middle of the
20th century. The corresponding studies argued that vote choice and political opinions were
largely a function of one’s own personal network. Much like the present study, these claims
were substantiated by survey research at the community level in Erie County, Pennsylvania
(Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and Elmira, New York (Berelson et al., 1954). The Columbia School
also noticed the prominent role occupied by kinship networks, viewing them as the most
important drivers of political identities. At the same time, they argued that individuals
generally choose to seek out information that reinforces their views; as such, the Columbia
School viewed campaigns and media as having little effect on actual political opinions. They
also held a dim view of overly individualistic theories where individuals independently made
strategic, rational voting decisions given their states of knowledge.
While acknowledging the role of kinship, Campbell et al. (1960) criticized the Columbia
School as too focused on social influences on political opinions. They argued that individuals
are “socialized” into a particular partisan identity early in life, usually through parents, and
these early partisan identities had long-lasting impact on subsequent political beliefs. Once
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again, these theories found little room for the impact of campaigns on political opinions.
The rationalist school of thought more generally criticized the Columbia School for social
determinism but also found a role for campaigns and media. They argued that one’s friends
and family may act as “information shortcuts” to process the political information generated
in a campaign, after which voters make fully rational decisions (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1994;
Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). This constellation of theories omits one important scenario,
that campaigns may have an effect of political opinions more generally but decisions are not
made by independent individuals. This lacuna is not surprising given that these are not
intended to explain political behavior in a developing world democratic context like India.
This paper argues that voters discuss politics and coordinate vote choice through kinship
networks. Kinship networks affect preferences by acting as a vessel to pool and discuss rel-
evant political information and as an implement to coordinate voting behavior. Much like
the original Columbia School, it is argued overly individualistic theories do not appropriately
capture a voter’s decision to vote or formation political opinions. However, this argument
expands role of kinship beyond what was initially envisioned by the Columbia School. Apart
from social influence on opinions, this paper views kinship as instrumental in strategic coor-
dination of political behavior.
This study finds that campaigns have an impact on both vote choice and political opinions,
with such effects flowing through kinship networks. This provides a point of departure from
the Columbia School. The campaign provides salient political information about which party
is likely to win the election and policy positions, as well as information about a candidate’s
ability to deliver, protect, and govern. The campaign period is a natural time for voters to
update their political preferences. Since updating preferences requires political education, it
is a costly endeavor. The campaign period is a natural time to update preferences due to
an increased flow of political information and the incentives to update preferences before the
upcoming election.
These impacts are magnified in a weak state environment because elected politicians are
more able to condition benefits and protection on partisan support without the encumbrances
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of the formal state, and, even when not engaging in clientelism, rely on personal skill and
capacity in delivering benefits. Furthermore, certain candidate characteristics, such as eth-
nicity and criminality, may actually provide a credible signal of a candidate’s ability to deliver
benefits or protect the population. Typically, candidates are announced at the start of the
campaign period and often little is known about them. The value of discovering the personal
characteristics of candidates, even apart from the increased expected benefit of supporting
the winner, provides powerful incentives for families to pool information to update political
opinions and strategize over vote choice.
4.2.1 Kinship
Defining kinship can be a difficult task. This paper puts forth a network conception of
kinship, as opposed to a group-based conception of family. As Inden and Nicholas (1977)
have shown, consanguinity, a standard criterion for kinship in Western societies, does not
fully characterize the South Asian family. For instance, a woman who marries into a family
becomes a part of that family. This cultural understanding of what constitutes a family is
crucial to any analysis of kinship. At the same time, it is important distinguish between the
relative distance in relationship between family members. Two women who have married into
the same family are likely to be more distant than those who have spent a significant portion
of their lives together, like siblings or parent/child. In the quantitative portion of this study,
two individuals are linked in the kinship network if they satisfy a “nuclear relation”: sibling,
spouse, parent, or child. This effectively characterizes the South Asian notion of a family
(since two women who have married into the same family will still be connected but more
distant than two brothers), while accounting for the relative closeness of family members.
Little work exists on the importance of families for political decision-making in India or
the rest of the developing world. This is all the more surprising given the importance of
families in Indian society. The last National Election Survey in India (Lokniti, 2009) found
that for 24.5% of respondents the views of a spouse or other family member mattered the
most, even more than one’s own opinion, in voting decisions.
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Kinship represents the most prominent and influential social and personal network in a
villager’s life. Due to the traditional nature and spatial arrangement of villages, a villager
typically interacts regularly with her extended family. Intra-household coordination is nat-
ural in a poorer rural context, as it is often used in employment and marriage decisions to
mitigate risks from consumption shocks (Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989).
The implicit assumption in this literature is that families are able to devise methods to main-
tain cooperative behavior among their members (Lucas and Stark, 1985). This extraordinary
ability of kinship ties to maintain cooperation makes it a natural place to observe coordinated
political behavior.
There is a large literature on the association between social/ethnic identity of voters
and partisan preferences in developing societies.6 In India, as in many other developing
contexts, politics is coordinated at the village level through village-level political leaders and
workers (Kruks-Wisner, 2011; Bussell, 2014) and identity is often too blunt an object to
understand political differences and changes at the village level, which typically have a few
castes and religions within them.7 For example, while Muslim voters may, in the aggregate,
lean towards a specific party in the polity, this does not imply that entire population of
a fully Muslim village will vote for that party. Generally, a fully Muslim village, like any
other village, will have factions supporting multiple parties. The relationship between these
factions and families has been known for some time; the seminal work on factionalism in
Indian villages, Lewis (1954), found that villagers “tend to equate their faction with their
kinship group.” At the same time, the critical role of the family in political decision-making
remains understudied.
6The existing literature posits instrumental calculations between co-ethnic voters over patronage (Chandra,
2004), psychic rewards for voting for co-ethnics (Chandra, 2009), and elite manipulation to construct disparate
ethnic “minimum winning” coalitions (Posner, 2005) as potential mechanisms to explain this association.
While these may be useful mechanisms to describe politics in the aggregate, it can be difficult to apply these
theories at the local level.
7In fact, the recent National Election Survey finds that only 5% of respondents list the opinions of caste
or community leaders as mattering the most for their vote choice.
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4.2.2 Influence and Coordination in Opinion Change
Campaigns and Information Pooling over the Kinship Network
The data from the United States suggest minimal effects of the campaigning on political
opinions. Gelman and King (1993) find that election results can be predicted within a couple
of percentage points a few months before the presidential elections, echoing findings by the
Columbia School. They argue that voters only piece together salient information for their
vote choice in the days before the election, but this salient information is readily apparent
months before an election to analysts.
The Indian case differs from this standard. A significant amount of necessary informa-
tion, from a voter’s perspective, is not apparent until the campaign begins. In particular,
candidates are typically announced at the start of a campaign, and candidate characteristics
may matter in an election. Given the relatively low intra-party democracy of most Indian
parties, there is often little information about the selected candidates. A candidate’s ethnic
background (Chandra, 2004) or criminal background (Vaishnav, 2012a) may serve as a cred-
ible signal of a candidate’s ability to deliver benefits. A second piece of crucial information
during the campaign period concerns the winnability of a candidate and a party. The major
media houses will typically provide a pre-election projections for an election at this time. In
a system that often displays a significant amount of volatility in vote shares, this can provide
new, concrete information. Patnam (2013) demonstrates that unexpected information about
the winnability of a party (through exit polls) may cause as much as a twenty point increase
in the probability of voting for that party. Finally, reasoning through disparate pieces of
politically salient information requires a lot of effort, perhaps much more than the American
context, and many voters only undertake this effort and update their preferences during an
electoral campaign. Thus, changes in beliefs may be less due to information and more due
to the process of updating beliefs.
Families often play an informative role in politics, with individuals sharing information
and educating each other about various issues. The literature of social influence generally
takes two forms, political socialization and political discussion. The idea of political social-
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ization, especially in regards to the political influence of a parent towards a child, has been
studied extensively in American politics. It is generally argued that parents play a crucial
role in inculcating particular preferences in children, the so-called direct transmission theory
(Glass et al., 1986). Others have argued for more nuanced approach while allowing for the
basic idea that parents inculcate political preferences (Jennings et al., 2009).
Political discussion is much more firmly associated with the Columbia School. However,
looking at American elections, the Columbia School believed political discussion simply re-
inforced existing political positions since individuals would seek out personal networks with
agreeable political positions. As such, the Columbia School did not believe campaigns or
media had much effect on political opinions or change. The notion of political discussion
within a kinship network as conceived in this paper differs in two major ways. First, as de-
scribed above, campaigns do provide salient information to voters that are generally required
for a reasoned discussion. Second, kinship is not selected and makes up the lion’s share of
a villager’s personal network. Thus, while families may experience common family histories,
members of the family vary widely in age, education, and other characteristics (unlike friend-
ship networks) that imply that members of a family are often exposed to disparate sources
of information. Kinship networks can then serve to pool a rich variety of salient political
information and to act as a conduit for discussion.
Political Coordination over the Kinship Network
Information pooling and political discussion, however, does not necessarily imply families are
coordinating political behavior. Why should members of the kinship network willingly give
away personal agency in political decisions for coordination over a kinship network?
One of the major themes of the study of democratic behavior in India, and the developing
world more generally, has been the use of voting to access protections or benefits from the
state. Chandra (2004) argues that India is a “patronage democracy” where voters support a
party so that the party may deliver benefits directly to its supporters through ethnic cues.
Chhibber and Nooruddin (2007) argue that voters observe the state’s ability to spend and
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direct funds in the future to make decisions about whom to support. What is common to
these theories, and many others on voter behavior in these contexts, is that the state is not
seen as objective arbiter of who will receive benefits and protections, and parties and local
political actors may condition state benefits or protection upon political support.
Targeted benefits received from the state are rarely given at the individual level, e.g.
jobs. As Vaishnav (2012b) has shown, India actually has the lowest per capita public sector
employment of any of the G20 economies. Direct payoffs and individualized benefits are
remarkably inefficient in the Indian political context. By contrast, many of the targeted
benefits are the sort of goods that are likely to benefit an entire kinship network and beyond,
such as roads or potable water (Bardhan et al., 2011). Because the entire family is likely to
benefit from any good, there is an incentive for the family to coordinate its votes, especially
since political actors are likely to condition family benefits upon the depth of support within
the family (Bardhan et al., 2009).
Under a secret ballot electoral system, as in India, it is typically difficult to enforce
political coordination between families and political actors; as Stokes (2005) has argued, this
sort of coordinated relationship requires “monitoring” of political choices. While not formally
monitoring per se, this coordination can be enforced through the density of social ties in the
village. In a village, an individual is being constantly observed by many others, from what
she says to those with whom she associates. In this high information environment, while
vote choice cannot be observed, one’s commitment to a party can reasonably be observed,
from showing up to political rallies to regularly association with party members. If benefits
are distributed with respect to demonstrated support for a party (Bardhan et al., 2009,
2011),8 this level of information provides a credible mechanism to enforce cooperation within
the household and condition benefits based upon political support. Nonetheless, the act of
demonstrating support is a costly activity that may be undertaken by the kinship network.9
A second mechanism results from the ability of kinship networks to mitigate physical
8Using a survey 89 village across West Bengal, these survey find that nearly 70% of respondent make
financial contributions to political campaigns, and 48% participate in party meetings.
9It is important to note that a wide-ranging analysis of the American case by ? has found limited evidence
that voters act out of self-interest.
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and economic risks. As described above, often villagers display a significant amount of
codependence in relations across the kinship network. At times the cost of opting in to
the clientelistic scheme described above may be too costly for the kinship network. Even
in such a scenario, detailed information is required about the personal skill and capacity of
candidates to deliver benefits since not all benefits are distributed along clientelistic lines. In
a context where family-level preferences are at a premium, which is to say that there exists a
norm that all family members should have similar preferences, a coordinated political choice
implies a larger bloc of votes to the candidate/party of choice. Even if the vote choice of
family members is unknown to other villagers, an uncoordinated vote choice only serves
cancel out the broader impact of the family since family members are voting for opposing
candidates/parties. In this context, it is best for an entire family unit to coordinate its
vote choice to the greatest extent possible to maximize its impact. Thus, a kinship network
may choose to shelter itself from monitoring from political actors while still coordinating
vote choice; it is this ability to shield from political actors, while creating a mechanism for
informed political decisions, that generates independent voter behavior.
In order to demonstrate the role of political discussion and coordination in opinion change,
this paper marshals three pieces of evidence:
1. Campaigns strongly affect political opinions and vote choice
2. This effect flows through kinship networks
3. The effect of kinship networks can be attributed to political discussion and coordination
4.3 Study Design and Qualitative Evidence
The study took place in two villages in the Indian state of West Bengal. West Bengal has its
own unique political history. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPM was, at the
time, considered the most organized political party in India, and, as a continuously elected
leftist party for 34 years, the party exercised very strong control over all state institutions and
personal networks in West Bengal through which it distributed patronage (Mallick, 1993).
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Furthermore, 68% of the population of West Bengal is rural (Census of India, 2011). This
suggests that large political shifts in West Bengal are likely to be due to changes in support
from the rural population. The political history of West Bengal provides another interesting
reason to focus on rural voters. After the CPM came to power in 1977, it forged a strong
rural base through land redistribution programs. In 1972, a law was enacted to restrict
formal landholding to a maximum of 5-7 hectares (about 12.5-17.5 acres) per family based
on size, which was poorly enforced. Using a combination of violent takeover of land (Ruud,
2003) and policies to grant titles to land, the CPM built its rural base. This effectively took
land away from the traditional landowning class, or zamindars, and redistributed the land to
the landless. Two policies were particularly notable in this task: 1) operation barga, which
sought to register and dole out land to sharecroppers, or bargadars; and 2) a patta (land
titling) program which gave land titles on vested lands which had often been extracted from
zamindars (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2003).
In addition to land reform, the CPM had developed a strong grassroots base, with con-
nection to youth through campus politics and to people associated with various occupations
through unionization. Yet, despite its massive advantage in organization and providing pa-
tronage, the CPM lost the control of the state in May 2011. While there were many underlying
reasons for the collapse, the proximate cause was the government’s decision to expropriate
land in the villages of Singur and Nandigram, which set off a wave of protests and demon-
strations against the government. In fact, the CPM and its allies only mustered only 63 out
of 294 seats in the last state assembly election (the new ruling coalition of Congress and Tri-
namool Congress (TMC) received 227 seats). Given the CPM’s level of organization and its
ability to insert itself into personal networks, West Bengal provides a particularly interesting
case in which to test the extent to which coordination over the kinship network contributed
to this change.
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4.3.1 Villages under Study: Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar
Two villages, Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar, were chosen with respect to the diverse case
design (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In particular, two villages were selected from the
same electoral constituency but with very different underlying demographic characteristics.
Holding the constituency constant across the study guarantees that any observed differences
between the villages of study are not due to constituency-level differences. As discussed
in detail below, Ranjanpur is a poorer, underdeveloped village with a Muslim population,
whereas Chaandinagar is wealthier village, both in economic and development terms, with a
Hindu population. Given the preponderance of development and economic class explanations
for political behavior and social structure, these are natural criteria upon which to base the
diverse case selection. The differences between the two villages allow one to deduce the
extent to which the discussion and coordination over kinship networks functions over very
different social contexts. At the same time, close observation of the kinship mechanism
in these contexts allows the researcher to deduce variation in the strength of the proposed
mechanisms.
In many qualitative designs, case studies are chosen carefully from a larger universe of
cases; that is, a small number of cases are chosen to deduce causal mechanisms from larger
quantitative empirical patterns. In this study, the situation is reversed, the frame for the
quantitative empirical analysis is taken to be the the villages under study.10 There are three
justifications for this approach. First, as discussed above, the larger empirical relationship
between family as a stated influence is well-established in the Indian context, so there is
little need to demonstrate this larger empirical pattern across India. Second, establishing
the impact of kinship networks on changes in political opinions and vote choice requires
extensive local within village data across family members. Finally, conducting survey research
concurrently with qualitative research permits the researcher to bring detailed and focused
knowledge of the context through direct observation to explain larger village-level empirical
10This is a common method in the study of American political behavior, where cities are often taken as the
frame for careful empirical studies (Berelson et al., 1954; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Gerber and Green,
2000).
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patterns.
4.3.2 Political Opinion Formation in Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar
The selected villages are in the Magrahat Purba assembly constituency, which is approxi-
mately 70% rural according to the 2011 Indian census. The boundaries of the constituency
are coincident with Magrahat 2 block in the district of South 24 Parganas. According to
the 2001 Indian census (the latest census for which religious data are available), the con-
stituency is 47% Muslim, well above the state average of 25%. This rural, Muslim character
of the constituency largely defines the set of politically salient issues in the area, while Hindu-
Muslim tensions are relatively low owing to the unique cultural character of this region in
West Bengal.11
The area is on a major rail line, and between 30 and 90 minutes south of various points
in Kolkata by rail. While still sufficient for basic agricultural production, this particular
region does not produce as much as the more fertile lands in other parts of West Bengal.
The relative ease of accessing Kolkata, combined with slightly lower agricultural production,
creates a larger wage premium for non-agricultural work and significant pressure to engage
in day labor or other work connected to Kolkata. As such, villages in Magrahat Purba are
reasonably connected to the political demands and information emanating from Kolkata. The
two villages, Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar, fall within the same geographical area insofar as
they are serviced by the same train station. At the same time, they are approximately a 45
minute walk apart from each other. This distance was selected to minimize spillovers across
study villages.
The campaign began with the announcement of candidates from each party. The TMC/Congress
alliance selected Namita Saha, a early supporter of Mamata Banerjee, the charismatic leader
11Until recently, this area of southern Bengal was heavily forested, as can be deduced from a large shrine
to “Bonbibi.” As the story goes, Bonbibi was an orphaned girl chosen by Allah to be a ‘mediator of peace,’
who guaranteed protection of the resources of the forest and all of its citizens, regardless of religion or caste
(Jalais, 2010). Today, Bonbibi is still worshipped by Hindus and Muslims alike. However, significant divisions
do persist, as can be seen in the non-commensality between Hindus and Muslims, and local political leaders
continue to be wary of potential Hindu-Muslim violence.
117
CHAPTER 4. A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES: KINSHIP NETWORKS AND
PREFERENCE FORMATION IN RURAL INDIA
of TMC.12 She was a political veteran who was known as somewhat of a political operator,
and was widely expected to be selected for the candidate nomination. On the other hand,
CPM, in a bit of surprise, selected a very young student leader, Chandan Saha, from the
Students’ Federation of India (SFI) from a nearby college. The SFI is broadly associated
with CPM, and many of CPM’s workers and leaders have come through SFI’s ranks. Impor-
tantly, the candidates were not fully known ahead of time, so their announcement injected
new information into the process of forming political preferences.
The political organization of the parties can shed light on how political actors and cam-
paigns affect voter preferences. India’s panchayat system is a three-tiered nested system, with
the zilla parishad (district-level panchayat), panchayat samiti (block-level panchayat), and
gram panchayat (village-level panchayat). Local politics is typically coordinated by block-
level party leaders, who are associated with the panchayat samiti. This represents the lowest
level at which political actors are relatively professionalized, with dedicated party headquar-
ters that coordinate local party behavior. The panchayat samiti in Magrahat Purba, like
many others across India, is housed in the same building as the block development officer
(BDO), the lowest-level civil service bureaucrat in charge of executing government policy.
Owing to this proximity, partisan responses to administrative decisions are crafted quickly.
At the village level there are two types of party workers, those that are more profession-
alized and look to organize party matters at the block level and those that deal with matters
within the village. Block-level workers are those who can help to organize mass events and
carry out the tasks of coordinating village-level party matters. Village-level workers usu-
ally work through informal organization, strategizing at tea shops and other meetings spots
within the village. In addition to canvassing, they provide the crucial service of “counting”
supporters. These counts are based upon direct observation of villagers. On voting day, these
village-level workers from each party sit outside polling booths keeping a tally of exactly who
enters the booth and the expected vote outcome. In a world where sophisticated microdata
12Mamata Banerjee formed the TMC as a breakaway party from Congress in 1997 (formally founding the
party in 1998). She is viewed as a strong charismatic leader who led agitations against CPM’s land policies
in Singur and Nandigram, West Bengal and is currently the Chief Minister of West Bengal.
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on voters is unavailable, this “counting” structure provides a flawed, but necessary, substitute
as well as a monitoring device for voters.
Ranjanpur
Ranjanpur is subdivided into “paras” or neighborhoods that are titled after the last name
of the villagers living in the neighborhood. Since villagers in the same neighborhood share
a last name, they are understood to be part of the same extended family. Ranjanpur is a
Muslim village and underdeveloped in comparison to many other villages in the area. Most
village roads remain unpaved, and the village is often flooded during the monsoons because
it sits on particularly low-lying land. The larger structure of political support is conditioned
by two major factors: family history and economic wealth.
Priors about political opinions and party support are first formed from the last name of the
individual, which is consistent with the name of a particular neighborhood. It is understood
that inhabitants of a particular neighborhood are part of the same extended family. Thus, at
a very broad level, partisan identity is associated with family. Traditionally, large landowning
families, or ex-zamindari families, tend to vote for TMC or Congress due to the losses of land
described above at the hands of the CPM.
A second major factor in Ranjanpur’s political identity is class. Approximately, three
to four generations ago, villagers started specializing in painting buildings and working with
plaster across Kolkata. This is still the most common profession in Ranjanpur, but, over
time, some individuals have become contractors, becoming significantly more wealthy. Access
to contracts typically flows through personal and family networks, and so contractors are
clustered by kinship. A second route to greater economic well-being has been government
jobs, specifically joining the police force. Government jobs have educational requirements
and hiring often works through personal networks. As such, one particular neighborhood has
used its kinship connections to bring many family members into the police force. Due to the
incentives for education, this is now the most well-educated neighborhood in the village.
There is a class dimension to the politics of CPM and TMC/Congress, and the more
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well-off families have a tendency to support TMC/Congress. Owing to the extended family
culture of Ranjanpur, the leadership of TMC/Congress and CPM are dominated by the two
numerically largest extended families in the village. The TMC/Congress-controlling family is
broadly more well-off and a former zamindari family, whereas the family that controls CPM
still has a significant portion of its family that remains undereducated and involved in day
labor.
In short, the structure of political identity in Ranjanpur is intimately tied to kinship.
Kinship networks generate economic opportunity and social class, which then structures
partisan support.
Chaandinagar
Chaandinagar is a large village, and this study only covers a portion of the village and consists
of families in a single polling booth. It is a Hindu area, consisting of a “general caste”
neighborhood, and a poorer scheduled caste neighborhood. Unlike Ranjanpur, family sizes
are much smaller and many different last names, among those who are seemingly unrelated,
can be found in the same neighborhood. In this sense, family is less structurally salient. At
the same time, while families are geographically delineated as in Ranjanpur, family identities
play a large part in political opinions. Chaandinagar is quite a bit more developed than
Ranjanpur, having its own athletic grounds and swimming pool, as well as being located
next to a high school. Much like Ranjanpur, political identity is intimately tied to kinship
through economic opportunity and social class.
Families in Chaandinagar acquired wealth through two distinct paths. First, the village
is home to what is reputed to be a naib family. The naib was an individual who managed
the lands of a large landowner, and thus inherited a significant share of land. These lands
were used for the athletic grounds. Members of this family are typically well-educated, some
of them holding upper middle class office jobs in Kolkata.
Second, a large number of families have taken up the skilled labor of silver work. Typically,
a subcontractor within the village will act as a middleman carrying goods to and receiving
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contracts from the Burra Bazar marketplace in Kolkata. While the subcontractor accrues
a significant amount of wealth, silversmiths often earn a significant wage as compared to
day labor. As silver work is a skilled trade, apprenticeship usually occurs within the family.
These wealthy families are clustered within the general caste neighborhood, which, adhering
to the class dimension of Bengali politics, tends to vote heavily for TMC and not for CPM.
Families in the scheduled caste neighborhood on the other hand rely on other professions,
either as day labor or handicraft embroidery of saris, which are far less lucrative, and are
more likely to support CPM. The structure of political leadership is a bit more disjointed in
Chaandinagar.
All of the major political leaders are associated with the general caste neighborhood,
perhaps owing to to the importance of caste in the social structure. Since there are no
natural connections for the CPM in the general caste neighborhood, the leadership is made
up of family members [and family wings] which broke off from traditionally TMC/Congress-
supporting families, in particular the family of the naib. This also demonstrates that when
there are party switches, they often involve a particular branch of the kinship network.
4.3.3 Comparing Kinship and Personal Networks in Ranjanpur and Chaan-
dinagar
This paper adopts the kinship network as the structure over which to conduct the analysis.
The word “family” is one that makes no claim on structure and social distance, and thus is
hard to use in a meaningful analytic way. In Ranjanpur, is everyone in the same neighborhood
in the same family, or is it just individuals in the same dwelling, and how does one draw these
borders? Virtually any definition of the word “household” is too small a unit for analysis.
Two brothers may very well be a part of two different households, but they may still share
close kinship relations and engage in political discussion. The kinship network in the analysis
accounts for those individuals who may engage in political discussion and coordination with
each other due to common kinship, while accounting for the fact that they may come from
different households. The kinship network structure also allows for the fact that individuals
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who are connected within it may differ in social distance (e.g., two women married into the
same family are more distant than two brothers). Interestingly, the English word “family” is
often used in common parlance in both villages to denote the kinship network as conceived
in this paper. This gives some face validity to applying the concept in this setting.
The density and importance of kinship networks, and personal networks more generally,
vary quite a bit in Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar, as will also be borne out in the quantitative
data. One of the first observable differences in the density of personal networks between the
two villages is that any villager in Ranjanpur essentially knows exactly where every other
villager in Ranjanpur lives, whereas this is not true in Chaandinagar. The difference in
density of kinship and personal networks can be partially understood through differences in
marriage practices.
Ranjanpur practices endogamy, or consanguineous marriage, which is common among the
Muslim community in India (Bittles, 2002). This is one reason why neighborhoods in Ran-
janpur are consistent with the last names of the individuals contained in them. As Ranjanpur
is a far poorer village than Chaandinagar, the marriage prospects for men, in an arranged
marriage system, are significantly weaker. Even when marriage is not consanguineous, wives
tend to come from nearby villages due to the weaker drawing power of men in Ranjanpur
in the marriage market. This results in dense but locally concentrated kinship and personal
networks in Ranjanpur.
Chaandinagar, by contrast, is both a Hindu village, with lower rates of endogamy, and
a more well-off village. The set of marriage partners come from a much a wider base of
villages across West Bengal, and sometimes even the city, due to better economic conditions.
The resulting personal networks in Chaandinagar are less dense but more spatially dispersed.
Spatial variation in kinship networks makes individuals more able to mitigate local consump-
tion shocks (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Furthermore, a broader class of “weak ties” due
to spatial dispersion in kinship may allow individuals to access a wider array of economic op-
portunities (Granovetter, 1973). At the same time, lower kinship network density, combined
with higher economic status, in Chaandinagar might make families both less able to enforce
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coordinated behavior and less dependent upon it.
Family Discussion and Coordination over the Campaign
The qualitative research suggests that there are a number of structural and historical reasons
for families to have similar political preferences; these differ quite significantly across the
villages of study. At the same time, the role of the family discussion and coordination is
common across both Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar. In fact, the existing cooperation across a
kinship network required for economic access and social class creates a natural environment for
political coordination. At the same time, it is clear that common political preferences due to
common histories and those due to persuasion and coordination are analytically distinct. This
paper isolates the effect of coordination and discussion across kinship networks on changes
in political preferences.
In contrast to urban areas, which were inundated by chaotic political rallies and parades,
villages experienced a quieter campaign season. Apart from a few visits from important
politicians and the occasional procession through rural areas, the villages were largely isolated
from mass political demonstrations. To the extent such activities did occur, they were most
often organized near the train station or at a busy market in order to maximize exposure.
The chief form of campaigning in the village setting was door-to-door canvassing. Given the
heavy hours required for day labor for many villagers, much of this activity would take place
at night. Since the canvassers were themselves villagers, the village campaign took on a more
personalistic character. An aspect of the political vernacular of the campaign season was the
conspicuous use of kinship-based language in political engagements. Political leaders would
refer to ghars (dwellings) of support, and villagers were open about the types of discussion
taking place within the family.
In both of these villages, families take on importance vis-à-vis political identity. Kinship
networks, as argued above, occupy a prominent role in structuring economic opportunities
and social class for villagers. It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a strong correlation
between kinship and political preferences. Preferences are not only a function of shared family
123
CHAPTER 4. A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES: KINSHIP NETWORKS AND
PREFERENCE FORMATION IN RURAL INDIA
histories and common social identity, they are a product of family-level coordination. Families
often help mitigate individual-level consumption shocks and engage in resource-sharing, and
thus developing a family-level political preference is often desirable. A family that is unable
to coordinate its voting behavior is a family that is unable to exert its weight.
This is not to say that individual do not have agency; rather, the codependence among
family means that preferences within a kinship network are inextricably linked and coordi-
nated upon. The relationship between kinship networks and political identity seems less to be
about a slow political socialization and more about periods of negotiation and coordination
within the family.13 It is only during important moments that kinship relations will take the
time to pool information and re-evaluate political positions.
This was explicitly seen during the campaign. Families met to collectively discuss/coordinate
vote choice shortly before voting day. A lot of weight is typically accorded to a head of the
household in these discussions, but this coordination is complicated since an extended fam-
ily typically has many heads of households, and the primary breadwinner may not be the
patriarch. These meetings offer an opportunity to pool information about the election and
strategize over vote choice. Anecdotally, pre-election polling suggesting TMC would easily
form government by large media houses (and the discussion around them) had a large im-
pact on decisions about the vote. An election pre-poll conducted jointly by Star-Ananda and
Anandabazar Patrika, the largest news channel in West Bengal and the largest newspaper in
West Bengal, respectively, predicted the Congress-Trinamool Congress coalition to win 215
out of 294 seats. A second impact was frustration over the land policy and weak economic
development under the incumbent CPM. These issues, in addition to explicit incentives for
coordination, provided the majority of substance for discussion across kinship networks.
Political leaders explained that their methods of monitoring partisan support, and count-
ing, were based on demonstrated support and that overall support was very difficult to gauge
in a secret ballot setting. In particular, leaders mentioned that they could conclusively deter-
13The importance of kinship in political identity sometimes causes difficulties for a newly married woman,
who must balance between her own family and the family into which she has married; this can be a source of
marital friction.
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mine a supporter by those who may themselves “close” during the campaign season, through
party activism and engaging conversations with other party members.14 At the same time,
it was clear that there was a certain segment of the population that could not be read by
the political leaders. These were people who associated with leaders and workers from both
parties, and seemingly promised their votes to both of them. This suggested that partisan
identity was strategically invested in by families, as opposed to foisted upon them, and that
kinship networks provided a space that was relatively immune from pressures above.
4.3.4 Survey Protocol
The population for the survey sample was taken to be the those individuals on the corre-
sponding polling booth’s official voter list for the two villages, which is available online from
the Elections Commission of India (ECI). An individual is eligible to be registered to vote
once he/she reaches the age of 18. Since the voter ID card is the principal form of iden-
tification in India, much like a driver’s license in the US, essentially all eligible individuals
register to vote. The voter list is a good source for family network information as each entry
includes a family relationship (usually father or husband), which provides information for a
basic family network rendering.15
The survey was conducted in two phases, a pre-test and a post-test phase. In India,
political parties, media, and researchers are subject to the so-called “model code of conduct.”
This restricts media and researchers from collecting political data and political parties from
making new policy promises. Only campaign behavior is allowed during the model code of
conduct, so a pre-post survey that bookends this campaign period provides a good measure
of campaign effects. The pre-test took approximately one month and ended the day before
beginning of the model code of conduct. The post-test took approximately one month as
14Party leaders were open about their engagement in using money during election to buy votes, but even
they felt it had little impact due to the secret ballot.
15However, these lists are often inaccurate, including names of deceased and people who no longer live in
the village (most commonly due to marriage). In India, the voter ID card is generally used as a basic form of
identification, much like a driver’s license in the United States, and as such, people may hold on to voter ID
cards to the village, even if they no longer reside there. The initial phase of the study involved vetting the
village for residence.
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well, and took place approximately one week after the vote results were announced.
In the pre-test, basic demographic information was collected about each individual, along
with a first round of questions on political preferences, including: 1) vote choice, 2) opinions
on local issues, 3) opinions on state-level issues, and 4) political demands. Finally, in the
first round, data were collected on certain aspects of the individual’s social network, such as:
1) friends, 2) preferred tea shop, 3) preferred social club, 4) individual turned to for a loan,
and 5) individual turned to when needing to go to the hospital.
In the post-test, questions on the political preferences were repeated. In addition, new
network data was collected on: 1) family relations in the village that cannot be gleaned from
the voter list (e.g. two sisters married into the same village), 2) participation in women’s
groups, 3) land contracts between families, and 4) employment contracts between individuals.
The data in these paper are drawn from voter preferences in the pre-test and post-test and
a family network coding based upon the voter list.
The survey protocol was designed to: 1) derive a sufficient sample to estimate network
effects, and 2) elicit truthful responses of private political information.
Villagers in India have very irregular schedules at home due to seasonal employment, day
labor, and agricultural priorities, so the surveyor requires a careful strategy to boost response
rates. Over the one month period in each phase, the survey team mapped out the schedules of
all potential respondents. Surveys were conducted in morning/afternoon and evening shifts,
with repeat visits to potential respondents to confirm refusal to participate or non-residence
in the village.
The assembly elections were conducted under volatile security conditions which required
the stationing of national paramilitary troops during the election. As such, along with a team
of 8 surveyors, A coding protocol was created to protect the privacy of each respondent.
Each survey was broken into four sections: 1) name sheet, 2) demographic and network
information, 3) political preference information, and 4) vote choice. Each section of the
survey was identified by a unique code that could only be connected to an individual by the
surveyors. In the course of the survey, once the name of the respondent was written on the
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survey, the name sheet was separated from the rest of survey and kept with the surveyor.
Each surveyor carried a large “ballot box.” After the network and preference sections of the
survey were completed, they were separated from the survey and dropped into the ballot box.
Finally, each respondent was asked to fill out a sample ballot in private, fold up the ballot
and drop it in the ballot box. This protocol had the advantage of demonstrating intent to
keep information private as well as the fact that, even if our data were seized by others, the
information could not be tracked to any individual. This protocol was necessary to elicit
truthful responses in a volatile setting that posed potential risks for the respondents.
4.3.5 The Campaign Period
Unlike many other places, the campaign period is well-delineated in India. Campaigns es-
sentially starts with the announcement of candidates and the model code of conduct. The
model code of conduct (MCC) promulgated by the Election Commission of India (ECI), a
non-partisan constitutional body with wide-ranging powers, helps significantly with this task.
The MCC puts strong restriction on the behavior of political actors, media, and researchers
during the campaign, which helps dramatically focuses plausible sources of impact over the
campaign. The directives under the MCC are followed fairly strictly since behavior is care-
fully monitored by rival political parties, and the ECI has a high level of independence from
political actors.
Under the MCC, government actors can neither announce new policies nor can they
process or release new funds under existing welfare and beneficiary schemes. Furthermore,
political advertisements in mass media are strictly regulated by the chief electoral officer of
the state electoral commission, which works under the aegis of the ECI. Finally, public rallies
were effectively banned within 48 hours of the election day. The majority of the impact of the
campaign period was restricted to media coverage of campaigns, public rallies and smaller
meetings further away from the election date, political deliberation and canvassing nearer to
the election date. Finally, local observation by the research team failed to note any serious
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irregularities during the campaign period.16
4.4 Campaign Effects on Vote and Opinion Change
This paper models the influence of kinship network on voter preferences through a pre-
post study design over an electoral campaign.17 The quantity of interest is the average
saturated effect of the campaign period, and how it varies over the kinship network. Here,
the average saturated effect refers to the average effect under the scenario where each unit
in the population experiences the campaign period, inclusive of network spillovers.18
The pre-post design, or other longitudinal data, has often been the tool of choice to study
the effect of political/electoral campaigns. Two desirable properties for the pre-post design,
and their relationship to the estimation of kinship network effects, are discussed in detail
here: 1) The ability of pre-post designs to estimate saturated campaign behavior; and 2)
the ability to of pre-post designs to capture outcomes at the individual level and remove
reverse causality. This section demonstrates that the electoral campaign had an effect on
both political opinions and vote shares for the TMC.
4.4.1 Using Pre-Post Designs to Understand Network-Based Campaign
Effects
Changes over the Campaign Period
A standard pre-post study design measures the outcome of interest before a specified period
(pre-test) and then measures the outcomes of interest again after the period of interest (post-
test). Often such designs are structured so that the period includes some “intervention” of
16One of the biggest concerns was that the announcement of election results may have had a significant
effect upon reported vote choice in the posttest. The estimated effects are in line with other studies such as
Patnam (2013). Furthermore, the strict secrecy employed in the survey protocol combined with the concurrent
presence of the lead researcher, who was clearly non-partisan, bolstered the quality of the data.
17This is also often called a before-after design or a two-stage panel.
18Sircar (2014) shows that, in general, randomized experiments cannot retrieve the saturated effect in
the presence of spillovers. In particular, under spillovers, the outcome of any unit is dependent upon the
treatment status of every other unit. Since a randomized experiment necessarily only treats some subset of
the population, the average saturated effect cannot be retrieved from such a design. By contrast, the average
saturated effect is retrieved by a randomized experiment when there are no spillovers over the network.
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interest. Technically speaking, however, causal attribution in this context can only be given
to the entire period between the two measurements, e.g., the campaign period, but not the
components, or interventions, within that period, e.g., media exposure, clientelistic appeals
(Campbell and Ross, 1968). Thus, we do not typically want to claim that a measurement
between two points in time constitutes a “causal” measurement. At the same time, focusing
on the measured difference over a period may provide meaningful, interpretable effects.
Brady et al. (2006) make the distinction between potential campaign effects and actual
campaign effects. Political campaigns are a function of party workers and leaders making
strategic decisions over a portfolio of strategies about how to maximize popular support, as
well as strategic decisions by voters on the consumption of various campaign appeals. For
instance, party functionaries might believe that it is best to make clientelistic appeals to
the impoverished and ideological appeals to professionals. Unfortunately, such decisions are
unknown to the researcher, and attempts to directly manipulate a campaign will necessarily
fail to account for such decisions.19
Potential effects refer to those types of effects that are measured under a controlled
scenario that excludes some realistic conditions, such as the personal agency of those creating
and those consuming the campaign. These are the types of effects that are measured in
randomized control trials and lab experiments, and they are valuable for isolating the effects
of a certain intervention, like a message or advertisement during a campaign. In contrast,
actual effects refer to those types of effects that do not compromise realistic conditions for
the campaign, as in longitudinal studies such as a pre-post design. While the changes in
a pre-post design can be attributed to the campaign period, it is typically not possible to
deduce the causal effect of individual components of the campaign period because the type
and magnitude of campaign exposure are not held constant across the population. In this
paper, the phrase “campaign effect” will refer to such pre-post changes, not the causal effect.
In this paper, campaign behavior is envisioned as the equilibrium of strategic behavior of
19Although it is common to use the phrase “campaign experiment,” such randomized experiments actually
manipulate a single piece of information, not entire campaigns which are a mixture of various strategically
determined appeals (Wantchekon, 2003).
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families and political actors, the sort of effect that cannot be measured with explicit researcher
manipulation. In this context, the influence of a kinship network in a pre-post design over the
campaign period have an intuitive interpretation–how equilibrium campaign behavior varies
within and across kinship networks over time.
Isolating the Influence of Kinship Network
When political parties execute electoral campaigns, they often target families. When an
individual is the target of a campaign, it is often likely that another person in her personal or
social network will also be targeted. Furthermore, individuals in the same social network share
information, discuss politics, and, perhaps, even coordinate voting behavior. Consequently,
the net effect of a campaign is much more than being directly targeted by a campaign. In
this context, empirically meaningful estimates of campaign effects on any outcome need to
account for spillovers and information spreading in a social network, as well as common
exposures to the campaign. In this paper, the structure of the kinship network is accounted
for using a network autoregressive structure, as detailed below.
Many network studies explicitly deduce claims from correlations over the network, which
has been criticized for having poor identification of causal effects (Lyons (2011)). In partic-
ular, social relations are often a function of the outcome of interest and vice versa,20 causing
serious endogeneity concerns in the estimates. The most difficult aspect of estimating the
effect of a social network upon any outcome of interest is “reverse causality,” the fear that the
outcome of interest or variables strongly correlated to the outcome of interest will be respon-
sible for the structure of the network. In order to address the concern of reverse causality,
this design isolates the effects over a campaign period. One can then investigate how the
campaign effects differ across a kinship network that stays fixed over the campaign period.
In other words, by limiting inferences to campaign effects, this design isolates the influence
an existing kinship structure has upon the outcome of interest.21
20As an example, similarity in political beliefs between spouses may be due to the fact that spouses discuss
politics with each other or because individuals with similar political attitudes tend to marry each other.
21It is important to note that these estimated influences are not the same as causal effects. In particular,
there is no claim about how manipulating the kinship network affects the outcome of interest. Rather, the
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Network-based analyses require an estimate of the effect (of the campaign period) for
each individual in the network since network heterogeneity occurs at the level of the individ-
ual. The difference between the post-test and a lagged pre-test outcome at the level of the
individual provides such as estimate.22 Other common designs, like the rolling cross sections,
regression discontinuities, or randomized experiments, provide evidence for average effects at
the aggregate level, not the individual level. Accordingly, none of these other methods can
easily accommodate the estimation of the effect of spillovers over the entire network.
4.4.2 Campaign Effects on Vote Choice
The data in this paper result from votes collected according to the protocol described in the
previous section. The analysis is restricted to individuals who reported casting a vote for
either CPM or the TMC/Congress alliance (henceforth, TMC) in order to conduct meaningful
before/after analyses with a binary variable. After making these restrictions on the data,
there were 837 usable individuals for the analysis in Ranjanpur and 257 usable individuals
in Chaandinagar.
In each village, campaign period yields a 10% increase in vote share for TMC. In Ranjan-
pur, the vote share for TMC jumps from 54% to 64% (from 451 to 535 of 837 voters), and in
Chaandinagar the vote share jumps from 68% to 78% (from 175 to 200 of 257 voters). Both
of these positive jumps in vote share are highly significant (p < 0.01) under the Wilcoxon
sign test for paired data. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display the cross-table of vote shares for CPM
and TMC in the pre-campaign and post-campaign phases in the two villages.
To the casual observer, a ten percentage point swing may seem quite high, but “band-
wagon effects” are known to be quite strong in India. This a function of the political coor-
dination discussed in section 4.2. For instance, using a geographic discontinuity design and
election results, Patnam (2013) finds that surprises in exit poll data yields a twenty per-
kinship network is treated as a “pre-campaign” variable, and the approach detects how particular campaign
effects vary across the kinship network. This is a standard technique for isolating the effects of structural or
identity-based variables on an outcome of interest, e.g., the effect of gender on the success of a job-training
program.
22The lagged effect is required because the pre-test outcome may not perfectly predict the post-test outcome.
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CPM 233 153 386
TMC 69 382 451
302 535




CPM 44 38 82
TMC 13 162 175
57 200
Table 4.2: Chaandinagar Votes
centage point increase in support for the winning party. Presumably, the effect is smaller in
this sample because there was some awareness among the population that TMC would win
the election. Furthermore, the data show that a significant share (especially in Ranjanpur)
actually switched their vote to the losing party. The magnitude and direction of the effects,
combined with the design, provide strong evidence for believable measurements for the vote
choice data. Overall, there is strong evidence of a sizable vote swing towards the winning
party (TMC) over the campaign period.
4.4.3 Campaign Effects on Opinion
The opinion data in this paper consists of “ideal points” generated from a 2-parameter Rasch
model. The ideal points are generated from the following 7 questions (all as agree/disagree
questions) that were asked before and after the campaign. The incumbent government refers
to the then outgoing CPM government:
• P1. The incumbent government of West Bengal has not attempted to create job for
Muslims.
• P2. The incumbent government has not been very focused on developing industry.
• P3. It was inappropriate for the incumbent government to take land from farmers in
Singur and Nandigram.
• P4. Mamata Banerjee has a plan for the land in Singur.
• P5. The incumbent government has explicitly attempted to take land from Muslims.
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• P6. It is inappropriate to build the “Salim Rasta.”
• P7. The incumbent (CPM) government hasn’t done anything over the last 34 years.
Several points are worth noting about the list of statements above. First, the questions
have been transformed from a 4-point scale. Second, the questions listed have been trans-
formed from the original question so that they all have the same orientation (agreement
would be consistent with the position of TMC), which is required for the estimation of ideal
points. Finally, the questions were chosen to be closely tied to prominent campaign issues
over which the CPM and TMC disagreed during the election. The issues were tethered to
partisanship for three reasons: a) partisanship is highly salient in West Bengal, b) connection
to partisanship makes ideal points over a single dimension more likely, and c) partisan issues
allow for assessment of the consistency between issue preference and vote choice. Further-
more, in order to determine campaign effects, it is important to investigate the issues that
were explicitly discussed during the campaign.23 Figure 4.1 displays the overall proportion
supporting each of the issues before and after the campaign. In each case, the data were
restricted to the voter sample constructed above for those who gave a preference on at least
one of the issues, P1-P7, in both pre-campaign and post-campaign phases. This yields 243
respondents in Chaandinagar and 817 in Ranjanpur.
A couple of things are worth noting after looking at figure 4.1. There seems to be a
broad movement towards TMC-oriented opinions from the pre-campaign phase to the post-
campaign phase. However, there is some variance in the extent of movement, as P6 and
P7 actually move in the CPM direction in Chaandinagar, and P5 doesn’t move much in
Ranjanpur. This suggests that there is some variation in the movement of opinions across
separate issues and geography; more importantly, it shows that movement in vote choice
doesn’t map cleanly on to movement in opinions.
23Each of the statements above referred to a major local campaign issue. In particular, the incumbent
(CPM) government was criticized for four things: a) poor treatment of Muslims, b) problematic land grab
policies for industry (particularly in Singur and Nandigram), c) inability to execute or support of controversial
industrial policies, and d) malfeasance during its time in government. Under these guidelines, most of the
statements above should be self-explanatory, except for P6. “Salim Rasta” refers to a controversial proposed
highway to be built by the Salim Group of Indonesia under the direction of the incumbent government, which
required land from the villages under study.
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Figure 4.1 displays the the proportion of respondents supporting each of the of the issues, P1 to P7, before
and after the campaign period
Ideal Point Estimation of Opinion
In this paper, a 2-parameter Rasch model was used to estimate ideal points. Many scholars
advocate fitting a 3-parameter model, including what is often called a “discrimination pa-
rameter,” which puts different weights on the salience of the issues (Jackman, 2001). In the
2-parameter model, each issue is given a position on the issue spectrum, but the issues have
identical weight in the estimation. In this model, one end of the spectrum will correspond
to views consistent with the positions of the TMC, and the other end will be consistent with
the positions of the CPM. Unfortunately, the 3-parameter model generally requires strong
prior beliefs about the ideological position of each issue which is avoided since there are only
7 questions. The benefit of fitting the 2-parameter model is that it can be fit fairly quickly
without strong assumptions on the parameters.
After each issue is placed on the issue spectrum, the model estimates the probability that
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an individual will agree with the statement (P1 through P7). The higher the probability
of agreeing with the statement, the more the individual will be placed towards the TMC
side of the issue spectrum. People who agree with positions where very few people agree
with the TMC position on the issue will be placed further to the TMC side of the issue
spectrum. Finally, in order to estimate the model over two periods, before and after the
campaign, underlying position of any given issue does not change over the study period (a
fairly reasonable assumption given the short window of the study). Let yik be the response
(agree/disagree) of person i ∈ {1, . . . , n} on issue k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The standard 2-parameter
Rasch model estimates:
P (yik = 1) = logit
−1(αi − βk) (4.4.1)
where αi denotes the ideal point of person i and βk denotes the position of issue k on the issue
spectrum. Notice, however, that the model is not identified since one can add a constant
to αi and subtract it from βk. Normally, as is done here, the expected value of αi is set
to 0 to keep the model identified. Now consider issue beliefs in both the pre-campaign and
post-campaign phases. Let yikt denote the value of yik in period t ∈ {0, 1}. There is now a
second problem for the analysis. In order to deduce changes in issue beliefs, the changes must
occur with respect to the “same” issues. Thus, one must freeze the βk terms across t = 0
and t = 1 and estimate separate ideal points, αi0 and αi1. To estimate the model, essentially
αi0 and αi1 are treated as ideal points for two separate individuals. However, this form of
estimation permits the ability to compare changes from αi0 to αi1. The entire 2-parameter
Rasch model across the pre and post periods may now be written over a population of n
persons in periods t ∈ {0, 1}:
P (yikt = 1) = logit
−1(αit − βk) (4.4.2)
where
αit ∼ N(0, σ2α); βk ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
Finally, in order create an interpretable dimension for the analysis, the ideal points (opin-
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ions) are formed as αitσα , where α denotes the entire vector of pre-campaign and post-campaign
ideal points. The opinions can be interpreted on a dimension with mean/median 0 and stan-
dard deviation 1. Comparing the mean opinion of two subgroups of the populations provides
information about relative distance in beliefs between the two groups, where the difference
in means can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations over the entire distribution of
opinions. The models are fit separately for each village due to difference in salience of the
issues (e.g., Muslim issues) across the two villages.
The estimated ideal points in the post-campaign phase are plotted against the vote choice
in the post-campaign phase in figure 4.2. The clustering at various points is due to the fact
that there are only seven items in the model, and many respondents answer the questions
in an identical fashion. As mentioned above, this ideological dimension is expected to be
tied to partisan difference, and this is borne out in the figure. The red ideal points denote
CPM voters, and the green ideal points denote TMC voters. In Ranjanpur, a CPM voter
has a mean ideal point of -0.21, and TMC voter has a mean ideal point of 0.36, so shifting
from CPM to TMC yields an increase of 0.57 standard deviations on the ideological scale. In
Chaandinagar, the effects are much smaller, where the mean CPM voter has an ideal point
of -0.09 and the mean TMC voter has a ideal point of 0.08, suggesting that a switch from
CPM to TMC predicts a movement 0.17 standard deviations on the ideological scale. The
Mann-Whitney test yields p < 0.01 for each of these differences.





Figure 4.2 displays the estimated ideal points in the post-camapaign phase on a single dimension, with red
points denoting those who voted for CPM and green points denoting those who voted for TMC. There is a
strong statistically significant relationship between vote choice and position on the “ideological spectrum”
in both villages, suggesting validity for the constructed ideal points. In Ranjanpur in the post-campaign
phase, the mean CPM supporter’s ideal point is -0.21, and the mean TMC supporter’s ideal point is 0.36.
In Chaandinagar in the post-campaign phase, the mean CPM supporter’s ideal point is -0.09, and the mean
TMC supporter’s ideal point is 0.08.
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A similar pattern is seen in the difference between pre-campaign and post-campaign mea-
surement of opinions in the two villages. In Ranjanpur, the mean ideal point in the popu-
lation increases from -0.15 in the pre-campaign phase to 0.15 in the post-campaign phase,
with p < 0.01 according to WIlcoxon sign test with paired data. In Chaandinagar, the mean
ideal point in the population increases from -0.05 in the pre-campaign phase to 0.04 in the
post-campaign phase, with p < 0.05 according to the Wilcoxon sign test with paired data.
This suggests that the campaign has strong effects on opinion formation as well. Figure 4.3








Table 4.3: Estimated Campaign Effects for Vote Choice and Opinion by Village
Figure 4.3 displays the differences in estimates for vote choice and ideal points by village for the pre-
campaign and post-campaign phases. P-values estimated from a Wilcoxon sign test with paired data are
given in parentheses.
This section demonstrates that villages under study experience fairly large shift in vote
choice over the campaign period, as well as an associated shift in political opinions. This
suggests that ultimately campaigns may have considerable effects on voter behavior, both in
vote choice and in ideological opinions, in rural India. The movement of ideological opinions
suggests that more than quid pro quo type politics is at play.
4.5 The Influence of Kinship Networks on Vote and Opinion
Change
This section investigates the role of kinship networks in the campaign effects deduced in
the previous section. In particular, the focus of the section is to deduce an interpretable
estimation strategy to understand the changes in vote choice and opinions over the campaign
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as a function of the kinship network. This section demonstrates that kinship networks have
a strong, discernible impact on these changes over the campaign.
4.5.1 Measuring Kinship Networks
The sample population for this study is the set of individuals on the official voter lists of the
polling booths corresponding to the villages of study. Voter lists are available online from the
Elections Commission of India (ECI). An individual is eligible to be registered to vote once
he/she reaches the age of 18. Since the voter ID card is the principal form of identification in
India (e.g., which is used for proof of identification for mobile sim card), almost all eligible
individuals were registered to vote in the villages studied.24 The voter list is a good source
for the (patriarchal) family network, as each entry includes a family relationship, usually the
father for males and unmarried daughters and spouse for women who have married into the
village. This provides enough information to generate a family network consisting of spouses,
siblings, and parents/children. In this study, a link was formed between two individuals in
the kinship network if they were siblings, married, or the parent/child of the other individual.
Figure ?? displays an entry from the voter list with identifying information redacted.
Figure 4.3: Estimated Campaign Effect on TMC Vote Share
Figure ?? shows an example of an entry in the voter list with kinship (and other) information.
In Ranjanpur, there are 731 unique pairs of individuals with a link (dyads) over 837
24However, these lists are often inaccurate, including names of deceased and people who no longer live in
the village (most commonly due to marriage). In India, the voter ID card is generally used as a basic form of
identification, much like a driver’s license in the United States, and as such, people may hold on to voter ID
cards to the village, even if they no longer reside there. The initial phase of the study involved vetting the
village for residence.
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individuals satisfying the voting criterion. In Chaandinagar, there are 172 unique pairs of
individuals with a link over 257 individuals. The number of links in the network emanating
from and individual is typically referred to as the degree of the individual. In Ranjanpur,
the average degree is 1.75, and, among those individuals with at least one link, the average
degree is 2.28. In Chaandinagar, the average degree is 1.34, and, among those individuals
with at least one link, the average degree is 1.80. In short, the network sample drawn in
Ranjanpur represents more dense kinship relations than in Chaandinagar.
4.5.2 The Relationship between Kinship Networks and Post-Campaign
Measures
This subsection demonstrates the existence of an association between kinship and vote choice
and political opinions. In figures 4.4 and 4.5, the kinship networks in Ranjanpur and Chaan-
dinagar are displayed by vote choice and ideal points, respectively. In each figure, estimates
of Moran’s I, a standard measure of “network autocorrelation,” is calculated for the post-
campaign vote choice and ideal points.
Consider a network characterized by an adjacency matrix, A, such that the entry Aij = 1
if there exists a link between i and j, and 0 otherwise. Let W , with entries Wij be the
row-standardized weight matrix calculated from A. That is, the terms Aij are divided by the
degree of i (if more than 0) so that rows of W sum to 1. In essence, W provides weights over
the network to ensure that those individuals with many links do not have disproportionate
influence on the constructed measure. For a population of n individuals and outcome yi for









j∈V Wij(yi − y)(yj − y)∑
i∈V (yi − y)2
(4.5.1)
where y is the mean of the yi values.
Moran’s I is defined over those individuals who have positive degree (i.e., only over in-
dividuals with links). Under these restrictions, the measure is constrained to be between -1
and 1, resulting in its interpretation as a correlation. The estimated Moran’s I for figures 4.4
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and 4.5 suggest significant network autocorrelation for vote choice and political opinions.
However, this kinship network relationship can be difficult to interpret. It is not clear
that the network relationship has anything to do with campaign effects or opinion formation.
It may occur due to the fact that those with common kinship start with similar political
opinions, as discussed in section 3. In order to separate out the effects for initial vote choice
and opinions, the rest of the section describes a technique to deduce vote and opinion change
during the campaign over a kinship network.
Figure 4.4: Post-Campaign Vote Choice over the Kinship Network
(a) Ranjanpur: I = 0.33 (b) Chaandinagar: I = 0.17
Figure 4.4 displays the vote choice of respondents overlaid on to the kinship network. In the subfigures,
a red vertex denotes an individual who reported voting fro CPM, and a green vertex an individual who
reported voting for TMC. In both villages, a significant amount of correlation in behavior is observed over
the network.
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Figure 4.5: Post-Campaign Ideal Points over the Kinship Network
-1.67 1.64
(a) Ranjanpur: I = 0.24
-0.66 0.74
(b) Chaandinagar: I = 0.18
Figure 4.5 displays the ideal points of respondents overlaid on to the kinship network. In the subfigures, the
color of the vertex denotes (more red or more green) denotes the extent to which the respondent held views
more consistent the CPM or TMC positions on the ideological scale. In both villages, a significant amount
of correlation in behavior is observed over the network.
4.5.3 A Simple Model of Network Influence and Opinion Change
Consider a population of n individuals arranged over a (kinship) network, G = (V,E), where
V (with |V | = n) denotes the set of individuals over the network, and E ⊂ V × V consists
of pairs of individuals that share an undirected link25 in the network, i.e., direct family ties.
Let yit ∈ R denote the opinion on a particular unidimensional issue for individual i ∈ G in
time period t ∈ {0, 1}.
The model presented here describes a general process where individuals who share family
ties may influence each other. To develop some intuition, consider the impact of a family
member j on individual i and vice versa, that is, (i, j), (j, i) ∈ E. Individuals i and j
initially have opinions yi0 and yj0, respectively. They engage in a discussion, and reformulate
opinions. Between t = 0 and t = 1, individuals update opinions due to personal characteristics
(unrelated to family members), as well as due to the influence of the other family member.
When there is no influence of the family link, an individual i updates opinions as a function of
25Formally, this implies that if (i, j) ∈ E, then (j, i) ∈ E.
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characteristics outside of initial opinion, τi ∈ R, and relevance of the initial opinion, θi ∈ R,26
for future opinion. Therefore, yi1 = θiyi0 + τi. On the other hand if i is fully convinced by
opinion of family member j in period 1, then yi1 = yj1. In reality, however, the influence of
a family member is somewhere in between these two extremes:
yi1 = γijyj1 + (1− γij)(θiyi0 + τi) (4.5.2)
yj1 = γjiyi1 + (1− γji)(θjyj0 + τj)
γij , γji ∈ [0, 1]; θi, θj , τi, τj ∈ R
The magnitude of γij is a measure of how much influence j has upon i. While this works well
for two connected individuals, the analysis requires a method to characterize the expected
impact of a family member to an individual over the entire kinship network. Accordingly, the
model considers a natural generalization of the process described in equation 4.5.2 to develop
a meaningful parameter of interest. For each individual i, j is a family member if it is in the
set N(i), the neighborhood of i, i.e., j ∈ N(i) implies (i, j), (j, i) ∈ E. The cardinality of the
neighborhood, |N(i)| = δi, is called the degree of i. Once an individual i has many neighbors,
one must also consider the relative importance of each family member upon the opinions of
i. The captures the fact that j might be quite influential for i in isolation, but when in the
context of other family members trying to influence i, j may not carry the importance to
influence i heavily in her direction. Let φij denote the relative importance of j to i. The





φijγijyj1 + φij(1− γij)(θiyi0 + τi);
∑
j∈N(i)
φij = 1, φij ∈ [0, 1] (4.5.3)
Since the goal of the model is to characterize the expected contribution of family member
26Intuitively, if the magnitude of θi is small, then the initial opinion matters little for future opinion. If,
however, θi is large and positive, then moving from t = 0 to t = 1 causes the individual to become more
extreme in her opinion.
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j to individual i, it will be useful to define three parameters: 1) the relative influence of
family member j on individual i – ρij ; 2) the expected relative influence of a family member
on individual i – ρi; and 3) the expected relative influence of family members on individuals
in the population – ρ. In this analysis, ρ is the parameter of interest. The three parameters
are defined formally below:













Each of the parameters defined above is constrained to be in the interval [0, 1]. The
relative influence of family member j to individual i, ρij , has an intuitive interpretation. It
is the fraction of the distance j moves i’s uninfluenced opinion in period 1, θiyi0 + τi, towards
j’s opinion in period 1 (controlling for the relative influence of other family members), and
ρi is simply the aggregate influence of the family. The parameter of interest, ρ, is simply the
average of these aggregate influences from one’s direct kinship linkages.
Regression Framework
It can now be show that the parameter of interest ρ may be readily estimated through a
network autoregressive regression model. To see this, let Ei denote the expectation function
across individuals, and let EN(i) denote the expectation across the neighborhood of i. Since
opinions in t = 0 and t = 1 are taken to be observed data, the expectation function is taken
conditional upon these values. Taking the conditional expectation, Ei[EN(i)(.)]|y0i, y1i, on






yj1 + Ei[EN(i)(θiφij(1− γij))]yi0 + Ei[EN(i)((1− γij)τi)]
(4.5.7)
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Letting Ei[EN(i)((1−γij)τi)] = α and Ei[EN(i)(θiφij(1−γij))] = β and simplifying yields:





yj1 + βyi0 + α (4.5.8)
In matrix form, this equation becomes:
y1 = ρWy1 + βy0 + α (4.5.9)





if j ∈ N(i)
0 if j /∈ N(i)
The regression form demonstrates a classic endogeneity problem, since the dependent
variable y1 can also be seen on the right side of the equation. Furthermore, the error structure
across family members may be very complicated. The trick is to solving these issues is to
notice that equation 4.5.9 rewritten by subtracting the first term from both sides:
(I− ρW)y1 = βy0 + α (4.5.10)
where I is the identity matrix.
One may now run the associated regression (with normally distributed errors) with the
transformed dependent variable on the left side with unknown parameters ρ, α, β:
y1(I− ρW) ∼ N(βy0 + α, σ2) (4.5.11)
⇒ y1 ∼ N((I− ρW)−1(βy0 + α), [(I− ρW)′(I− ρW)]−1σ2)
The parameters may be estimated through maximum likelihood estimation. Details on
the relative speed and quality of estimation in a maximum likelihood setting for network
(spatial) autoregressive regression, vis-a-vis other estimation techniques, may be found in
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Franzese and Hays (2008). Causal interpretations of ρ hinge upon the links of the network
being independent of underlying individual-level characteristics, which is certainly untrue in
most cases.27 The inclusion of y0 as a predictor guarantees ρ isolates the expected influence
of a family relation on the change in opinion; that is, the estimated influence is not due to
correlation in initial opinions between family members. Thus, one can interpret ρ as the
expected influence of a family relation on changes in opinions in the population over a fixed
time period.
4.5.4 Results
The network autoregressive regression model described above was fit to the data in Ranjanpur
and Chaandinagar. In particular, the post-campaign vote for TMC and the ideal points
estimated post-campaign from the Rasch model were taken as dependent variables, with the
pre-campaign vote for TMC and ideal points taken as predictors corresponding to the initial
political opinion for the regression form in equation 4.5.11. The models were fit in the R
statistical environment, using the lnam function in the sna package. The estimated ρ term
from each regression is displayed below.
Figure 4.6: Value of ρ for Vote Choice






Figures 4.6 and 4.7 display estimates for the ρ for the vote choice and ideal point re-
27In a setting where the links are drawn with probabilities that are not a function of individual characteristics
(e.g., the Erdos-Renyi model), the ρ parameter would provide a causal estimate for spillover effect of moving
from a null network (no links) to the generated network. This is one general way to deduce the causal impact
of the links in a network. Intriguingly, this approach does not require observation of each counterfactual or
the randomization probabilities.
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Figure 4.7: Value of ρ for Ideal Points






Figures 4.6 and 4.7 display the estimated ρ for vote choice and ideal points by village with 90% confidence
bounds simulated from the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters (inverse of
the Fisher information matrix).
gressions in each of the villages. The estimates are displayed with 90% confidence bounds
simulated from the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for the estimated parameters (us-
ing the inverse of the Fisher information matrix). The data suggest a very strong kinship
network effect on both vote choice an political opinions. In Chaandinagar, moving from a
situation where one’s kinship linkages completely support the CPM to a situation where one’s
linkages completely support the TMC predicts a 9% increase in the probability of voting for
TMC, and Ranjanpur displays a stronger effect with such a change predicting a 17% increase
in the probability of voting for TMC. By contrast, the models yield changes of similar mag-
nitude with respect to opinions. In Chaandinagar, changing the average ideal point of one’s
kinship linkages by one standard deviation yields a 0.08 standard deviation movement in ideal
points in the same direction; in Ranjanpur, this movement yields a 0.10 standard deviation
movement in the same direction. These data suggest strong kinship network effects upon
changes in both political opinions and vote choice over the campaign. This demonstrates
that kinship networks play an information role in addition to a strategic coordination role for
votes, which suggests kinship networks do more than merely engage in material exchange.
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4.6 Explaining Kinship Network Effects
This section demonstrates that the observed kinship network effects can be explained by
political discussion and coordination within the family. In particular, a majority of respon-
dents report political discussion and coordination within the family for vote choice, and an
overwhelming percentage of respondents describe family as the most important influence vis-
à-vis other prominent sources of political influence. One of the difficulties in interpreting the
impact of kinship networks is that the observed effects may be due to other factors correlated
to kinship. This section shows that the results are robust to controlling for other prominent
explanations of political influence such as media exposure, associational life, and promises of
benefits, as well as relevant demographic factors such as age and gender.
4.6.1 Political Discussion and Coordination within the Family
The survey evidence in the villages of study confirms the idea that political discussion and
coordination within the value drives observed effect of kinship networks. In the post-campaign
phase, respondents were asked the following questions:
• C1. Did your family have a discussion regarding the vote (i.e., about vote choice)?
• C2. Did your family decide who to vote for together?
Figure 4.8 displays the proportion of respondents in each of the two villages who reported
engaging in political discussion within the family for vote choice (C1) and explicit family-level
coordination of vote choice (C2). The vast majority of villagers report engaging in each of
these behaviors. In addition to political discussion which may be necessary for information
pooling, families tend to engage in explicit coordination of vote choice. These data suggest
that families play a crucial role in observable political outcomes. While this speaks to the
prevalence of family influence, it does not say anything prominence or importance of family
influence.
In order to address the relative importance family influence vis-à-vis other prominent
influences on individuals, respondents were asked the most influential information source
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Figure 4.8 displays the proportion of villagers in Ranjanpur and Chaandinagar who engage in family discus-
sion and explicit family coordination of vote choice.
for vote choice between family, friends, newspapers, and television news. The results are













In both villages, family is the overwhelmingly prominent source of political influence. The
data also point to increasingly important role for television news in political decision-making.
Finally, there is evidence that individuals rely more on kinship networks in Ranjanpur and
compared the Chaandinagar.
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4.6.2 Kinship Network vs. Other Prominent Political Influences
The subsection above shows that respondents attribute the strength of their kinship effects
to political discussion and explicit political coordination. Nonetheless, it is possible that
the observed effect is due correlation at the family level of other prominent explanations of
change in preferences over a campaign. This subsection looks at ρ controlling for prominent
sources of influence, namely media, promises of benefits, and associational life, as well as
demographic factors of gender and age.28 The prominent types of influence considered in this
analysis are:
• Media. As mentioned above, the Columbia School did not believe media effects to be
strong, the so-called minimal effects hypothesis, due to the capacity of individuals to
select their own personal networks who reinforce their opinions. Since then, there is
some concrete evidence of media effects on political opinions, even in the United States
(Vavreck, 2001; Gerber et al., 2006; Vavreck, 2009), which has been critical of the
Columbia School. Since family members are likely to access similar sources of media,
and have similar effects from the media, this may affect the level of kinship effects.
• Associational Life. The impact of social capital and “associations” in a robust civil
society and democratic behavior has been well-documented (Putnam, 1993). At the
same time, Chhibber (2001) has argued that Indian democracy survives with fewer
associations among its citizens. To the extent that associations matter in Bengali
villages, they are reflected in the social clubs, which are often partisan in nature. Once
again, attendance at social clubs is correlated with the kinship network, although it is
typically restricted to men.
• Promises of Benefits. As described earlier, a major literature focuses on the im-
portance of clientelism and patronage in the Indian system (Chandra, 2004; Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007). These promises are expected to be correlated over the kinship
network, especially since political actors often target several family members.
28Note there is no variation at the household level on social class or identity in this type of data.
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The data on media (whether the respondent watches news on television or reads the news-
paper) and associational life (whether the respondent attends a social club) were collected in
the pre-campaign phase to prevent biases in response. The data on promises were collected
from the following question: ”Before the vote, did any party (do not name the party) make
promises for personal benefits to you in order to get your vote?”29 The relative proportions
experiencing each type of influence is displayed in figure 4.9.







































































Two categories of predictors were fit to the (saturated) network autoregressive model:
• Influence. Pre-campaign ideal point/vote choice, media, associational life, promises
(and all higher order interactions)
• Demographic. Pre-campaign ideal point/vote choice, gender, age (and all higher
order interactions)
Saturated models are fit to purposely overfit the data and provide more conservative
estimates of ρ. The results in figure 4.10 show that the value of ρ remains remarkably
consistent over all models, suggesting a very robust result.
29The explicit instruction to not name a political actor was done to create incentives for truthful reporting.
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Figure 4.10: Estimates of ρ for Vote Choice and Opinion Under Various Models



















(a) Estimated ρ for Vote Choice



















(b) Estimated ρ for Ideal Points
Baseline Influence Demographics Influence + Demographics
Figure 4.1 displays the estimated ρ for vote choice and ideal points by village with 90% confidence bounds
simulated from the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters (inverse of the Fisher
information matrix).
The survey evidence in this section suggests that the influence of kinship networks is due
to family-level discussion and political coordination. Even when controlling these for other
prominent sources of political influence, one finds similar magnitudes of kinship influence in
vote choice and opinion change, suggesting that the lion’s share of kinship network influences
can be attributed to political discussion and political coordination.
For much of this paper, the data have been presented side-by-side. From a purely quanti-
tative point of view, two cases are insufficient to draw larger trends from the data. However,
one can start generating hypotheses from the data presented here alongside qualitative obser-
vation. It was noted that the average degree of the individuals sampled in Chaandinagar was
lower than that of Ranjanpur. This corresponds to qualitative observation which suggested
that social networks in Chaandinagar were less dense than in Ranjanpur.
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Chaandinagar broadly does better on all socioeconomic metrics than Ranjanpur. Given
the importance of kinship networks, and social networks more generally, for mitigating risk,
one might assume the that both network density and the importance of networks for coop-
eration should be lower in Chaandinagar. While the movement in political opinions are not
directly comparable, it does seem that there is little difference in kinship networks on polit-
ical opinions when measuring in movement according to standard deviations. However, the
magnitude of the changes in vote choice is much greater in Ranjanpur than in Chaandinagar.
Kinship networks in Ranjanpur play a greater role in the coordination of votes, as compared
to Chaandinagar, suggesting variation in the importance of networks in coordination of vote
choice. Two related hypotheses result from these observations: 1) the density of personal
networks leads to increased reliance on such networks for coordinating voter behavior; and
2) lower reliance on kinship networks for risk mitigation (due to wealth) leads to lower levels
of coordination in vote choice over the kinship network.
4.7 Conclusion
Using data from two villages in the Indian state of West Bengal, this paper demonstrates that
kinship networks have a strong impact on the formation of political preferences through infor-
mation pooling of salient issues, political discussion and explicit coordination of the political
behavior. Kinship networks affect more than just vote choice, they also affect ideological
positions. This suggests that families are engaging in more than just quid pro quo politics
with politicians.
A novel approach that juxtaposes qualitative observation at the local-level with micro-
level data collection provides strong evidence for the mechanisms proposed. This paper
develops an entire empirical strategy to deduce personal network effects on opinion change
by integrating longitudinal data over a fixed network with measurement of political opinions
through vote choice and ideal point estimation. It is also shown that a network autoregres-
sive model assessing the impact of kinship networks on political preference change can be
interpreted from a general decision-theoretic process.
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4.7.1 Implications
There are several implications of this study for the future analysis of political behavior in a
democratic developing world context. First and foremost, this paper demonstrates that social
structures may address concerns associated with low information and weak state capacity in
developing societies. This shows how democracy can thrive even in contexts where commonly
believed requisites for a robust democracy, such as urbanization, economic development, and
high levels of education, are absent. In particular, kinship networks can allow voters to reason
through disparate pieces of information in order to make informed choices, while coordination
of voting behavior across the kinship network maximizes the impact of the political decision.
A voter who does not have sufficient information, or the capacity, to make reasoned
political decisions is vulnerable to manipulation from other political actors. In this way, the
kinship network protects a voter and her independence from pressures from above, much like
the kinship network helps mitigate consumption shocks in poor, rural settings. While many
families may choose to publicly demonstrate their allegiances to a party in exchange for access
to state benefits, not all families behave this way. Many other families choose to keep their
allegiances private while still coordinating their vote choices. Coordinating vote choice within
the kinship network guarantees that the decision has maximum impact on the outcome of the
election. In fact, recent work in the Indian state of Rajasthan finds that local political leaders
are surprisingly poor at guessing the partisanship of their constituent voters (Schneider, 2014).
At the same time, in the same villages, Schneider and Sircar (2014) find that benefits flow
through partisanship when such co-partisan affiliation can be inferred by the political leader.
This suggests the coexistence of both the clientelistic and non-clientelistic strategies described
in this paper. Families can strategically choose to coordinate on a clientelistic strategy by
demonstrating their support for a party or a non-clientelistic strategy, and remain insulated
from the pressures above. In this sense, the kinship network approach constitutes a more
general approach to local political behavior that characterizes a fuller range of voter strategies
including information pooling, moving beyond simply clientelism or patronage.
One might be concerned about the generalizability of the results in this paper, given
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that the study was done in two villages. However, the importance and ubiquity of dense
kinship networks in developing rural societies is well established in both anthropology and
development economics. Unlike caste relations, which, in their form, is unique to South
Asia, and which even varies significantly in practice across Indian states, there is a certain
commonality across contexts in using kinship networks to mitigate risk. In that sense, this
paper addresses a mechanism that can easily be applied to other settings. However, without
explicit examinations in other contexts, it is too early to say the extent to which the results
here generalize across the developing world.
4.7.2 Hypothesis Generation
A comparison of the two cases also yields some hypotheses about how the results of this
paper might change as economic context and the density of kinship networks change. The
economic impact on kinship network effects can be disaggregated into two components, the
extent to which the kinship network is dependent upon the village economy and the extent to
which individuals are economically dependent upon the kinship network.30 Ceteris paribus,
as individuals become less economically dependent upon kinship or other personal networks,
one should expect the effect of such networks to decrease. The implications of economic
dependence of the kinship network on the village economy are more complicated. Tables 4.6
and 4.7 display the answer to the following question in the villages of study: In this election,










Table 4.7: Chaandinagar–Level for Vote
Despite being a state-level election, intriguingly very few respondents select the state/province
30Unfortunately, these cannot be easily disaggregated in the present study since kinship networks are both
less dependent on the village economy and individuals are less hooked into kinship networks in Chaandinagar
as compared to Ranjanpur.
154
CHAPTER 4. A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES: KINSHIP NETWORKS AND
PREFERENCE FORMATION IN RURAL INDIA
level as the most important level of development in the election. This suggests that there are
two modes of voters, those who view the state level as making demands to the central govern-
ment and those that view it as crucial for local development. The percentage of respondents
who answer the most local level to this question are a good proxy for the extent to which
kinship networks are hooked into the village economy because it characterizes the level at
which voters think about sociotropic (societal) issues. While the modal level of importance
is the village in both sites of study, a higher percentage of respondents in Ranjanpur are
hooked into the village economy, and kinship coordination effects are stronger in Ranjanpur.
At the same time, one may conceive of a countervailing force in that typically a voter will
have less information about higher levels as compared to the village level. Coordination over
a kinship network could result from increased importance of the information pooling function
of kinship networks.
One may also wonder what would occur if this study were conducted in an urban setting.
If the individual is less dependent upon the larger kinship network, as in the urban middle and
upper classes, one might expect voter behavior that is not too different than the Occident;
perhaps, kinship networks will have been replaced by friendship networks and online networks.
In poor urban areas such as slums, the answer becomes a bit more complex. Short-term
migration and questionable tenancy fundamentally fragments kinship networks. In many
cases, an urban worker will send remittances to his home village. It is exactly in this setting,
without a deep personal network, that individuals are most vulnerable politically. Looking
across the literature in highly urbanized countries, as in South America (Auyero, 2001; Stokes,
2005), or even studies of slums in India (Auerbach, 2013) one notices some common features,
in particular, the prominence of party machines in co-opting voters and access to the state.
A natural hypothesis in this setting is that it is precisely when voters are vulnerable with
weaker personal networks that strong party machines are more likely, even in an electorally
competitive setting.31
31While the CPM was dominant in rural West Bengal, it was not an electorally competitive setting. The





In this conclusion, I briefly touch upon my future agenda resulting from the three papers
included in this dissertation. Each paper constitutes a distinct line of research that may
spawn a number of papers. I wish to reflect on how a research agenda can be created from
these three papers.
5.1 On Rent Extraction and Efficient Allocation over Social
Networks
This paper creates a method for analyzing the allocation of goods when the units in a social
network may extract rents from the allocator. One of the existing challenges in game theory
has been the inclusion of social network structures. The “comparative statics” in this universe
are no longer a function of parameters, they are a function of network structure. As such,
many of the propositions address the effect of changing the structure, e.g., by adding a link.
There are two directions for future research in this game theoretic setting. The first
direction is to keep the basic structure of the model but to change the objectives of the
allocator. In the model presented in this dissertation, the allocator is required to target
every unit in the network. One may imagine that an allocator prefers to target as many
units as possible within a fixed budget constraint or a fixed number of units. Changing the
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objective function of the allocator is likely to create very different results.
A second direction for future research is to bring data to the problem. The natural place
to conduct such an analysis is in the provision of local public goods that have spillovers, like
schools. This would entail mapping out where spillovers from local public goods flow, and
the relative bargaining power of various localities in bargaining with the government.
5.2 Analyzing Randomized Experiments with Spillovers
The paper included in this dissertation is intended to be used as a guiding document for future
papers and research design. The paper shows that one can find non-parametric, causally-
identified estimates of quantities of interest when one considers the “social distance” between
the units of study. As of right now the project is heavy on abstraction and weaker on explicit
application of the ideas.
Two major agendas that will come out of this paper are: 1) clarifying the concept of social
distance; and 2) applying the method to data with spatial and network spillovers. While the
concept of social distance is formally defined in the paper, much more work needs to be done
on when the notion of social distance is practically usable. For instance, in spillovers over
online networks, it is natural to believe network distance will suffice as a social distance.
For any outcome that requires face-to-face contact, such as certain diseases, it is natural to
believe that geographic distance will suffice as a social distance. It will also be necessary to
develop practical heuristics for when such a candidate for social distance will not suffice for
the analysis.
The second agenda is to apply the method to existing data and apply it to new research
designs. As described in the paper, thinking about social distance in the design phase is
likely to yield major benefits in estimating causal effects after the study has been concluded.
The goals here are simple. The method will be applied to existing datasets to see whether
standards of causal identification were truly achieved, and to re-estimate effects. Furthermore,
the goal is to undertake a series of experiments which explicitly incorporate social distance
into the research design to demonstrate applicability of the method.
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5.3 A Tale of Two Villages: Kinship Networks and Preference
Formation in Rural India
This paper combined qualitative observation with a before-after study design to draw out
mechanisms in political preference formation in rural India. The study speaks to my inter-
ests in local political behavior in India. In particular, this paper shows how local kinship
networks process political information and coordinate political behavior. The data demands
for networks are often very high, and the world of “big data” such as online networks, is often
too large and confusing to draw out clean mechanisms. The techniques used in this paper
may be applied in a wide range of settings to deduce and understand network effects.
Future goals of the study include expanding the logic of the paper to urban areas and
state actors. While the analysis has been conducted in a rural setting, it would be advisable
to conduct a similar study in an urban setting in West Bengal where kinship networks are
likely more fragmented, but other personal networks may dominate social relations. The
natural next step in this study is to replicate in such an urban setting.
The paper made a number of claims about how voters interact with the state. However,
the state is missing in the data analysis. Along with Mark Schneider, I have developed a
set of techniques to cross-reference voter preferences and distributional preferences of local
political leaders. The goal is to apply similar methods in rural and urban settings in West
Bengal. Finally, it would be advisable to test these theories in other states in India, and
perhaps outside of India.
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Giné, X. and Mansuri, G. (2011). Together we will: Experimental evidence on female voting
behavior in pakistan. Unpublished.
Glass, J., Bengtson, V. L., and Dunham, C. C. (1986). Attitude similarity in three gen-
erational families: Socialization, status inheritance, or reciprocal influence? American
Sociological Review, 51:685–698.
161
Goyal, S. (2003). Learning in networks: a survey. In Demange, G. and Woooders, M., editors,
Group formation in economics: networks, clubs, and coalitions, pages 122–162. Cambridge
University Press.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology,
78(6):1360–1380.
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